

1910

JUBILEE ISSUE

1960

THE ROUND TABLE

Contents of Number 200

A MESSAGE FROM THE QUEEN



NINE VIEWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH

from

UNITED KINGDOM

CANADA

AUSTRALIA

NEW ZEALAND

SOUTH AFRICA

INDIA

PAKISTAN

CENTRAL AFRICA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

And Articles from Correspondents in

UNITED STATES UNITED KINGDOM IRELAND


PAKISTAN CANADA SOUTH AFRICA

NEW ZEALAND

September 1960

Price 7s. 6d.

By Air Mail Ten Shillings



THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

	PAGE
A Message from The Queen	334
The Commonwealth: A United Kingdom View	335
A Canadian View	341
An Australian View	349
A New Zealand View	358
A South African View	365
An Indian View	371
A View from Pakistan	378
A Central African View	385
A View from the United States	390
United States of America: The Presidential Campaign	395
United Kingdom: Home and Abroad	402
Ireland: Two Main Problems	412
Pakistan: The Constitution Commission	417
Canada: Legislating Against Time	421
South Africa: From Sharpeville to the Congo	425
New Zealand: A Testing Session	431

No. 200

September 1960

Price 7/6

By air mail 10/-

London: THE ROUND TABLE, LTD.

THE ROUND TABLE

Jubilee Issue 1960

The following messages have been sent and received

To Her Majesty The Queen, August 4, 1960:

The conductors of THE ROUND TABLE, subjects or citizens of many nations of the Commonwealth, whose evolution they have followed, and as they hope assisted, from the first year of King George V, desire on the occasion of their Jubilee issue to send to Your Majesty their heartfelt good wishes and prayers for long, happy and peaceful years as its Head.

The Editor

To the Editor, THE ROUND TABLE, August 5, 1960:

I am most grateful for the kind message of good wishes which you have sent me from the conductors of THE ROUND TABLE. Please convey my warm thanks to them all.

On the occasion of your Jubilee issue I send my congratulations to all concerned in the production of THE ROUND TABLE, and my best wishes to all its readers.

ELIZABETH R.

THE COMMONWEALTH: A UNITED KINGDOM VIEW

JUBILEE OF THE ROUND TABLE

THE ROUND TABLE shares its fiftieth anniversary with the Union of South Africa, not by coincidence but because it is the child of the Closer Union Societies through which in the years before 1910 the idea of the union of the four colonies was recommended to the South African people. The company of old colleagues who then founded THE ROUND TABLE had all been active in the Closer Union movement; some of them believed that the political theory on which their campaign in South Africa had been based provided the key to the main problems of the British Empire (for whose inner circle of adult nations they began to popularize the term "Commonwealth"); all of them wished to devote themselves to the serious study of those problems in the coming years. It would have saddened the founders—it does in fact sadden the few survivors—to know that the joint jubilee finds the Commonwealth seriously questioning whether South Africa, the mother country of the Round Table movement, can continue in membership at all; and that the anniversary year has seen economic war declared upon the Union by two sovereign members of the Commonwealth, Ghana and Malaya, whose existence as independent nations was scarcely dreamed of in 1910.

We live, however, in the Commonwealth of 1960; and it is this Commonwealth and its future that is analysed in this jubilee issue of THE ROUND TABLE by writers from many of its component States and from the friendly republic in North America. The most cursory perusal of their contributions will show a Commonwealth so entirely changed in composition and organization from the Empire of 1910 that the criteria for its assessment which were then axiomatic can no longer be applied. The principal founder of THE ROUND TABLE, Lionel Curtis, based his lifelong campaign for the "organic union" of the Commonwealth on the assumption that it ought to be invested with visible collective power sufficient to prevent the outbreak of world war. Not all of his colleagues agreed with the constitutional means he proposed—the issue between them was debated in these columns in 1948 and 1949—but they did not disclaim the end he believed that it would serve. Today, however, the Commonwealth has quite ceased to be a unit of power in the sense that Curtis postulated. "It is only possible", writes our Indian contributor, "for India to continue in the Commonwealth because to her it does not mean entanglements in foreign policy and defence." We still seek to preserve world peace by concentrations of unchallengeable force; but the Commonwealth is not one of them.

Nor is the Commonwealth of today fairly judged by the speculative test of its co-operation in case of either world war or a limited war in which one of its members might be concerned. Though, as the organic unionists constantly

pointed out, the cohesion of the Commonwealth under strain appeared so doubtful in time of peace that it was ineffective to deter an aggressor, its actual cohesion in 1914 and 1939 sufficed to secure survival and eventual victory. Fundamentally, what rallied the entire Commonwealth (except Ireland on the second occasion) to the combined war effort was the sense of blood relationship between those members of the Commonwealth which then had sovereign or (in 1914) near-sovereign governments. But the idea of a Commonwealth held together by community of blood was suspended in 1947, when India and Pakistan were given dominion status, and finally abandoned in 1949, when India was retained in membership after renouncing allegiance to the Throne. The latter date is the crucial turning point. It is remarked in these articles that the decision of 1949 was deprecated by a significant section of Australian opinion, and that its wisdom was questioned by the greatest statesman in the oversea Commonwealth, Jan Christiaan Smuts. But whether at that parting of the ways the right choice was made is not now relevant. We are concerned with the welfare of the Commonwealth as it has subsisted since 1949. The dream of all imperialism, of which Alexander was the originator and organic union was the last expression, that somehow a larger patriotism, perhaps symbolized by allegiance to a crowned personage, might transcend national rivalries—that exalted vision has perished for our time. The Commonwealth is not founded on community of blood. It is not organized for military commitment. It is as firmly rooted in the principle of national sovereignty as the outer world. It is a society of many races, among which the vast numerical preponderance is with those of darker skin. Its member states will pursue their separate policies, as much in war as in peace. Even actual hostilities between them are not inconceivable: blood has actually been shed on the frontiers of Kashmir, in an unresolved conflict which occupies a disturbingly prominent place in the thoughts on the Commonwealth of both our Indian and Pakistani contributors. It is from the qualities native to a Commonwealth of this character, and not from the different virtues of the system that came to an end in 1949, that hopes for the future must be derived. It is gratifying to find that our contributors, all of them fully conscious of the transformation that has come about and of the negation of once treasured aspirations that has to be accepted, are agreed that membership of the Commonwealth is valuable to their countries and in perceiving in the institution high possibilities—not always the same possibilities—of service to the future of the world.

The Commonwealth as a Bridge

THE determining feature of the present Commonwealth, and its principal point of contrast with the Commonwealth of the past, is its multi-racial character. It is important to look at this as a positive foundation for the development of the future Commonwealth, and not as a dilution of its more concentrated integrity when under white hegemony. Our contributors from overseas are fully conscious of the expanding opportunities. The American, reflecting upon his countrymen's readier sympathy for the British point of view as their own increasing world responsibilities enlarge their under-

standing of those discharged by a colonial Power, dwells upon the significance of the Commonwealth for the free nations of the west as "a bridge to the whole uncommitted world". It is indeed such a bridge: there may be others, but none that will bear so broad a stream of traffic in mutual understanding. This view is echoed from Australia, the nation of the old Commonwealth which, with New Zealand, was most reluctant to see it transformed. Nevertheless "Australians do not hanker after outmoded doctrines of white supremacy. . . . The new Commonwealth of Nations may yet appeal to them precisely because of its multi-racial character, which is at once a challenge to statesmanship and an opportunity of maintaining good relations with nations of many races under auspices as favourable as could be conceived."

The Round Table Canadian Group develop the same idea in more specific terms. They feel that their own country is a bridge in a narrower sense, interpreting between the Commonwealth and its ally the United States: "more than ever before Canada appears to participate in the life of the two continents". Then, looking out upon the world scene, they argue that even the dissentient attitude of Canada at the time of the British intervention at Suez, was dictated by concern for the comity of the Commonwealth.

The Government in Ottawa was particularly disturbed by the effect of Suez on India. In the preceding few years it had worked closely with this State in the difficult period of the Korean and post-Korean war, and had come to value the bonds between the eastern and western parts of the Commonwealth. It believed that the association bereft of its chief Asian member would be less influential in the world. At the United Nations Canada's proposals were designed first of all to extricate Britain and France from a difficult position and then to close as quickly as possible the breaches within the Commonwealth and the Anglo-American alliance.

This sense of a *rapprochement* between Canada and India, two countries which would be as the poles asunder but for the Commonwealth connexion, specifically in its new multi-racial shape, is fully sustained in the Indian article of our series:

Till India became independent, Canada was to most Indians no more than a name on a map. All interest in America was directed towards the United States. Once freedom was attained, however, relations with Canada expanded rapidly. The considerable economic assistance received, and the fact that the two countries saw eye to eye on many issues of foreign policy, helped greatly in this. But the primary cause was that India found Mr. St. Laurent, Mr. Pearson and Mr. Diefenbaker (all of whom have visited the country) sympathetic personalities.

and the writer continues very significantly "Party politics in Canada have had no influence on Indo-Canadian relations." This last point is important, because obviously the development in as many countries as possible of a convention of bi-partisan policy in Commonwealth affairs must make for the stability of the whole association.

Admittedly, this connexion between Canada and India is selective within the Commonwealth, and has to be balanced with India's comparative apathy towards Australia and New Zealand and antipathy to Pakistan and South Africa. Nevertheless, the multiplication of these bilateral relationships

between Commonwealth States is to be welcomed. Canada has one, of longer standing, with the West Indies. A weakness of the Commonwealth hitherto to which our New Zealand group rightly draws attention, has been the tendency of its outer members to approach one another radially through the centre, the United Kingdom, instead of directly along the chords. In the ideal Commonwealth there will be a complete nexus, providing equally firm ties of each with each. It will not be completely realized: some threads will always be absent from the pattern, or fragile. But it is reasonable to expect that, as more of the new States feel their feet in world affairs, the new threads spun or strengthened will be more numerous than the old ones cut.

To revert to the earlier metaphor, it is in the bridge concept that the principal worth of the new Commonwealth resides. It is not an organization of power, but a complex of interlocking cultures. This is not to forget that much power resides in it; for it still contains a quarter of humanity. But the power is not, and is not likely again to be, deployed in concert. The decision to organize the Commonwealth as a group of sovereign States must be acknowledged without any implied reservations. The members will behave as do all other sovereign States: their governments, conscious of an unlimited responsibility for the welfare of their own people, will conduct their external policy with an exclusive eye to their national interest. To secure that interest they will continue to enter into combinations with other States within and without the Commonwealth indifferently; nor will they commit other members of the Commonwealth by their proceedings, or expect to be committed by their Commonwealth partners, unless specific obligations have been undertaken between them. If, for example, the United Kingdom, by joining the Common Market or otherwise, chooses to interweave its affairs with the fabric of a more closely integrated Europe, she is no longer likely to be accused—these articles imply as much—of betraying her leadership of the Commonwealth. If Chinese infiltration into Malaya threatens a conflagration in the Pacific, or the stresses on India's Himalayan frontier lead to bloodshed, every member of the Commonwealth will have to consider separately whether it is concerned with the conflict. At the very moment of writing Dr. Nkrumah is putting Ghana in a posture of war against Belgium in the Congo, but it would be absurd to suppose that her actions could of themselves involve, say, the West Indies or Pakistan in hostilities.

Community of Culture

NEVERTHELESS, in pursuing its national interest, whether separately or in combinations created by treaty like N.A.T.O. or S.E.A.T.O., every member uses methods of policy that are strongly coloured by the Commonwealth connexion. The tie of sentiment, which where it is felt is the strongest of all bonds, is now felt only by some of the members, and these not the largest or the most numerous. But all preserve the habit of private discussion of world affairs among themselves, and their rulers know one another's minds with an intimacy unattainable by nations which normally exchange views only through the formal communications of diplomacy or the publicized rhetoric of the United Nations. That is the superficial but potent

influence even upon the most self-centred policy of a sovereign member of the Commonwealth. But underlying it is something deeper and more pervasive: not an identity but a community of culture. Our Indian contributor may be quite correct in saying that "the Commonwealth is now no more than an association of States" (he might better say "an association of peoples") "who have nothing in common except the fact that they were once parts of the British Empire"; but that is a very great fact. It is, in the first place, a connexion that they share with the United States of America, their lasting ties with which are essential to the stability of them all. During the years or centuries in which each of these nations, including the former American colonies, shared the experience of rule from London, the cultures of all reacted upon one another to an extent which now enables them to draw upon a common fund of various civilization as rich as that which the sovereign nations that were children of the Roman Empire inherited from the ancient world. It has been justly said that the Roman Empire neither declined nor fell, but changed. The British Empire has likewise not ended, but its children have grown into adult nations, preserving family ties without family discipline. Rome left her children linked together by Greek art and thought, Roman law, the Christian faith. What corresponding stock of possessions has been carried forward from the dependent past to fortify the nations of the Commonwealth?

There is first of all the English language. It still provides the essential *lingua franca* of administration for many polyglot nations once of the obedience; and even in Asia and Africa where patriotic pride insists on its eventual supersession by some selected official vernacular it seems destined to survive as a supplementary medium of communication with the thought of the western world. With this goes English education and the influence of English literature, of the poets, the preachers and the prophets of liberty upon the new civilization of Africa and the old civilizations of Asia. As our Canadian article observes, the English universities, especially Oxford, are still places of resort from overseas, and capable of training a cadre of public administrators through whom the similar intellectual discipline of their youth may continue to pervade the high places of government in many lands. The hegemony of Oxford will yield to the demand of nationalism for educational self-sufficiency; but everywhere in the Commonwealth the young universities are shaping themselves on the model of the Isis and the Cam.

It is possible that the most potent influence of all in preserving the communion of culture in the Commonwealth will be exerted by the tradition of English jurisprudence. The English common law, which is a way of life translated into a complex of rights and duties, has not only been transplanted in many directions overseas: its methods of thought have moulded the growth of juridical systems alien to itself, and informed them with the characteristic British reverence for the liberties of the subject. If only the Commonwealth can re-equip itself with a tribunal of appeal, which can command respect as the organ of all the members equally and not, as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has seemed to so many of the new States, a relic of imperial rule, the judges and counsel preserving the brotherhood

of the law throughout the Commonwealth may be the most potent force of all in keeping its ideas on human relationships developing on parallel lines.

Out of all these elements comes the great master fact that the peoples of the Commonwealth have a common language, larger and more flexible than is printed in the dictionaries, through which they may maintain perpetual converse with one another as nations not having the inheritance cannot do. Rudyard Kipling, the publicist of the old Empire, based a vision of the future on the idea that in the control of communication lies the mastery of the world. The thought can be applied with different force to the new Commonwealth. The two parts of Oscar Wilde's essay "Intentions" are subtitled "Some Remarks on the Importance of Doing Nothing" and "Some Remarks on the Importance of Discussing Everything". The paradoxes may be interpreted in a far from cynical sense. The Commonwealth as a collectivity has divested itself of the power of action—that belongs to the members, each in its separate sphere. But its collective resources for applying a rich variety of thought to the elucidation of the problems of humanity grow greater with the years. It will be important to the future world not for what it does but for what it thinks, and for what it is.

Great Britain,
August 1960.

A CANADIAN VIEW

A MEMBER OF TWO CONTINENTS

THE place of Canada in the Commonwealth has been determined by certain enduring factors in her life, which change in relative significance with time, but remain basic. Of obvious importance is her position in North America as a neighbour to the United States, with whom she has powerful bonds in economics, culture and friendship. Geography also gives her, unlike other members of the Commonwealth, a proximity to Britain and western Europe that modern technology accentuates. With jet aircraft the Atlantic shrinks to the dimensions of a narrow sea, and the region of Polar ice to the north seems but a slight barrier between her and the vast Eurasian land mass of the Soviet Union. Every direct air route from North America to northern Europe and Asia crosses a part of Canada. Today the accelerated speed of communications enables thousands of Canadians annually to visit Britain and Europe, and refresh the sense of their origins. It is thus that the meaning of geography changes as technology changes, and both create for Canada a network of vital interests with neighbours on both sides of the Atlantic, strategic, economic, political and cultural. More than ever before Canada appears to participate in the life of two continents.

A second major factor is the composition of her population with its dual cultural strains, British and French, and the perennial resolve of its leaders to achieve a feeling of national unity that will secure survival for the federal State. Since the American Revolution the people of British extraction have striven to retain a political identity distinct from their English-speaking neighbours, and their efforts have been successful only through constant and patient collaboration with the French, who have been equally anxious to avoid absorption in the Republic. For both the tie with Britain has been an invaluable means for creating common elements of national life and securing unity and independence. The monarchical and parliamentary institutions of Westminster, appropriately re-adapted to American conditions, constituted in the last century something which both could readily accept. These institutions remain the substance and symbol of Canada's political distinction in the western hemisphere, unduplicated in any other American State. This fact is imponderable in its effects, but at any rate it strengthens the sense of political kinship with the Commonwealth. It partly helps to explain why in her relations with Britain Canada's goal has never been independence but interdependence.

The dual composition of her population has had other and different influences on Canada's connexion with the Commonwealth. The French, although they readily collaborated with the English in preserving intact the bonds with Britain, have always shrunk from deep involvement in imperial concerns from fear of the adverse effects on their position as a cultural minority. From the days of Laurier their chief spokesmen have favoured a

national autonomy without explicit imperial commitments. This French influence was joined to another even more potent, the determination of all party leaders to reject the establishment of any centralizing authority in the Empire that might hamper them in making appropriate commercial or other arrangements with the United States. For them direct negotiation with Washington was something that they were early resolved to control to the extent of their power. This attitude was perhaps most pronounced among leaders of the Liberal Party but was hardly less evident in their Conservative opponents. Economic necessity lay at its root. Canada, in projecting a continental State, wherein the fissures of regionalism and race were unfortunately never absent, sought economic expansion as a major means to resolve domestic discontents and foster unity. Such expansion partly depended upon finding markets across the southern frontier. Although she had originated as a trading outpost of Europe and Britain, Canada was increasingly attracted by the expanding and buoyant market of the adjacent Republic. Hence for policy-makers in Ottawa the achievement of harmonious economic relations with their neighbour was a paramount interest never neglected. Even the introduction of imperial preference at the end of the last century was dictated, not merely by an interest in the Empire, but by a concern to employ preferences as a lever in tariff negotiations with the United States.

After the Second World War

WITH these permanent influences in mind we can examine more closely Canada's rôle in the Commonwealth since the Second World War. Throughout this era one circumstance is conspicuous: the affairs of the Commonwealth in general and of Canada in particular have become intricately entangled with those of the United States. No country is more aware than Canada of the immense power and dynamism of the Republic. The fact is brilliantly clear in economics. Owing to a conjunction of circumstances in the war and post-war years her economy has become more closely interlaced with that of her neighbour and less closely with that of Britain and the Commonwealth. In the late thirties she sold Britain and the countries of the Commonwealth almost half her exports; in the post-war years she has sold them less than a quarter. Not merely does 60 per cent of her exports now go to the United States, but over 70 per cent of her imports originate there. This situation is likely long to endure in view of Canada's abundant unexploited resources and the growing demand of American industry for them. The rapid pace of industrial growth in the Republic tends to augment the volume of south-north trade and foster the intertwining of the two economies.

This situation naturally creates in Canada, especially among nationalists, uneasiness and even apprehension. The heavy reliance on the American market and on American production limits the country's commercial freedom to manœuvre, ties her closely to the unpredictable fluctuations in the business life and policy of the Republic, and confronts her with an incorrigible problem in the balance of payments. A change in this ill-balanced trade was Mr. Diefenbaker's aim on acquiring power in 1957, but in the three years since then he and his government have derived meagre comfort from their

efforts. There seems slight prospect that Canada will soon recover her relative position in the trade of the Commonwealth as a whole held before 1939. It is rather in other fields of economic action, especially investment, that her influence may be important.

More complex are the defence arrangements and the special political relations of Canada with the United States. These derive from the Second World War, its sequel the Cold War, the appearance of nuclear weapons and the country's dangerously exposed position. The threat of Russian aggression in western Europe after 1945 drove Canada into successive outright commitments radically different from anything in her past. Her attachment to N.A.T.O. was pivotal, for it implied in time of peace the sending of Canadian troops and air units to Europe. Yet at the same time it involved no necessary conflict between her Commonwealth and North American ties, since it meant a collaboration with both Britain and the United States in defending Europe and the free world on which the Commonwealth relies. Canada also co-operated with the United States in plans for protecting North America. These defensive measures might be viewed as ancillary to those of the North Atlantic alliance, but, since they have not been brought under N.A.T.O., they greatly accentuate the direct dependence of Canada on the decisions concerning peace and war ultimately made in Washington. This dependence admittedly differs only in degree from that of other Commonwealth countries, such as Britain, Australia and New Zealand, all of whom ultimately rely for security on the Republic's air power, massive control of a nuclear deterrent, and capacity to shape the course of world events.

Foundations of Foreign Policy

CANADIAN leaders have never doubted that the alliance with the United States is indispensable for furthering their principal foreign objective, namely the country's security and international peace in general. They are not, however, under the illusion that the decisions of American governments are invariably wise and well calculated to achieve this end, and have no wish that their own policy should be a mere echo of that in Washington. They are mindful that the press and other organs of opinion will promptly criticize them whenever it is an echo. But they also appreciate that Canada's voice alone can seldom make a strong and decisive impression on policy-makers in the White House. For this, apart from other reasons, the Commonwealth is significant, for through it they can always consult with friendly nations interested in peace, especially Britain, and achieve as much agreement as possible in order to exert the proper suasion on American leadership. Admittedly the Commonwealth in virtue of its present character has discordant voices, but sometimes it is possible to have them speak in unison, as they did on a critical occasion in January 1952, on the need for a cease-fire in Korea. Canada is thus deeply interested in close consultation within the Commonwealth because it is imperative for this group of nations to influence American policy in a dangerous world of nuclear power.

These facts help to make plain why the Liberal Government in Ottawa reacted as it did to the Suez incident. It was not, as some critics at home and

abroad alleged, because when the chips were down it was pro-American and anti-British. Such allegations might seem to have a semblance of support in certain hasty and heated remarks of Mr. St. Laurent, then Prime Minister, in defending Canada's policy. But basically his Government was moved, not by a want of sympathy with Britain or an admiration for the equivocations of Mr. Dulles, but by its genuine anxiety to preserve at all costs Anglo-American collaboration and the maximum unity in the Commonwealth. It deprecated Britain's policy of deciding without the advice of her western allies when a serious aggression should be met by force. It had no wish to see Britain go it alone. Any sharp rift within the English-speaking community and any deep cleavage of opinion among members of the Commonwealth, not merely embarrassed Canada, but jeopardized the forces capable of defending the free world from aggression. The Government in Ottawa was particularly disturbed by the effect of Suez on India. In the preceding few years it had worked closely with this State in the difficult period of the Korean and post-Korean war, and had come to value the bonds between the eastern and western parts of the Commonwealth. It believed that the association bereft of its chief Asian member would be less influential in the world. At the United Nations Canada's proposals were designed first of all to extricate Britain and France from a difficult position and then to close as quickly as possible the breaches within the Commonwealth and the Anglo-American alliance.

From all this it is evident that in Ottawa the decision-makers have taken the post-war Commonwealth seriously and deplored any action, whether by Britain or other members, that might dismember or weaken it. Both before and after Suez the Secretary of State for External Affairs reiterated his conviction of its basic necessity for Canada's foreign policy. Through the medium of its loose and flexible association Canada could best contribute a salutary influence towards peace in the world. Yet, at the same time, it may well be questioned whether the Liberal politicians in office up to that date had perceived and used all the opportunities for voluntary and fruitful co-operation within the Commonwealth. Mr. Mackenzie King and his successor Mr. St. Laurent paid consistent lip-service to the importance of the association. But in action, during an era of revolutionary change, they never boldly went out of their way to enlarge its importance. Nor did they publicly exhibit any impressive imagination on its future. Before 1939 Mr. King had perhaps done more than any other single Canadian to shape the relations of Canada to the Commonwealth. With a shrewd grasp of the facts of national autonomy he had successfully fought every attempt to make it a closely knit exclusive unit, and exalted the freedom of each member to accept or reject the need for common policies. For him at this time non-commitment was an essential mark of self-government. After the war he was not zealous in promoting innovations in the character of the Commonwealth beyond the admission of the new Asian members. He certainly helped to induce Canada to retreat from its pre-war form of isolation, but the new commitments undertaken were seldom to the Commonwealth as such; they were primarily to Europe and America. It is doubtful whether he foresaw the far-reaching

implications of the new global and multi-racial Commonwealth, and if he did he was silent about them. One of his characteristic adages, "Let sleeping dogs lie", was irrelevant to the revolutionary scene at the time, but he applied it. He was so lacking in enthusiasm for the Prime Ministers' meeting in London in 1946 that before departing he told Parliament in Ottawa, "If I had consulted my own feelings at this time I would have remained here."

The Official Cadre

THE most positive attitude towards the Commonwealth came, not from party leaders absorbed in the short-run issues of politics, but from a group of senior permanent officials in the Department of External Affairs. These men had much in common. Many were recruited from academic life and educated in Britain, usually at Oxford, as well as in Canada. They had witnessed the debates of the twenties and thirties over autonomy without emotional involvement and, with a greater sense of perspective than the politicians, they were anxious to secure a fruitful co-operation among the members of the Commonwealth in the interests of world peace. From this group Mr. Lester Pearson was recruited to the political arena as Secretary of State for External Affairs (1948-57). With the support of Mr. St. Laurent and the leading departmental officials, who were former colleagues and close friends, he strove to make consultation within the Commonwealth more dynamic than it had ever been in the past. He grasped the enhanced value of this world-wide association in an age when the grave issues of other continents had come to impinge on Canada. Hence he emphasized, not merely the traditional bilateral links between London and Ottawa, but the invaluable multilateral links among the many member nations.

The Pearsonian period, when the influence of the Department of External Affairs reached its zenith, formally ended with the victory of the Progressive Conservative Party in June 1957. Yet its influence endured. No substantial change in policy respecting the Commonwealth became evident, although the words and gestures of the new leaders were somewhat different. In opposition the Progressive Conservatives had traditionally voiced tender feelings towards the "Mother Country" and were usually more emphatic than their opponents in protesting attachment to the idea of the Commonwealth. But, like many other politicians before them, they discovered on assuming office that reshaping policies was more difficult than making speeches. Consultation within the Commonwealth at the political level benefits greatly from the personal understanding of leaders in the different countries. The Progressive Conservatives had necessarily to feel their way, become acquainted with leaders in the other countries, and familiarize themselves with the complex interplay of interests in this grouping of diverse nations.

Mr. Diefenbaker, however, was genuine in his enthusiasm for the Commonwealth. He was prompt in making one major move to strengthen its ties in his proposal for a trade and economic conference, which met in Montreal in September 1958. It is tempting to compare this conference with that of Ottawa convened by a former Conservative leader in 1932. But actually it

was something different. It did not result in a series of tariff arrangements to protect the member States competing with foreign states. Rather the emphasis was on measures that might quicken the expansion of trade and investment in a Commonwealth closely tied to the world economy. Yet the conference demonstrated an old truth that a strong concern for the nation's economic interest was no less characteristic of Canada's Conservative tradition than attachment to Britain. When the economic issues of the Commonwealth are involved, the Conservatives are not disposed to think with their hearts rather than their heads. Mr. Donald Fleming, Canada's chief spokesman on this occasion, pressed with some success for a removal of restrictions on dollar purchases in the British market. He was anxious, like previous governments, to re-establish the traditional commercial bonds with Britain. A major increase in British-Canadian trade required, however, not merely a move towards sterling-dollar convertibility; it needed also a reduced Canadian tariff on British products. The concession made by the Government in Ottawa on this matter was modest. It undertook to maintain the free entry of certain goods, such as automobiles, trucks, aircraft, electric steam turbines, as well as the existing preferential rates on others. These arrangements were not to be altered except by negotiation. The manufacturers of course would oppose a more drastic attack on the tariff, and the Conservatives were unwilling to antagonize the manufacturing interest by giving British producers a free run in the Canadian market. Nor, as is evident from their unfriendly attitude towards New Zealand butter, were they any more anxious to alienate the agrarian interest.

The concern of the Progressive Conservative Government for what it interpreted as national interests was demonstrated in other ways, not least of all in its position at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in Geneva (1958-9), where it rigorously pursued a course favourable to its own specific interests with little concern for those of Britain. The simple fact is that the two major Canadian parties may talk differently about the Commonwealth, but they seldom act differently when basic national interests are at stake. This situation cannot be otherwise, since in the long run both respond to much the same potent pressures within the nation.

In the last decade Canada has increasingly responded to the problems of the new evolving Commonwealth in Asia and Africa. One feature of the response already mentioned was the close diplomatic collaboration with India, a direct result of the special international tensions and ideological struggles of the time. In an age of neither peace nor war it was logical to seek an understanding with new associates in a Commonwealth that had suddenly become one of the few bridges between free Asia and the West. The pursuit of such understanding involved in turn a concern for the economic and social lot of the masses in free Asia, expressed in collaboration with the Colombo Plan and in grants to the Technical Assistance Administration of the United Nations. This policy was widely supported by the public, and the most common criticism of the original contribution of \$25,000,000 per annum to the Colombo Plan was its modesty. In 1958 the Conservative Government increased the contribution. By March 1959 Canada had pro-

vided within the terms of the Plan some \$200,000,000 in addition to much else in special grants.

The urgent economic needs of the emergent States might be epitomized in the two words: markets and capital. Since 1939 Canada has not been a market of the first importance for the products of the Asian and African communities, and is not likely to be in the near future. She can more readily help by subscribing capital for public investment through the Colombo or other plans. Both political parties now support the principle that the provision of capital and technical assistance are elements in the Commonwealth relationship necessary to help in resolving the ugly discord between political freedom and social poverty.

Links with the Caribbean

IT is eminently logical that among the emergent communities Canada should reflect a special interest in the most contiguous, the federation of the West Indies, which is still in a stage of Colonial tutelage. Apart from propinquity the reasons for this interest are found in history and complementary resources. The Maritime Provinces in particular have long had links with the British Caribbean. In the old Empire after the American Revolution they were joined to the sugar islands in a lucrative commerce; the one traded lumber, flour and salted fish for the sugar, molasses and rum of the other. Since 1898 Ottawa has provided tariff preferences on West Indian products, and the preferential principle was embodied in successive agreements whereby Canada gave preferences on sugar and other tropical commodities in return for tariff concessions on some exports. The Canadian preference on West Indian sugar has remained specially valuable to a non-industrialized society whose crowded population is still precariously dependent on the products of the soil.

Private investors in Halifax, Montreal and Toronto have long been interested in the islands, and Canadian bankers opened branches in the Caribbean region half a century ago. More recently Alumina Jamaica, a subsidiary of the Aluminium Limited of Canada, has established one of Jamaica's most important industries, with an investment exceeding a hundred million dollars. Much private capital from Toronto and Montreal has also poured into the rising tourist industry. With the advent of federation in 1958 the Canadian Government has provided public capital and technical assistance, and the capital will duly add two ships to the inter-island trade.

The complementary nature of Canada and the West Indies, which determined their past relations, is of course rooted in facts of geography. The islands of the Caribbean offer the tropical products that a northern country requires, and in return receive the commodities that they lack. Similarly, as a tourist area, the West Indies have an environment congenial to the inhabitants of a northern dominion and hence attract Canadian investors as well as visitors, who also value in these islands the presence of British political traditions and law akin to their own. But the complementary aspect has another feature. Canada is an affluent society with a high *per caput* income; the West Indies a poor society with a low *per caput* income. The one can more

readily accumulate capital, some of which can be employed to the benefit of the other. In brief, a special set of circumstances exists well calculated to encourage these two very different communities to constitute a regional grouping for mutual advantage, which could unquestionably give to the Commonwealth in the western hemisphere a new and enhanced significance.

Canada,

August 1960.

AN AUSTRALIAN VIEW

A NATION LOYAL TO THE THRONE

OF the ten million people now in Australia over a million were alive sixty years ago when the Australian colonies were united in a federal Commonwealth. During their life-times Australia has passed through the successive stages of self-government within the British Empire, dominion status within the British Commonwealth and, more recently, membership of the Commonwealth of Nations. So rapid a transition would seem extraordinary but for the comparable developments in so many other parts of the Commonwealth. In summing up Australian attitudes towards the modern Commonwealth of Nations, it is important to ask how far Australians have been in sympathy with these changes and what they think of the specially tumultuous pace of events since the Declaration of 1949 ushered in the age of the new Commonwealth.

Beginning with federation itself, every one of the significant changes in Australian status has occasioned doubt and misgivings in Australia and encountered strong opposition here. The colonists of the 1890's were far from united in deciding on federal union. Since then every development in the growth of dominion status, the British Commonwealth and the Commonwealth of Nations has been deprecated by significant sections of the Australian people, most often on the ground that the substance of Anglo-Australian relations was being imperilled for the sake of shadowy gains in the wider sphere of the Commonwealth as a whole. Pride in the peaceful evolution of the Commonwealth and satisfaction with the continuance of the monarchy as a direct link between Great Britain and Australia have been accompanied by doubts whether the vast changes made in imperial relations during the twentieth century have not enfeebled the unity of the self-governing nations once under British rule and robbed it of anything more than historical significance.

Most Australians thought of the British Commonwealth that ended in 1949 mainly as a link with Great Britain. The British tie was and is very precious to Australians. They are loyal to the throne; they are conscious of the British origins of their parliamentary and legal systems; although they are developing a culture of their own, they share in the cultural traditions of the British Isles; they owe much of their prosperity and growth to British investment and enterprise. Until the Second World War Australian governments habitually looked to London for leadership in foreign affairs and defence, even when criticized in their own country for doing so. Many Australians, especially those associated with the more conservative political parties, doubted the wisdom of the attempts made during the 1920's and 1930's to define the relationships between Great Britain and the self-governing dominions. They rejected as dangerous and narrowing every attempt to set precise legal limits to loyalties that were founded in tradition, monarchy

and the recognition of great interests held in common. Opinions in Australia were divided about the merits of the Balfour Declaration of 1926; Australia did not adopt the Statute of Westminster (1931) until 1942 when a Labour government was in power and under pressure of war-time necessity.*

Australians acquired their independence almost without pressing for it. Sixty years ago they were colonists with substantial rights of self-government, but firmly subordinated to Great Britain in foreign policy and other vital matters. Today they are British subjects still, but also citizens of a sovereign state, which is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. It is difficult to find anything that Australians have done to hasten the changes of the last fifty years. Rather they have acquiesced with varying degrees of conviction in movements for the reform of imperial relations that have drawn their impetus from the ambitions of Canada or South Africa or Eire or in recent years the new Asian members of the Commonwealth.

Close Relations with the United Kingdom

THE greatest changes in the Commonwealth, however, have not all proceeded from the political actions of its members, nor been agreed to at conferences of prime ministers. Two world wars and profound changes in the relationships of the great powers have had fundamental influences. Forty years ago it would not have been a great travesty of the facts to declare that Australia clung to Britain for guidance in foreign policy and for aid in defence. The ties between Britain and Australia were written in the blood of wars as well as in the affections of kinship and common allegiance to the Crown. The Second World War strengthened those ties even while it revealed to Australians what should have been obvious to them twenty years before: the United Kingdom was no longer able to play the vast rôle in defence and foreign policy that they had expected of her. American aid was sought during the war and American alliances have been established since. Today every part of the Commonwealth, including Britain, has to depend for some part of its protection on the United States of America.

So far as Australians are concerned, these changes have not diminished the desire for close relations with the United Kingdom. The old basic loyalties continue, although some of the most compelling reasons of self-interest in preserving links with Britain and the Commonwealth have largely disappeared. In some ways the challenges of the contemporary world have even strengthened in Australian eyes the value of partnership with Britain and the Commonwealth. Increasing dependence on the United States carries its own risks of submergence among the many countries whose foreign policy and defence have to be planned with a close eye to the leadership of the American republic. Membership of the Commonwealth and close relations with Britain strengthen the position of Australia as an ally of the United States because they demonstrate that Australia does not stand alone.

The transformation of Asia and Africa by the forces of political change since 1945 owes much to the magnificent successes and something also to the

* The adoption was retrospective to the outbreak of war in 1939.

shortcomings of British statesmanship. The character of international relations has been changed beyond recognition by the emergence of new nations in Asia and Africa. Australians had their first experience of these powerful movements when much of the Netherlands East Indies became the Republic of Indonesia and when Great Britain granted independence to India, Pakistan and Ceylon. These latter changes converted what had been almost a family partnership of Britain and her former self-governing colonies into a new Commonwealth of Nations, that is, a multi-racial association founded in equal proportions on historic unity and on faith that Britain and the countries formerly under her sway would do well to preserve some formal unity among themselves.

The Revolution of 1949

SO far as Australians are concerned, the United Kingdom has been the powerful advocate and the persuasive leader in transforming the British Commonwealth of Nations into the new multi-racial Commonwealth. Without great willingness in London to keep India, Pakistan and Ceylon in the Commonwealth, it is unlikely that many Australians would have favoured the fundamental changes made by the London Declaration of 1949, which converted the British Commonwealth into the Commonwealth of Nations. Most Australians regarded the grants of independence made to India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma as the natural ends of long-established British policies. Australians, who had gained their own independence so smoothly and peaceably under the aegis of Great Britain, gave hardly a thought to the tremendous difficulties that were involved in the transfers of power to the new Asian governments and probably did not think at all about whether those governments would wish to enter the Commonwealth. When it became known that only Burma desired complete independence and that the other Asian states wished to be members of the Commonwealth in equality with the old dominions and Britain herself, many Australians understood the gratification that was so marked in the United Kingdom. They soon realized the advantages to Australia of having Commonwealth links with the new Asian countries.

Nevertheless, some prominent Australians had serious misgivings about the formula produced in 1949 for the admission of a republic to the Commonwealth. For the British Commonwealth to become the Commonwealth of Nations was enough to arouse regrets in Australia. For the King to be recognized in some countries, not as a king but merely as Head of the Commonwealth and the symbol of association in the Commonwealth, was in the eyes of many Australians a lamentable sacrifice of the position of the Crown as the coping stone of unity.

None of these reactions reflected lack of goodwill towards the Asian countries. Australians were troubled by the changes of 1949 because they feared that their ties with Britain, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, all of which were important to them, were being weakened for the sake of highly problematical benefits. In India itself there was enough criticism of the decision to become a Commonwealth member to justify Australian

doubts whether the experiment of 1949 was worth undertaking. Fortunately, the great acts of faith that preserved the Commonwealth in that year were supported officially in Australia and the doubters themselves were as keen as anybody for the experiment to succeed.

Few Australians expected that the decisions of 1949 would lead to a stream of other additions to Commonwealth membership, but in fact that has been the case. "At present", commented *The Times* recently, "when Colonial Office control is removed from a dependency its inclusion in Commonwealth councils is all but automatic." Ghana and Malaya have been duly admitted; Nigeria is to come in soon; Cyprus may wish to join; Sierra Leone will become independent next April and wishes then to become a full member of the Commonwealth. Nobody professes to want to keep any nation out of the Commonwealth and it is as gratifying to many Australians as to most Englishmen to see former British dependencies move into independence while preserving a strong desire for association with the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries. But what will all these countries have in common with one another apart from experience of British rule, some resemblances in political and legal traditions and, perhaps, some affinities with one another in their thinking on the great problems of our day? How much real political equality or significant common interests can there be among such diverse nations, some large, some small, some rich, some poor, some well-developed, some backward, some monarchical, some republican, some politically stable, some suffering internal strife? When the representatives of the Commonwealth meet in conference, how much will survive of the intimacy and frankness that apparently existed in bygone days? How much effective consultation on matters of common concern can take place among such a heterogeneous group of nations? In such a situation as this, will the members of the Commonwealth go on thinking that membership is still really worth while? May they not prefer to develop their relationships with the United Kingdom and with other countries, whether members of the Commonwealth or not, independently of the Commonwealth link?

The Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. R. G. Menzies, has given an answer to such questions. Delivering the first Smuts Memorial Lecture at the University of Cambridge last May, he declared that the unity of the Commonwealth would endure despite the diversity of its members. The diversity of the Commonwealth, he acknowledged, was bound to go on increasing; because of this fact, he contended, there was special value in the meetings of Commonwealth leaders and in agreement among the members on "a common philosophical approach to world problems". Mr. Menzies affirmed also that the Crown is still a unifying force in the Commonwealth, even among the nations that have formed themselves into republics. A majority of Australians hopes that the Prime Minister was right about these matters and shares his faith in a "Commonwealth of Nations, changed and changing, but, so long as we see clearly, destined to endure".

The problems of Papua and New Guinea may influence Australian thinking on such questions. Some Australians believe that the best long-term policy for Papua and New Guinea is to foster their development of political indepen-

dence and to hope that, when independent, they will choose to become members of the Commonwealth. There are, as the Prime Minister himself declared recently, signs that political independence for Papua and New Guinea may be achieved rather earlier than has sometimes been thought.

The Commonwealth will go on changing. Unless the direction and the pace of change both alter fundamentally from what we have become accustomed to in the last decade, Australians will have to remind themselves that neither their relations with the United Kingdom nor their loyalty to the Throne are any longer dependent on the Commonwealth. Following on the Commonwealth Conference of December 1952 the Parliament of Australia passed the Royal Style and Titles Act of 1953, which declared that the Queen's title in this country is "Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom, Australia and Her Other Realms and Territories, Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith". Her Majesty is Queen of Australia and the former debate on the divisibility of the Crown is at rest. Australians could preserve their monarchy and their ties with Great Britain even if the Commonwealth of Nations ceased to exist.

Apartheid and the Commonwealth

IF it can be made to work, the Commonwealth as it exists today may turn out to have its greatest strength at the point of greatest apparent weakness, that is, its multi-racial character. The experience of the Commonwealth Conference held last May shows how vitally the Commonwealth depends on peaceable solutions to the problems of race relations and how exacerbated those problems are within the Commonwealth itself. The Conference was in fact over-shadowed by the South African attempts to defend *apartheid* and by the resolution of the South African government in pursuing that policy despite vehement protests from a majority of Commonwealth countries.

It is possible that the troubles over *apartheid* are occurring at a critical stage in Australian thinking on the problems and the advantages of the multi-racial Commonwealth. No one could be sure of such a point as this, because public feeling has not been put to any test, such as might have been imposed on it, had the Conference decided to consider *apartheid* formally and passed a resolution on it. Only speculation is possible about what Australians are thinking today on the Commonwealth; and speculation amounts to plucking particular straws from the wind.

Apartheid has been condemned in Australia with convinced unanimity. The Prime Minister believed that he should not comment upon *apartheid* and the troubles in South Africa because it is not the practice of Commonwealth countries (as he thinks, rightly) to pass formal or public judgments on one another's domestic problems. His reticence did not commend itself to many Australians. Fortright condemnation of *apartheid* was heard all over Australia and was not thought to be inconsistent with faith in the Commonwealth. Moral indignation was joined together with a sensible belief that neither white supremacy nor the segregation of coloured peoples is practical politics in the world today.

Australians do not hanker after outmoded doctrines of white supremacy.

Even their immigration policy has been motivated in recent times more by a dread of racial conflict in Australia than by any other consideration. The new Commonwealth of Nations may yet appeal to them precisely because of its multi-racial character, which is at once a challenge to statesmanship and an opportunity of maintaining good relations with nations of many races under auspices as favourable as could be conceived. Aspirations like these may be disappointed with terrible swiftness, but they may also succeed.

Perhaps *apartheid*, as administered by Dr. Verwoerd's government, will turn out to have been a decisive factor in convincing Australians that a Commonwealth of Nations which includes Asian and African members could be as valuable to the world and to Australia in the 1960's as the British Commonwealth was in the 1920's and 1930's. Certainly, the troubles in South Africa have destroyed very effectively the remnants of any Australian hopes still surviving that somehow, despite all the changes of form and constitution, the old British Commonwealth could linger on within or alongside the new Commonwealth. South Africa, one of the old self-governing dominions, has been active in cutting herself off from Canada, Australia and New Zealand both by the policy of *apartheid* and by republicanism.

At the London Conference of last May Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaya acquiesced in the final communiqué that so largely evaded the problem of *apartheid*, but did so only in courtesy and from deference to the ordinary rule of unanimity. He warned us, however, that "unanimity is out of date" and obviously will be unlikely to compromise again. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan hinted that, if and when the nationalists in South Africa adopt a republican form of government, he will oppose the re-admission of South Africa to the Commonwealth as a republic, unless *apartheid* has been abandoned meanwhile. Very few Australians really wish to lose South Africa from the Commonwealth, for they cannot see how just and wise policies in that country would be made the more likely by such extreme courses. Nevertheless, they know that remarks like those of the Tunku and the President were not made lightly and that similar ideas have been expressed in other discussions on the Commonwealth and *apartheid*. If some future conference of prime ministers is forced to consider a resolution aimed at South Africa, what course would justice and reason dictate? What sort of Commonwealth will remain if the prime ministers again yield to the view that *apartheid*, or some other question touching vitally the precious convictions of member states, is a matter of domestic jurisdiction and therefore must not be discussed?

The End of a Common Defence System

APARTHEID is for the present the most spectacular source of disunity in the Commonwealth, but it is very far from being the only one. The disputes between India and Pakistan over Kashmir are not yet resolved. The continued admission of republics to the Commonwealth is tilting the balance of numbers more and more heavily against the effectiveness of the monarchy as the symbol of the free and equal association of Commonwealth members. The Commonwealth no longer has interchangeable citizenship;

only in the United Kingdom are all Commonwealth citizens given the same status as the native born. Parliamentary government no longer flourishes throughout the Commonwealth as a joint heritage. In Pakistan it has been suspended, in Ghana modified profoundly. The abolition of appeals to the Privy Council in some Commonwealth countries is slowly weakening the unifying force of the traditions of English law.

The strategic and defence problems of the Commonwealth have long since ceased to be a bond of unity. Before the Second World War Canada and South Africa (of the members of the Commonwealth today) had already resolved to shape their own courses in foreign policy. Only Australia and New Zealand followed Britain into war automatically in 1939 and Australia made a separate declaration of war against Japan. Today no member of the Commonwealth need be at war because another member is at war unless brought into the conflict by some defence pact involving countries outside the Commonwealth. Britain and Australia (and New Zealand) continue to share some sense of a common fate and common obligations in the great questions of defence and foreign policy, but even they have their most important ties in such matters outside the Commonwealth. Australia has to look to the United States of America rather than to the United Kingdom for defence against major enemies. Britain, for her part, is more closely associated with the United States in defence policy than with any member of the Commonwealth. These are the conditions of life in the 1960's and to most of its members the existence of the Commonwealth is neither essential in defence and foreign policies nor predominantly significant in shaping their international outlook. India, Ceylon and Ghana stand outside the Commonwealth almost entirely in their attempts to remain uncommitted on the most critical questions of world politics. They may be compelled, however, to learn that it takes two to remain uncommitted and be driven by the heightening of international tensions to support the efforts of the free world in trying to stave off and prevent final disaster.

Most members of the Commonwealth have had to enter into regional pacts in order to safeguard their security. None of these pacts derives any strength from the existence of the Commonwealth. Members of the Commonwealth participate in organizations like N.A.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O. purely as individuals. The hope sometimes expressed in the 1940's that members of the Commonwealth that were active in a particular region would speak and act with enhanced authority because of presumed backing elsewhere in the Commonwealth has proved altogether illusory, except perhaps for Canada in her relations with the United States. The Commonwealth is simply irrelevant to regional pacts of defence.

Australians like to think of the Colombo Plan as though it were a Commonwealth affair. Certainly the origins of the plan are to be found in the proceedings of the Conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers held in Colombo in January 1950. That assembly considered economic policy in South and South-East Asia. A meeting in Sydney in May 1950 to prepare the groundwork of the Plan was attended by delegates of the United Kingdom, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and Australia together with

representatives of Malaya and British Borneo. But the United States joined the Plan in 1951, Japan in 1954, and Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, the Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam between 1951 and 1954. The Colombo Plan began in the Commonwealth but swiftly spread beyond it. Perhaps the Plan strengthens the unity of the Commonwealth countries that work in it, but that is doubtful.

Trade relations within the Commonwealth have diminished in importance to its members for some time. Over 40 per cent of British exports are to the Commonwealth and to the Republic of Ireland and Commonwealth ships carry two-thirds of United Kingdom trade with Commonwealth countries; but outside the United Kingdom the trade of the Commonwealth countries with one another has always been small. Australia's main customer is still the United Kingdom, but our second best market is Japan, which this year has been our biggest buyer of wool and could yet replace Britain as our principal market. The United Kingdom remains the largest oversea investor in Australia; American investment has sometimes been extensive but has been less regular than British and its total amount is far smaller.

It is thought in Australia that the United Kingdom itself may become increasingly committed to Europe in trade, politics and defence; if she does, she may become less committed to the Commonwealth economically than at present. At the time of writing the United Kingdom still has to decide whether to join the European Common Market (subject, of course, to the consent of the countries concerned). The great debate on this question has referred again and again to the likely effects on the Commonwealth of British entry into the Common Market. British assessments of the problem, most of which show a remarkably strong sense of responsibility to the Commonwealth as a whole, appear to conclude that a British entry into the Market would produce no insoluble problems for any Commonwealth country. They are more doubtful about the possible effects on the Commonwealth as an association of nations.

So far as Australia is concerned, the immediate consequences of a British entry into the Market are likely to be small. British preferences in the Australian market have become more valuable to Britain than are the reciprocal benefits enjoyed by Australian exporters in Britain, and some adjustments superseding the Ottawa arrangements of 1932 were made in the trade agreement negotiated in 1957. The Commonwealth preference system is in fact of diminishing importance to our export trade, although still certainly significant for some minor industries such as dried fruits, wine, dairy products, and perhaps also sugar (because of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement within the International Agreement). On balance, we may stand to gain more from increased British prosperity in the Market than to lose through a change in the United Kingdom's commercial policies.

The other binding economic element, not of course fully a Commonwealth matter, is the sterling area arrangement. The exclusiveness of a currency club has, however, diminished with the gradual return, desired by both the United Kingdom and Australia, towards freer convertibility and the ending of discrimination in trade.

Whether Australia is likely today to have misgivings at seeing the United Kingdom become a continental power as well as a Commonwealth one is highly doubtful. In most Commonwealth countries, certainly in Australia, the United Kingdom appears already to be as much a European power as a member of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth of Nations needs a strong Britain. If entry into the Common Market will strengthen her, then Australia is not likely to look for more than as generous a settlement as possible of any problems that may arise, should the present system of preferences be abandoned.

The Will to Continue

THE Commonwealth of Nations is held together only by the will of its members. Within the unity of the Commonwealth there are other, closer unities, such as those that join Australia with Britain (or New Zealand or Canada with Britain). Every state in the Commonwealth apparently still believes that the advantages of membership, which imposes very few responsibilities, more than outweigh any conceivable disadvantages, which seem in fact to be practically non-existent except for South Africa. It is possible, however, to imagine easily enough circumstances in which states of the Commonwealth might renounce membership, perhaps because of disagreements with other Commonwealth countries, or because membership was no longer convenient, or because the great hope that the Commonwealth may succeed as a multi-racial association had been defeated too brutally. The Commonwealth will undergo further changes in the near future and its survival will depend on practical demonstrations of usefulness. Historic links and high aspirations cannot of themselves inspire continuing unity. It is for these reasons that the multi-racial character of the Commonwealth may be regarded as tremendously significant. The longer the Commonwealth endures, the more critical its multi-racial character will become, capable either of preserving the Commonwealth as a magnificent answer to one of the world's great problems, or of destroying it through the imperfections of its own members.

Australia,
August 1960.

A NEW ZEALAND VIEW

A CHANGING DEFENCE PATTERN

UNTIL the First World War, New Zealand was almost totally dependent on the United Kingdom for her security and her trade. These ties of interest were reinforced by common cultural and political traditions—even today over nine-tenths of the population of New Zealand have their origins in the British Isles. Between the wars, the self-governing territories of the British Empire emerged as autonomous States and asserted their equality as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. But New Zealand did not look upon this development with any enthusiasm. For her, the British connexion meant everything; and, in particular, it meant that she had a friend in time of need and a secure market for her products.

With the first Labour Ministry in 1935 there came a change of approach. A combination of idealism, desire to follow an independent policy, and good judgment led the new Government to assert its faith in a universal system of collective security. It supported attempts to strengthen the machinery of the League of Nations and, after the Second World War, it took an active part in the foundation and work of the United Nations and associated agencies. Successive governments were able to show that a world organization can give scope for factors other than sheer power and provide small countries with an influence out of proportion to their size. Nevertheless, it became evident that the United Nations could not provide an effective counter to Communist expansion in the Far East and South-East Asia. The Second World War had underlined British military weakness in the Pacific, and New Zealand was forced to look again to her wartime protector, the United States. In 1951, when the United States took the initiative in concluding a peace treaty with Japan, New Zealand, Australia and the United States signed the A.N.Z.U.S. Treaty, a tripartite defence guarantee from which the United Kingdom was excluded. The A.N.Z.U.S. relationship has continued to provide valuable opportunities for consultation with the United States at political and military levels, and it has meant that both New Zealand and Australia have been furnished with United States defence information of the highest importance. However, the A.N.Z.U.S. grouping did not include powers with "on the ground" responsibilities in South-East Asia—and eventually the S.E.A.T.O. Treaty of 1955 was signed at Manila by Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

A.N.Z.U.S. and S.E.A.T.O. provide the political framework within which the American defence guarantee operates. There can be little doubt that on issues of basic policy the organizations provide the Americans with opportunities—to state the position in its most favourable light—to reduce the possibilities of divergence between their policies and those of their allies. Thus pressure has been maintained on New Zealand governments to dissuade

them from giving effect to any inclinations they might have to recognize Communist China.

An informal defence arrangement, known as A.N.Z.A.M., enables the Australian, New Zealand and United Kingdom Governments to prepare plans for the defence of their interests in South-East Asia. A.N.Z.A.M. had its beginnings in 1946. Its headquarters are in Canberra and use is made of the Higher Australian defence organization, with the participation of United Kingdom and New Zealand staffs. New Zealand's major decision to station forces overseas in peacetime was taken within the A.N.Z.A.M. framework. In 1955 the three partners agreed on the value of having forces immediately available for "fire brigade" operations, and they created a Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve to which all three countries contributed ground, air and naval units. While the primary rôle of this force is to constitute a mobile reserve available to meet any international emergency in the area, the three governments agreed in 1957, at the request of the newly created Malayan Government, to allow their forces to assist the Malaysians in operations against the Communist terrorists in the Federation. The three governments still maintain these forces.

A.N.Z.A.M. has been called a Commonwealth defence arrangement, but the stationing of New Zealand troops in Malaya reflects, in part, traditional associations with the United Kingdom, since assistance in the external defence of Malaya is regarded as primarily a United Kingdom responsibility. On the other hand, New Zealand's contribution to the Strategic Reserve must also be seen as a contribution to the broader international obligations assumed by New Zealand for collective defence in the area.

New Zealand involvement in the South and South-East Asia areas has been given further practical expression in her participation in the Colombo Plan. Starting as a Commonwealth project to assist Commonwealth countries in the area to improve their standards of living, the scope of the Plan was soon broadened to include the other Asian countries in the area, while the amount of financial aid available has been augmented by the accession of the United States and Japan. New Zealand's contribution in terms of capital aid and, still more, in the provision of technical training and assistance has already been valuable; but recently there has been a fuller appreciation that the Colombo Plan provides New Zealand with the opportunity to take a most vital part in a field of external policy. In this instance, geography, a sense of goodwill, national aptitudes and self-interest combine uniquely; and a real effort is being made to seek out a pattern of assistance which will ensure that New Zealand resources and skills are applied in the best possible way. Thus experts have been made available by New Zealand in the fields of education, health, agriculture, engineering, financing and accounting. The Government has also directed that steps be taken to increase New Zealand's capacity to bring Asian students and trainees to New Zealand.

Evidence of New Zealand's increasing interests in the Asian and Pacific areas, and of her decreasing reliance on the services traditionally supplied by the United Kingdom, is provided by her expanding diplomatic activity. At the beginning of 1955 the only posts in the area were in Australia and

Japan. Now there are missions in Thailand, Malaya, Singapore and India. Japan has an Embassy in Wellington, Nationalist China a Consulate-General. Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Malaya, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand have accredited their representatives in Australia to New Zealand, but only India and Thailand actually maintain offices in Wellington.

Economic Changes

BY passing the Statute of Westminster in 1931, the United Kingdom formally acknowledged the full autonomy of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Yet, in 1932, in response to the economic crisis of the time, the Ottawa Agreements sought to formalize a renewal of the older mercantilist system. The classical imperial economic pattern was of an industrial metropolitan centre with its periphery of undeveloped sources of food and raw materials. For the British Commonwealth, this pattern was already an anachronism in 1932, but the economic disasters of the day caused a defensive reaction towards the past. The Ottawa measures were never a notable success and, over the years, have accorded less and less with economic facts. Now, the United Kingdom has lost its economic ascendancy and cannot itself provide the cohesive force of a world-wide trading system. It finds itself gravitating towards other groupings, and, in particular, towards Europe. For their part, the peripheral members of the Commonwealth have developed beyond the stage where their economies can be considered as complementary to that of the United Kingdom—a fact recognized in 1959 when New Zealand and the United Kingdom entered into a revised "Ottawa" Agreement giving New Zealand the right to reduce preferences on British goods. The resurrected mercantilist system is, indeed, losing its meaning. A way must be found of replacing its vestiges by something more in keeping with present needs.

The progressive unification of Western Europe is a new factor of major importance. The European Economic Community has been spectacularly successful and its impressive potential is shown by the impetus it has given to the creation of the European Free Trade Association. The division of Europe between these two economic groupings is not stable, and a formula must be sought for an accommodation between the two. The United Kingdom, the senior partner in the E.F.T.A., has in the past presented its Commonwealth obligations as an unsurmountable obstacle to any closer association with the European Community. However, in the face of the Community's obvious success, it is now being realized that United Kingdom isolation from the main stream of European progress involves a relative decline in its economic power and political influence. Accordingly, there is a growing readiness to reassess the economic significance of the Commonwealth relationship and to seek means of reconciling Commonwealth interests with the economic integration of Europe.

The United Kingdom must, for a long time, continue to be a market of major importance for Commonwealth producers, but the fact remains that the mother country is increasingly less able to absorb the surplus production of its former dependencies—a development which has been accentuated by United Kingdom efforts since the war to encourage the domestic production

of agricultural commodities. Commonwealth members are finding, too, that there are disadvantages in having too great a proportion of primary production centred upon a single market. These developments have led New Zealand, which depends more than any other Commonwealth producer upon the United Kingdom market, to seek other outlets for its products. On the other hand, with the diversification of their economies, New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries have found that the grant of tariff preferences to United Kingdom goods adds to their import and production costs.

In these circumstances it would seem that there must be an overhaul of Commonwealth trading relationships. Commonwealth members will suffer if they are linked to a United Kingdom which is failing to share in a new era of European economic growth, while the United Kingdom itself cannot be expected, in deference to outmoded trade concepts, to decline attractive opportunities of economic expansion. A united Europe which included the United Kingdom could provide the greatest market in the world for Commonwealth products. The stimulation to economic activity which would result from integration should mean cheaper, more attractive and more specialized products of European manufacture for Commonwealth purchasers.

The agricultural marketing policies developed by the European Economic Community will be of particular importance to New Zealand, because of the advantage she enjoys in the production of meat and dairy products. Our present market outlets for these high quality products are limited: almost all New Zealand exports of lamb and dairy products go to the United Kingdom market and the main market for beef has been North America. It is, therefore, discouraging to learn that the proposed agricultural policies of E.E.C. may continue the protectionist tendencies of the member countries. The hope would be that, if the United Kingdom became associated with the Community, agricultural policies would be revised. As part of a comprehensive adjustment, it might be possible to negotiate the surrender of the preferences given by the Commonwealth countries in return for the assurance of expanding outlets for products of New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries in a united Europe. It would, however, be difficult for New Zealand to contemplate any settlement which would involve the loss of her rights of unrestricted access to the United Kingdom market, or which would place New Zealand products in a less favourable position in that market than those of her European competitors.

It seems that there must eventually be an accommodation between the United Kingdom and the European Community. It would not be in the interests of either party to resist this result. Should, then, other Commonwealth countries be mere spectators of an historic development? Surely the answer is "no". Only by playing a part in the fashioning of the new entity can the Commonwealth countries concerned expect to have their own interests respected.

The Expanding Commonwealth

THE picture we have so far drawn of New Zealand policies and interests is not one in which the Commonwealth appears likely to play a dominant

—or even a prominent—rôle. And yet closer analysis suggests that, as New Zealand—of necessity—becomes less dependent on her ties with the United Kingdom, she becomes more dependent on associations with the countries of the Commonwealth as a whole. Over the past 25 years New Zealand, as a small and isolated country, has recognized the importance to her of an effective world security organization. For similar reasons, she now values her membership of a grouping of States which is world-wide rather than regional, which is multi-racial and representative of many of the major civilizations in the world, and whose members, by and large, accept the values, traditions and methods of parliamentary government. Indeed, it would seem that the very dilution of the old Commonwealth which has caused concern to some can be welcomed by New Zealand. Recognizing, as we must, that the federal dream of Lionel Curtis can no longer be realized and that Commonwealth membership involves no formal ties or commitment to any form of collective action, New Zealand can see advantages as the membership of the Commonwealth expands and becomes more representative. The Commonwealth is presented with new challenges and opportunities to exert its influence; it gains a wider sphere of understanding and experience; and the interchange of ideas and the pursuit of common interests which is the Commonwealth's main justification can become more varied, and not necessarily less intensive.

It is a principle of Commonwealth membership that no Commonwealth country has the right to interfere with the internal affairs of another. Nevertheless, New Zealanders are concerned about the racial policies being pursued in South Africa. The final communique of the recent meeting of Prime Ministers emphasizes that "the Commonwealth . . . is a multi-racial association" and that there is a "need to ensure good relations between all member States and peoples of the Commonwealth". Mr. Nash, the New Zealand Prime Minister, has pointed out that this is a positive statement. *Apartheid* may be South Africa's internal problem, but it runs counter to the principle of racial equality on which the Commonwealth relationship is founded.

There are many advantages—not all of them tangible—to be gained from free association in the Commonwealth. There are exchanges of view and practical co-operation on all manner of topics and at different levels. There is the regular exchange of political information and collaboration in widely separated technical fields. There are the personal contacts of Commonwealth representatives at the United Nations and other international gatherings. The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association facilitates the exchange of visits between members of the Commonwealth legislatures. There has always been close co-operation in educational fields, and now the Commonwealth Education Scheme provides an imaginative and timely initiative, to which New Zealand is giving active support.

If the Commonwealth in its newly developing form is to be strengthened, greater efforts must be made to improve contacts between the members. Most countries have tended to think too exclusively in terms of their association with the United Kingdom. Thus we in New Zealand have close links with

Australia and Canada, but few with Pakistan, Ghana, South Africa or the West Indies. As Mr. Nash has recognized:

So long . . . as much the closest relationship of each member is with the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth bond is in danger of being rather a brittle one. The Commonwealth will be strengthened in proportion as the ties between the periphery and the centre are supplemented by cross ties among the peripheral countries.

Mr. Nash went on to suggest a greater exchange of Missions between Commonwealth countries. In this regard, it is significant that the 1960 Report of the Department of External Affairs points out that the friendly association of peoples within the Commonwealth affords increasing opportunities for New Zealand to establish good relations with some of the new African States. The possibility of New Zealand's extending assistance in Africa along the lines of that already extended in Asia is envisaged; and the desirability of establishing at least one New Zealand post in the area, particularly in Nigeria, is acknowledged.

New Members of the Commonwealth

RAPID political developments throughout the world mean that the Commonwealth is evolving rapidly. There is need to decide the policy to be adopted for the admission of new members. This is a problem of particular interest to New Zealand as the administering authority of the Trust Territory of Western Samoa. The Territory expects to become an independent State at the beginning of 1962, and this development may raise—most explicitly—issues that will interest many United Kingdom dependent territories as they move towards political autonomy. This is so because the United Nations General Assembly will concern itself with the terms on which the trusteeship agreement is terminated. The Assembly is likely to insist on full “independence”, if that expression can be said to have any meaning in the case of a State of 100,000 inhabitants. Does it follow that Western Samoa will become a member of the United Nations? The answer to this first question must depend on the attitude of the Samoans themselves. If they were to feel that they had the financial and other resources required—or, perhaps, if they succumbed to the blandishments of interested members of the United Nations—an application for membership of the world organization would surely be successful. What, then, if Western Samoa were to seek membership of the Commonwealth? Would a country which had been recognized by the United Nations as an independent State qualify for full membership of the Commonwealth or would it be offered some other status? It is evident that the United Kingdom is alive to the issues involved, because a meeting was recently held in England between representatives of interested Commonwealth countries, among whom was the New Zealand Secretary of External Affairs, to discuss the future of smaller territories.

The flexibility of the Commonwealth relationship should make it relatively easy to assure new admissions of most of the benefits of Commonwealth membership, even if there is the danger that diffusion might weaken existing

contacts. But difficulties arise over those unique gatherings—meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. The point could be reached at which sheer weight of numbers would deprive them of much of their value. A number of solutions have been canvassed, some of which would involve the adoption of a two-tier structure, so long resisted. For instance, it has been suggested that something along the lines of the permanent and non-permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council could be applied in relation to meetings of Prime Ministers. Again, it has been proposed that more emphasis should be placed on regional meetings at which the less influential members could participate.

Proposals along these lines do not overcome the problems presented by the rigidity of equal status and the sensitiveness of national pride. Certainly, New Zealand would find it difficult to convince an Independent State of Western Samoa that it should be found a place within the Commonwealth which is anything less than full membership. The Commonwealth may have to reconcile itself to an influx of new members and, as in the past, adjust itself to new conditions. This adjustment could take the form of still greater emphasis on a functional approach. Commonwealth members would co-operate on, and, if need be, meet to consider, matters on which they were particularly interested. Such an approach would have to be adopted at all levels. Thus, by a change in the name or in the procedure of meetings of Prime Ministers, it could be ensured that those Prime Ministers who were concerned with particular issues of foreign affairs could meet together. This is a procedure already followed in regard to defence discussions. Prime Ministers who are not interested stay away.

This problem of the small territories and its solution will have a significant bearing on the future development of the Commonwealth; and, perhaps, on New Zealand's part in it. After all, it is not very difficult to imagine the situation in which New Zealand, as well as Western Samoa, would be classified as "a small territory".

The New Zealand Prime Minister, when addressing the Commonwealth Relations Conference held at Palmerston North on January 12, 1959, stated a New Zealand view on the place of the Commonwealth today:

Its multi-racial inclusiveness gives the Commonwealth a unique opportunity to act as a link and go-between for Asia and the West and for Africa and the West. Perhaps even this will not be its greatest contribution to peace and stability in the world. At a time when the nations are fast sorting themselves into blocs—Communist, neutralist, Asian, African—the Commonwealth manages to straddle several. The benefits of this are fully appreciated by its members. The Commonwealth in fact forms a bridge—the only one which exists at the moment—by which the ideas and influence of Asia can be brought to bear on Western governments and vice versa. While misunderstandings and misconceptions grow on every side to plague international relations, such an institution which helps enlarge the area of understanding between nations is of the greatest value.

New Zealand,
August 1960.

A SOUTH AFRICAN VIEW

THREE SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

EVER since the Union was founded in 1910, her relations with the Empire-Commonwealth have been a subject of controversy in South Africa. In the very first general election three schools of thought were evident. L. S. Jameson, the Leader of the Opposition, proclaimed the need "to draw closer the ties which bind the various parts of the Empire"; Louis Botha, the Prime Minister, said it was his first duty to "see that we have a contented people in South Africa, and thereby strengthen the Crown and the British Empire at large"; and J. B. M. Hertzog, the Minister of Justice, announced ambiguously that "if we are no longer permitted to be free republicans, we will be and remain free Britons . . . so long as we are given the privilege of working out our national salvation through the recognized means of autonomy".

The first of these three schools of thought, which hankered after a receding prospect of a close-knit Empire and always sought to curb the advance of local autonomy, lingered on into the 1940's within the ranks of the Dominion Party, but today it is no longer a force to be reckoned with in South African politics. The second was given world-wide prominence by Botha's associate and successor, Jan Smuts. He, like Botha, was won over from his hostile attitude towards Britain by the grant of responsible government to the Transvaal in 1907. Thereafter he always sought the friendship of Britain within the framework of existing law and custom and believed that it was in the best interests of South Africa that she should be an active member of the Empire-Commonwealth, co-operating closely for peaceful purposes in normal times and for the achievement of victory in time of war. In 1943 he spoke of the major rôle which the Commonwealth should perform when the Second World War was over; and in 1949 he doubted the wisdom of the approval of India's request to remain within the Commonwealth as a republic, because, he said, the Commonwealth might then degenerate into the nebulous position of the Holy Roman Empire "after it had become merely a name and there was nothing else behind it". His successors in the leadership of the United Party, Mr. J. G. N. Strauss and Sir D. P. de Villiers Graaff, have continued to proclaim that the Crown and the Commonwealth connexion are of value to South Africa. The third school of thought still looks upon Britain as the erstwhile oppressor of Afrikaners and a seducer of English-speaking white South Africans from a pure attachment to national ideals. With the "Second War of Freedom" (which ended in 1902) still in the forefront of their minds, its members see themselves as continuing the struggle for absolute national autonomy and republicanism.

For all Smuts's breadth of vision and brilliance of intellect, it is the third of these schools that has made most of the running in South Africa and is now in control of her destiny. This article will recall the past achievements of Afrikaner nationalism and explain its present dilemma.

After the false starts of the 1914 rebellion and the failure of the republican deputation to the Peace Conference in 1919, Afrikaner nationalism achieved a series of remarkable successes during the premiership of Hertzog (1924-39). By the late 1930's Hertzog himself, and the majority of the Afrikaner people, seemed satisfied. The principle of equality between the Dominions and the United Kingdom had been accepted in the Balfour Declaration. The United Kingdom had renounced her powers over the Union in the Statute of Westminster. The Union Parliament had ensured in the Status of the Union Act that the Governor General should act exclusively on the advice of his South African ministers. And in the Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act South Africa had acquired the means to conduct her foreign relations without British assistance. South Africa also had her own flag and her own nationality, and her Governor General was a South African appointed on the advice of the Union Government. In Hertzog's eyes South Africa had come of age. It was true that the King of England was still King of South Africa and that South Africa was still a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. But the King had no independent powers in South Africa, and as the Commonwealth was a White Man's Club it could be regarded as a convenience rather than a burden, especially as Hertzog was satisfied that South Africa was free to remain neutral should Britain go to war and to resign whenever she wished.

These halcyon days were terminated by the outbreak of the Second World War. Hertzog and Smuts did not see that event in the same light. To Hertzog the Second World War, like the first, was of no concern to South Africa. "It must not be forgotten that we are concerned here with a war in which the Union has not the slightest interest. We are not interested in a war between Poland and Germany." He therefore proposed to Parliament that South Africa should remain neutral. To Smuts it was a war of vital concern to "the future welfare and safety of South Africa" and he proposed that the Union should sever its relations with Germany and "continue its co-operation with its friends and associates in the British Commonwealth of Nations". Smuts won that debate and forced a government to conduct the war. Thereupon Hertzog went out into the wilderness with bitterness in his heart, believing that his defeat had demonstrated that the foundation of the United Party had been a serious mistake. The English-speaking white South Africans and their Afrikaner friends were again sacrificing the interests of South Africa for the interests of Britain and it was necessary to restore Afrikaner unity and achieve a republic. That was what Dr. D. F. Malan had been saying since 1934, when he had condemned fusion as risking the loss of everything that had been achieved by Afrikaner nationalism and a surrender of its basic principles—no different in kind from the conciliation policy of Botha, against which Hertzog himself had been the first to rebel. Unequivocal republicanism was a prominent feature of the programme of Malan's "Purified" Nationalist Party, and he was even more critical than Hertzog of the policy of participation in the war. To him the war of 1939 was another of England's wars. England was trying to thwart Germany from regaining what she had lost in the unjust treaty of 1919. To bring together in one

Reich all who belonged to the German race and spoke its language was a task with which a good Afrikaner nationalist should sympathize. "I say emphatically . . . to draw us into war, to fire one shot from a South African gun, to spill one drop of South African blood, would be a crime."

For a while the Nationalist forces disintegrated. Some, particularly in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, sought to prepare for the expected German victory by creating a New Order on National Socialist lines in South Africa, while others, including Malan, adhered to parliamentary methods. Malan applied himself doggedly to the task of reuniting them within the ranks of his party, and the defeat of Germany enabled him to triumph. In 1948 he presented the electorate with a programme designed to save White South Africa from the evils of *laissez-faire* and liberalism, and to preserve Afrikanerdom from being undermined by alien influences. Republicanism was still important, for "the republican form of state . . . is . . . the only effective guarantee that South Africa will not again be drawn into Great Britain's wars". But other matters were more urgent.

Nationalism in Power

SINCE its dramatic victory in 1948 the Nationalist Party, under the leadership of Dr. Malan, Mr. J. G. Strijdom and Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, has been primarily concerned with setting *apartheid* in motion and dealing with the constitutional crises that that evoked. But at the same time the process of whittling away imperial links and symbols has been resumed where Hertzog left off. The South African Citizenship Act of 1949 went further than the parallel legislation of the United Kingdom and the other old members of the Commonwealth in making no provision for the common status of Commonwealth citizen or British subject, and in granting few privileges to immigrants from the Commonwealth. Appeals to the Privy Council were abolished in 1950. The Union Jack ceased to fly with the South African flag on public buildings in 1957. "God save the Queen" has been abolished as a national anthem. The uniforms and styles of rank of the armed forces have been Afrikanerized. The British tenure of the naval base at Simonstown has been brought to a close. And it has been decided that a decimal coinage shall be introduced in 1961 to replace the British system. But all such changes remain without their coping-stone so long as the Queen of England is Queen of South Africa, and there is now an overwhelming feeling within the Nationalist Party that the time has come for the realization of the republican ideal. As long ago as 1937 Malan flatly declared that the monarchy is "for the most part alien and un-Afrikaans". In January 1960 Dr. Verwoerd elaborated the point:

It is inherent in the monarchies of the Commonwealth that this person, however good and honourable he might be, is bound by bonds of birth to a different country. The fact that such a person is called the monarch of South Africa does indeed stress South Africa's independence as a completely independent State, but that does not take away the fact that the sovereign of South Africa, in terms of the monarchies of the Commonwealth, is always chosen from the heirs of the Royal Family in another State, Britain. It is not possible in a country with a

population like ours (however much one may respect the sovereign of that other country, and however much one might honour him and fulfil the obligations as long as that person is also king of one's own country) to get away from the fact that this unifying effect is not there—particularly here where more than 50 per cent of the population have a different heritage from those stemming from the country having that sovereign. Such a person cannot have the same unifying effect as a man coming from the midst even of a heterogeneous people can have. The sovereign can and does have that effect in Britain, but the same person cannot fill that rôle for the whole of South Africa. The monarchy will always be the background for division. If we want to develop a common national sentiment we must have a Head of State who comes from our own midst and whom we respect.

Meanwhile the Nationalist governments have been finding their feet in the post-war world. In many ways it is an ominous world. The expansion of communism, the emergence of new States in Asia and Africa, the reaction against colonialism in America and in Britain, spell danger. Nationalist anglophobia has been reinvigorated by what is regarded as British intransigence in the matter of the High Commission Territories, British foolhardiness in yielding to Black nationalism in West Africa and East Africa, and British injustice in the severity of the denunciations of *apartheid* in her pulpits, press and Parliament. Furthermore, the changes in its composition have made the Commonwealth an even less desirable association than it was. In 1951 Malan exploded against "the policy of converting the British Colonies, one after the other, into free, independent members of the Commonwealth, presumably on an equal footing in all respects with the existing members. . . . The Commonwealth can, and could in the past, exist only as a result of an essential identity of interests between all its members. . . . But now . . . this question must necessarily arise: what greater measure of identity or commonality or oneness exists, for example, between South Africa and India than exists between South Africa and the Netherlands, or Belgium, or France or Germany, or, for example, between Australia and the Negro State of West Africa than between Australia and the United States of America? To this question there can be but one reply." It is indeed difficult for Afrikaner Nationalists to accept with equanimity the transformation of the Commonwealth from a White Man's Club into a club for White and Brown and Black men. It is not even as though their membership of the Commonwealth has restrained India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana and Malaya from being vehement critics of South Africa. Year after year at the United Nations India has initiated attacks upon *apartheid*, upon the treatment of Indians in South Africa and upon the Union's administration of South-West Africa; and now Malaya has imposed an official embargo upon trade with the Union and it is possible that other countries, including other Commonwealth countries, may follow suit. To a great extent, therefore, contemporary facts reinforce traditional sentiment in repelling South Africa from the Commonwealth.

However, there are other facts which point in the opposite direction. If *apartheid* is out of step with the racial policies of the rest of the Commonwealth, it is also out of step with the policies of the rest of the world; and as the colonial régimes withdraw from other parts of Africa it becomes more

and more necessary for a Union Government to act positively and not merely negatively in foreign affairs. South Africa has no formal alliance with any country and would find it extremely difficult to conclude one of any value, so long as she refuses to deviate from the present version of the policy of *apartheid*. The United Kingdom and the old Dominions are among the countries which understand South Africa's problems best and have exercised most restraint when South Africa has been under fire at the United Nations. Moreover, in one important respect the South African Government finds itself in complete accord with the governments of all the other members of the Commonwealth: it is anti-communist. Were South Africa to leave the Commonwealth she would find herself alone in a cold and hostile world; she would have increased the likelihood of a concerted trade boycott; and she would have deprived herself of the opportunities she now has of putting her point of view inside and outside the formal meetings of the Prime Ministers and the other Ministers of the Commonwealth, and of Commonwealth representatives at the United Nations, in Washington, in London and elsewhere. She would also have abandoned material benefits which accrue to her as a Commonwealth country. Even though she remained in the Sterling Area, she would no longer participate in its loose system of management, for that is confined to the Commonwealth members of the Area. She would lose her privileged access to the London capital market, which still provides her with a high proportion of her development capital. And she might forfeit her imperial preferences. Even though the value of these preferences has declined since the 1930's, about half of South Africa's commodity exports still go to Commonwealth countries, and South Africa receives preferences on many of them. Nearly a third of her exports go to the United Kingdom, which gives her preferences averaging about 10 per cent over non-Commonwealth competitors in a wide range of commodities, including fresh and tinned fruit, fish and wattle products, maize and kaffir corn, and asbestos. It is estimated that these preferences apply to about three-fifths of South Africa's exports to the United Kingdom, that is to say, about one-fifth of her total commodity exports. These are facts which even a Nationalist Government cannot afford to ignore.

Adhesion, Secession or Exclusion

BEFORE 1949 it was generally assumed that, in accordance with the Balfour Declaration, allegiance to the Crown was an essential attribute of membership of the Commonwealth, so that republicanism and Commonwealth membership were mutually exclusive. The approval by the Prime Ministers' meeting of 1949 of India's request to remain in the Commonwealth as a republic removed that assumption and pointed the way to what Dr. Malan regarded as the proper course for South Africa. Reporting the decision to the Union Parliament he waxed eloquent about the advantages to South Africa of following the Indian example. The Commonwealth, he said, was linked by common interests and a common outlook, it was uniformly anti-Communist, and it had shown an ability to adapt itself to changing conditions. "I make bold to say that . . . all sections in South Africa are

agreed . . . that we want to remain in the Commonwealth if no restrictions are placed on our freedom . . . whatever the circumstances may be we would like to remain in the Commonwealth."

As we have seen, Malan himself began to boggle at the admission of Ghana. It is doubtful whether his temporary enthusiasm was ever shared by the Transvaal (Verwoerd) wing of the Nationalist Party, and since the leadership passed to that wing the prospects that the Indian example of a republic within the Commonwealth would be followed, or, if followed, adhered to, have been uncertain. In the 1960 session of Parliament legislative provision was made for a referendum of the white voters of the Union and South-West Africa, to be held at a time to be determined by the Government, on the question whether South Africa should become a republic. The Prime Minister said that if a majority of the votes cast in the referendum was in favour of the change, he would introduce the necessary legislation in a later session of parliament; but he did not commit himself on the contents of the proposed legislation. He did not even say whether he intended the republic to be inside or outside the Commonwealth. He has subsequently stated that the answer to this question will be given by a National Congress of his party and announced before the referendum. The members of that congress, which is expected to meet in August, will have to weigh their psychological urge to complete the severance of the connexion with Britain, finally and absolutely, against their calculations, not only of the adverse effects upon South Africa of her withdrawal from the Commonwealth, but also of the number of voters who would oppose a republic outside as distinct from a republic inside the Commonwealth. This last consideration may assume some importance, because while the United Party, the Progressive Party and the Liberal Party are opposing the Government on this issue in either event, the National Union, which is beginning to make some inroads into the Nationalist ranks, is supporting a republic, but only provided it is inside the Commonwealth.

The referendum may take place as early as October 1960. If the result is adverse to the Government, that will not be the end of the matter. Dr. Verwoerd has given notice that he would continue to strive to realize the republican goal. If, secondly, the decision of the Party Congress is for a republic inside the Commonwealth and the result of the referendum is favourable to the Government, it will still be for the other members of the Commonwealth to decide whether South Africa should be granted the privilege that has already been accorded to India, Pakistan and Ghana; and in all the circumstances it is conceivable, though unlikely, that the answer might be No. Thirdly, if the result of the referendum is favourable to the Government (whether the party decision is for a republic inside or outside the Commonwealth), it is still to be seen precisely how the Government will propose to translate the decision into law. The legislation might do little more than substitute a President for the Governor General, and provide for the manner of his appointment; but it might be more far-reaching.

Union of South Africa,
August 1960.

AN INDIAN VIEW

THE PIONEER REPUBLIC

WHEN, on August 15, 1947, India became a Dominion, it was the start of a process that has, in the course of years, changed both the nature and the form of the Commonwealth. It ceased, in the first place, to be a British Commonwealth. Till then it had been a community of States whose inhabitants were wholly or largely of British stock, and who felt themselves, as Mr. Menzies described it in 1950, to be "British wherever we may be". Now for the first time there had come into being a new member, whose people were of a different race, colour and religion, and had a rich and ancient culture of their own. The British Commonwealth was converted overnight into a Commonwealth of Nations, though the formal recognition of this change only came some years later. Since 1947 the Commonwealth has expanded to include many other Asian and African nations; but undoubtedly the decisive step was that taken by India. If she had opted to stay out, it would have been almost impossible for Pakistan and Ceylon to have assented to membership, and the road would not have been easy for Ghana, Malaya and the rest of the long procession we have now come to expect. Indeed, there is reason to think that Burma withdrew in the belief that India intended to do the same, and the latter's decision came as a shock to her. It was India, the pioneer of modern Asian nationalism, who established the bona fides of the new Commonwealth based less on blood than on will.

This transformation of the Commonwealth became very clear in 1949, when the other members agreed that India could continue to be a member even after she became a republic. This removed, as far as India was concerned, the traditional and symbolic link. Common allegiance to the Crown had been a strong binding force holding together the old Dominions. Now the King was to be the Head of the Commonwealth, commanding no loyalty in that capacity but serving merely as a figure-head of convenience. The example of India has been followed by others, Malaya going even further and remaining in the Commonwealth while having a monarch of her own. Tradition and sentiment are no longer the foundations of the association. The members have different constitutional forms. They do not even have a common form of political organization. One can no longer say, as so many were fond of saying till but a few years ago, that the true basis of the Commonwealth was an acceptance of British political institutions and democratic values. Pakistan has a military dictatorship which, however efficient, is not in line with democratic methods of government; and South Africa has adopted and is pursuing vigorously a policy which is in violation of all liberal principles. Perhaps India is in a sense to blame; having removed the traditional foundations of the Commonwealth and based it solely on practical considerations, she has made it possible for other members to abandon

what had once been the fundamental principles of the association without losing their membership of it.

A Functional Association

FOR the Commonwealth is now no more than an association of States who have nothing in common except the fact that they were once parts of the British Empire; and it is of a functional organization that India continues to be a member. The old Dominions are still bound by allegiance to the Crown and have common interests of foreign policy and defence, though even these latter ties have become more tenuous since the war. But to India the essential purpose of the Commonwealth is consultation on matters of common interest. She has since 1947 been consistently pursuing a foreign policy which is based on no commitments. True to the great Indian traditions of tolerance and detachment, she has evolved a policy of eschewing ideological partisanship and judging all questions on their merits and not from preconceived conclusions. Non-alignment presupposes non-involvement. She has, of course, not jettisoned her scale of values, has stood up for freedom and civil liberty everywhere and has never failed to condemn clear aggression. But she has not allowed herself to be dragged into the "cold war", and, despite the border dispute with China, has maintained friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The logical corollary of this policy of non-alignment is the refusal to adhere to military alliances, which she considers to be an extension of the "cold war" and a diminution of the "area of peace". It is only possible for India to continue in the Commonwealth because to her it does not mean entanglements in foreign policy and defence. Indeed, she has not hesitated, when the occasion arose, publicly to condemn Britain herself for aggression, and, as the memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden have made clear, during the Suez crisis the British Government resented bitterly the attitude and activities of Mr. Nehru and his advisers.

In fact, far from influencing the foreign policy of India, membership of the Commonwealth has not had even an emollient influence on her differences with other members. With most of them, it is true, India has had little trouble. Relations with Britain have been consistently cordial. The Suez crisis was exceptional, and seems to have had no permanent effect on Indo-British relations. Throughout that crisis Mr. Nehru always made it clear that his criticism was of the British Government and not of the British people, and the great volume of criticism within Britain itself lent strength to this distinction. No incident at this time was more striking, and greater proof of the strength of the Indo-British connexion, than the visit paid to Delhi by the late Mr. Aneurin Bevan. In his public address he spoke with approval of India's attitude, emphasized how greatly it had helped to bring back the British Government to the right path, and then claimed for Britain the same right to criticize India. The large audience of Members of Parliament that heard him, first in silence and then with loud applause, had vividly brought home to them the real value of the Commonwealth. The British Government had disregarded the obligation—indeed, the commitment stated

explicitly by Mr. Attlee in the House of Commons on May 8, 1946—to keep other members of the Commonwealth fully and continuously informed of all matters which Britain might be called upon to decide, but which might affect Commonwealth interests. For this lapse the British Government were legitimately criticized. But consultation and criticism, as Mr. Bevan emphasized in Delhi, formed a two-way process.

As for relations with the other Commonwealth countries, there has, since 1947, developed a strong feeling of friendship towards Canada. Till India became independent, Canada was to most Indians no more than a name on a map. All interest in America was directed towards the United States. Once freedom was attained, however, relations with Canada expanded rapidly. The considerable economic assistance received, and the fact that the two countries saw eye to eye on many issues of foreign policy, helped greatly in this. But the primary cause was that India found Mr. St. Laurent, Mr. Pearson and Mr. Diefenbaker (all of whom have visited the country) sympathetic personalities. Party politics in Canada have had no influence on Indo-Canadian relations. With Australia and New Zealand relations have never attained the same intensity. The same is true of Ghana. West Africa is still too remote a region to stir the imagination of Indians, and Mr. Nehru's personality has, at least in their eyes, eclipsed that of Dr. Nkrumah. Relations with Malaya, too, while pleasant, are still somewhat insipid. The problem of the Indian settlers periodically disturbs good relations with Ceylon, but it has not been allowed to have an influence out of proportion to its real importance. Particularly in recent years the two countries have drawn closer to each other. Much of the credit for this, on Ceylon's side, goes to the late Mr. Bandaranaike, and it is to be seen, once Ceylon has again a stable government, whether the goodwill departed with him.

Unsympathetic Partners

BUT with Pakistan and South Africa India's relations have been throughout in a state of acute tension; and it is one of the ironies of Commonwealth history that, till the recent worsening of relations with China, the two States that the Indian Government, and Indian public opinion generally, regarded with most dislike were members of the Commonwealth. Pakistan was born of passion, and is the embodiment of all the principles that India denies. It was the product of the assertion of a political party, representative of a large religious community, that people of different faiths could not live together and that religion was the basis of nationality. Partition, and the horrors that followed it, made it impossible for the two peoples to forget the enmity that had dominated the recent past; and the policy of the new State of Pakistan seemed to most Indians to be inspired solely by a desire to harm India. She encouraged the princely States of Junagadh and Hyderabad to resist the Indian Government in order to prevent unity. But it was Kashmir that became the major point of friction, and it has bedevilled relations ever since. To the outside observer the case of Pakistan on Kashmir may well sound plausible. Pakistan itself had come into existence on the basis that the Muslims in India formed a separate nationality and had the right to

a homeland of their own; and there was no reason why the logic, however pernicious, that all territories wherein Muslims formed a majority should be transferred to Pakistan, should not be applied to Kashmir. But in India there is near unanimity that the Government's policy on Kashmir is in its broad essentials right and, indeed, the only one possible. In consenting to the formation of Pakistan the people of India were accepting not the principle of religious nationality but that of self-determination. If the majority of inhabitants living in certain areas wished to secede they should be allowed to do so; and the fact that these people wished to secede because they were Muslims was unfortunate, but essentially irrelevant. Certainly India could never accept that other areas where there happened to be Muslim majorities should for that very reason automatically be transferred to Pakistan. This would have destroyed the foundations on which free India has been building herself; for she takes pride in being a secular state wherein people of different faiths, including a large minority of Muslims, live together in harmony. The problem was further complicated by Pakistan's effort to force the issue. Tribal invasions sponsored by her hustled the Maharaja into acceding to India, and the armies of India and Pakistan fought each other in Kashmir for a few months till a cease fire was reached. India referred the case to the United Nations, and from the start made it clear that Pakistan was an aggressor who should vacate the territory she had occupied, whereupon India would enable the people of Kashmir to determine their own future by a plebiscite. Sir Owen Dixon, the Chief Justice of Australia, who was invited by the United Nations to report on the Kashmir issue in 1950, agreed that Pakistan had been guilty of violating international law. But Pakistan is still in occupation of a part of Kashmir.

To India, therefore, the basic issue in Kashmir is that of aggression, which all the events and changes in Kashmir, in Pakistan and in the world during the last thirteen years have not altered; and the feeling that the United Nations has not squarely faced this issue has been the cause of much disillusion. Her denunciation of a fellow member of the Commonwealth as an aggressor has, of course, been a source of embarrassment to the other members. This is a development without precedent in the history of the Commonwealth; and the fact that the association has survived it is perhaps the best proof of its strength. But there has been in India considerable resentment at the failure of the members of the Commonwealth to condemn Pakistan in a forthright manner and their efforts to take what they consider an impartial view.

If, however, in her relations with Pakistan India has felt herself in isolation, she has had the moral support of the whole Commonwealth in her dealings with South Africa. The problem of the South African citizens of Indian descent has a long history, and even the British Indian Government had found themselves dissenting from the South African Government. Since 1947 the Indian Government, like their British predecessors, have criticized the South African Government's policy of racial segregation and opposed all efforts to send these persons back to India. The attitude which the Indian Government have been consistently adopting in all parts of the world is that

Indians settled overseas should regard themselves as loyal citizens of their lands of domicile, and not seek to return to India. Gradually this question of the treatment of Indian citizens of South Africa, which India brought forward regularly at the United Nations, has merged in the larger question of *apartheid*, the policy adopted by the South African Government towards all their non-white subjects, both black and coloured. As the South African Government proceeded step by step along a course which to all men of thought and faith throughout the world was wholly indefensible, it brought the future of the Commonwealth into danger. The greatest strength of the Commonwealth is the fact that it is the only genuine multi-racial association in the world today, and if a Commonwealth Government were to be permitted to pursue such a policy of racial discrimination, sooner or later the association would be torn apart. The members of the Commonwealth, of course, realize this, and hence the gravity of the discussion of this topic among the Prime Ministers in London this summer. The communiqué issued at the end of the Conference, though worded in general and neutral phrases, could have left the South African Government in no doubt that the other Governments disapproved of *apartheid*. Unless the South African Government modify their policy—which at present seems most unlikely—it may well be that when South Africa becomes a republic, the other members will refuse their consent to her continuance in the Commonwealth. That would be the logical development of the new Commonwealth that came into existence in 1947.

The Binding Sentiment

THIS analysis of India's relations with the other members of the Commonwealth compels us to face the question why India has continued to be a member. There is no obvious reason why she should, while there would seem to be many strong arguments for secession. As far back as 1926 the Independence for India League was started by a then junior politician, Jawaharlal Nehru, with the primary object of campaigning against Dominion Status. *Purna Swaraj*—full freedom—was the slogan, there being an intense dislike of any association with the British. Yet in 1947 the Government of which Mr. Nehru was the head kept India in the Commonwealth; two years later they secured a revision of its framework to reconcile membership with republicanism; and since then they have seen nothing incongruous in belonging to an association of which Pakistan and South Africa are fellow members.

The answer to the riddle is to be found in the tradition, which developed in the last hundred years of British rule in India, of co-operation between the rulers and the ruled. From the days of Macaulay there had been an emphasis on the ultimate logic of British rule, on Indian self-government as the fulfilment of the British adventure. Administrators like Munro and Elphinstone, and Viceroy's like Canning and Ripon, Irwin and Mountbatten, had always understood their primary task to be to prepare for the day—"the proudest day in English history"—when the British could withdraw from India. Outside the ranks of officialdom, too, were men like the first editor of *THE ROUND TABLE*, who devoted their energies to making the attainment

of Indian freedom a co-operative task. This had its response in Indian nationalism, which never acquired an exclusive character, and whose greatest leader formulated a policy of appealing to the conscience of the British. There were, of course, extremists on the Indian side just as there were die-hards on the British; but neither of them were, fortunately for both countries, ever in control. The transfer of power was effected in 1947 in an atmosphere of cordial goodwill. The Indian people elected to forget the bitter memories, and remembered only the pleasant aspects, of their relations with Britain. Almost all the politically articulate sections of the people had been educated in the English language, and many of their leaders had been educated abroad. Mr. Nehru has recently acknowledged that his years at Harrow influenced his decision in favour of maintaining the Commonwealth connexion; and Mr. Nehru is the symbol of the many Indians who have been educated in British schools and universities and the many more who have been steeped in British ways of life and thought. Indeed, it has been said with much justification that the only real Englishmen left in the world today are those of Indian birth. The basic tie which has kept India in the Commonwealth is one of sentiment; and it is a tie which observers from other countries, including both the United States and the Soviet Union, have found it difficult to understand.

Today, thirteen years after the British withdrew as rulers from India, this sentimental tie is still strong. The Indian people owe no allegiance to the British Crown; yet last year they gave the Duke of Edinburgh a tumultuous reception such as he has rarely received anywhere else, and Queen Elizabeth can expect as great a reception, if not a greater, when she visits India next year. But sentiment is by its very nature a fading bond, which may outlast a few decades, but will hardly outlive a generation. Even four years ago a writer in *THE ROUND TABLE* could speak of an "inert acceptance" view of the Commonwealth in India. If India remains in the Commonwealth today still mainly because of sentiment, she can only, as time passes, continue to do so because of its advantage.

This utility of Commonwealth membership already exists, and is generally recognized. All political parties except the Communists today acknowledge that India stands to gain by being in the Commonwealth; and the Communist criticism that India's membership is part of the general nexus with Western capitalism carries little conviction. In the last debate a few months ago on this issue in the House of the People, the Government spokesman described the Communist effort as one of "flogging a dead horse".

A Medium of Influence

BUT in what way does India benefit by being a member of the Commonwealth? Not primarily in technical assistance, educational facilities and trading privileges, great as they are; there is in fact a greater volume of co-operation of this nature with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Membership of the Commonwealth has been most useful to India in that it has enabled her to exercise a greater influence in the world. It is of advantage to belong to the best, and most effective, organizational expression that we

have of the world's interdependence. Just as the membership of India has added to the political strength and influence of the Commonwealth in that India represents, more perhaps than any other nation, free and uncommitted opinion in Asia and Africa, so membership of the Commonwealth has enabled India to reach out and influence opinion in all parts of the world. She was, for example, among the first to recognize the Communist régime in China, and it would not be wrong to say that Britain followed in her wake. Throughout the Korean war, Mr. Nehru's reactions and assessments of Chinese policy were of crucial significance, and Delhi became one of the great junctions of world affairs. At the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954, as we now know from Sir Anthony Eden's *Memoirs*, the views of India influenced the policy of the British Government considerably, and therefore could not be ignored by the United States. The use of the Commonwealth as a medium through which India can express herself has, in fact, taken firm root; and today, on both the questions of relations with the Communist Powers and of the future Africa—perhaps the two most important problems confronting mankind—the Indian outlook has undoubtedly coloured that of the Commonwealth. It is as a multi-racial association for consultation on such matters of common interest that India hopes to see the Commonwealth develop and grow stronger; for from participation in such an association she herself draws strength.

India,

August 1960.

of Indian freedom a co-operative task. This had its response in Indian nationalism, which never acquired an exclusive character, and whose greatest leader formulated a policy of appealing to the conscience of the British. There were, of course, extremists on the Indian side just as there were die-hards on the British; but neither of them were, fortunately for both countries, ever in control. The transfer of power was effected in 1947 in an atmosphere of cordial goodwill. The Indian people elected to forget the bitter memories, and remembered only the pleasant aspects, of their relations with Britain. Almost all the politically articulate sections of the people had been educated in the English language, and many of their leaders had been educated abroad. Mr. Nehru has recently acknowledged that his years at Harrow influenced his decision in favour of maintaining the Commonwealth connexion; and Mr. Nehru is the symbol of the many Indians who have been educated in British schools and universities and the many more who have been steeped in British ways of life and thought. Indeed, it has been said with much justification that the only real Englishmen left in the world today are those of Indian birth. The basic tie which has kept India in the Commonwealth is one of sentiment; and it is a tie which observers from other countries, including both the United States and the Soviet Union, have found it difficult to understand.

Today, thirteen years after the British withdrew as rulers from India, this sentimental tie is still strong. The Indian people owe no allegiance to the British Crown; yet last year they gave the Duke of Edinburgh a tumultuous reception such as he has rarely received anywhere else, and Queen Elizabeth can expect as great a reception, if not a greater, when she visits India next year. But sentiment is by its very nature a fading bond, which may outlast a few decades, but will hardly outlive a generation. Even four years ago a writer in *THE ROUND TABLE* could speak of an "inert acceptance" view of the Commonwealth in India. If India remains in the Commonwealth today still mainly because of sentiment, she can only, as time passes, continue to do so because of its advantage.

This utility of Commonwealth membership already exists, and is generally recognized. All political parties except the Communists today acknowledge that India stands to gain by being in the Commonwealth; and the Communist criticism that India's membership is part of the general nexus with Western capitalism carries little conviction. In the last debate a few months ago on this issue in the House of the People, the Government spokesman described the Communist effort as one of "flogging a dead horse".

A Medium of Influence

BUT in what way does India benefit by being a member of the Commonwealth? Not primarily in technical assistance, educational facilities and trading privileges, great as they are; there is in fact a greater volume of co-operation of this nature with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Membership of the Commonwealth has been most useful to India in that it has enabled her to exercise a greater influence in the world. It is of advantage to belong to the best, and most effective, organizational expression that we

have of the world's interdependence. Just as the membership of India has added to the political strength and influence of the Commonwealth in that India represents, more perhaps than any other nation, free and uncommitted opinion in Asia and Africa, so membership of the Commonwealth has enabled India to reach out and influence opinion in all parts of the world. She was, for example, among the first to recognize the Communist régime in China, and it would not be wrong to say that Britain followed in her wake. Throughout the Korean war, Mr. Nehru's reactions and assessments of Chinese policy were of crucial significance, and Delhi became one of the great junctions of world affairs. At the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954, as we now know from Sir Anthony Eden's *Memoirs*, the views of India influenced the policy of the British Government considerably, and therefore could not be ignored by the United States. The use of the Commonwealth as a medium through which India can express herself has, in fact, taken firm root; and today, on both the questions of relations with the Communist Powers and of the future Africa—perhaps the two most important problems confronting mankind—the Indian outlook has undoubtedly coloured that of the Commonwealth. It is as a multi-racial association for consultation on such matters of common interest that India hopes to see the Commonwealth develop and grow stronger; for from participation in such an association she herself draws strength.

India,
August 1960.

A VIEW FROM PAKISTAN

THE END OF WHITE PREDOMINANCE

WHEN the time came for Pakistan and India to emerge as independent States, there existed a pattern under which nations formerly dependent upon Britain were associated with her as fully sovereign States. To extend that pattern to nations of Asia was a bold and momentous decision. In 1957 another similar decision was taken and Ghana became the first African country to be admitted to the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth was originally an association of white nations, who followed the Christian religion, who lived according to European ways and standards and who, except for the Boers of South Africa and the French of Quebec, spoke English. In fact the old members of the Commonwealth, that is the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, represented one common civilization. They had no loyalties except to that civilization and its ideals. Because of this, the old Commonwealth was a cohesive organization, with definite attitudes. With the entry into the Commonwealth of Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Ghana and the Federation of Malaya, all this has changed. The whites, not more than one hundred million, in the entire Commonwealth, are outnumbered by the non-whites, who are not less than five hundred million. Anglo-Saxon culture is no longer predominant in the Commonwealth and Christianity is just one of several main religions that prevail in it. The older Commonwealth countries are highly developed economically and have high standards of living and extensive social services. The new Asian and African members are deficient in all these respects. Thus amongst the constituent units of the Commonwealth today there is far less uniformity than there was amongst those of the former white Commonwealth.

Pakistan and India were the first two non-white States to join the Commonwealth. They joined it by their own decision. But they were admitted to it by the decision of its older members. These members must have known that by admitting Asian countries and later African countries, they would be totally changing the character of their Commonwealth and that it would cease to be exclusively theirs.

What was the alternative to admitting Pakistan and India to the Commonwealth? Enough had happened in this sub-continent to show that its people could not be kept in perpetual subjection. If they had to be independent, it was better, from the point of view of the members of the old Commonwealth, that the new independent States should be associated with them, rather than be cut off from them altogether. That view was dictated, no doubt, by strategic, political, economic and perhaps sentimental considerations. Similar considerations doubtless weighed with the leaders of Pakistan and India to persuade them that their countries should join the Commonwealth.

An important characteristic of the organization of the Commonwealth is its flexibility. The Dominions, as the member States were formerly called, were not set up as sovereign States. They evolved their sovereignty over a period of time, and the first agreed and explicit statement about it was the Balfour formula of 1926. The Dominions obtained the right to enter into treaties, and to send to and receive from other States diplomatic representatives as well as the right to make war and peace. Under the Balfour formula the Dominions owed allegiance to the Crown. In 1949 India decided to adopt a republican form of government. She was allowed to remain a full member of the Commonwealth, recognizing the King as its Head, but not owing allegiance to him. In 1956 Pakistan became a republic and it was agreed that she should continue as a full member of the Commonwealth.

Scope of Co-operation

THE members of the Commonwealth co-operate with each other in a variety of matters. This co-operation consists in mutual consultation in policy matters and providing each other with services and assistance. Pakistan has participated in the conferences of Commonwealth Prime Ministers and Finance Ministers and in the other conferences that have been held from time to time, to consider economic affairs, trade, communications, science and research and education. There are a number of Commonwealth Committees and Councils of which Pakistan is a member. Pakistan belongs to the sterling area. At the time of independence Pakistan's trade was mostly with India and the United Kingdom. As a result of Pakistan's policy of diversifying her trade and because of difficulties with India, this position was changed. But Pakistan still has substantial trade with the United Kingdom and her trade with the other Commonwealth countries has increased. At present 37 per cent of Pakistan's trade is with Commonwealth countries. Pakistan's participation in the Commonwealth system of tariff preferences is insignificant. Pakistan takes advantage of educational and training facilities in Commonwealth countries.

By far the most impressive form of Commonwealth co-operation in which Pakistan participates is the Colombo Plan, under which she has received assistance from certain Commonwealth countries, the total allocations (until the end of 1959) being:

- | | |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Canada | \$C109.5 million. |
| 2. Australia | £A12.29 million. |
| 3. New Zealand | £NZ2.06 million. |
| 4. United Kingdom | £1.34 million. |

Appreciative as Pakistan is of this assistance from the Commonwealth, it must be stated that she had received until the end of December 1959 economic aid from the United States of the value of \$1,118.97 million. Thus economically Pakistan's mainstay is not the Commonwealth but the United States.

Pakistan depends principally on the United States also for military aid. In 1954 Pakistan signed the Mutual Security Pact with the United States. This

is purely a defensive arrangement. No aggressor is named in the treaty. The arms supplied under it to Pakistan are not to be used for any aggressive purpose. In entering into this pact, the United States was moved by the desire to check Communist aggression in the area. However, as Pakistan expected, the arrangement has proved to be an effective deterrent to Indian aggression against her, for since it was entered into there have been no troop movements by India on Pakistan's borders. In 1954 Pakistan joined the South-East Asia Defence Organization, for short S.E.A.T.O., of which the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand are also members and of which the most powerful and therefore the most important member is the United States. In 1955 Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, which, on the withdrawal from it of Iraq, in 1959, was renamed the Central Treaty Organization. The other members of C.E.N.T.O. are the United Kingdom, Turkey and Iran. The United States is not a member of it, but participates in all its committees.

The value of S.E.A.T.O. and C.E.N.T.O., as defence organizations, is largely psychological. Pakistan depends for her defence upon the determination of her people to preserve their independence, assisted by the technological resources of the United States. Pakistan accepts American military aid as do many other non-Communist countries, some of them having far greater resources than Pakistan. She accepts that aid purely for defensive purposes. With the Soviet Union, India and China, Pakistan wishes to have the friendliest relations, for it would be the height of folly for her to seek any other kind of relations with such powerful neighbours.

In the context of the prevailing inter-block rivalry, it was understandable that the Soviet Union and China should condemn Pakistan's adhesion to the pacts with the West. Out of gratitude to the Soviet Union, whose veto always came to his rescue in the Security Council on the Kashmir question, Pandit Nehru roundly condemned the western system of alliances. Pakistanis always believed, and it is now clear, that India objected to Pakistan's pacts with the west on the ground that India did not wish to see any accession to the defensive strength of Pakistan. However, now that India senses danger from China, India no longer condemns Pakistan's defensive pacts, though Pandit Nehru still harps on the virtues of non-alignment.

Bad Relations with India

ESSENTIALLY non-alignment is a better policy, especially for countries living next door to powerful neighbours. But it is meaningless for both India and Pakistan so long as their mutual relations are as bad as they have been. It is in this background that President Ayub Khan's offer of joint defence to Pandit Nehru must be understood. The Pandit rejected that offer. But other leading Indians, such as Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, are in favour of accepting it, for they realize that even with the help of the western powers India cannot be defended without the spontaneous and active co-operation of Pakistan. Such co-operation would not be forthcoming unless the Kashmir question were settled. This has been made amply clear by both the President and the Foreign Minister of Pakistan.

The Kashmir dispute is a child of the Radcliffe award. Its other child is the

waters dispute with India. Sir Cyril (now Lord) Radcliffe, who demarcated the boundary between India and Pakistan, going against his terms of reference, awarded the Muslim majority district of Gurdaspur to India. This made it possible for India to carry on military operations in Kashmir and consolidate her hold over it. He also gave away to India other large Muslim majority areas. Lord Radcliffe justified this departure from his terms of reference on the ground that communal considerations in the disposition of territory must give way before "other factors", such as the necessity of assuring the flow of irrigation waters. Actually, he disrupted the irrigation system of West Pakistan. The boundary line which he drew cuts across canals and rivers flowing into West Pakistan.

Although Pakistanis regarded the Radcliffe award as unfair, they accepted it, as they were morally bound to. India, too, accepted it. But in the spring of 1948, after the Arbitral Tribunal, which had been set up to decide disputed issues between the two countries, had been wound up, India, in violation of the stipulations contained in the award, stopped the waters in the two canals originating on her side of the border. This caused considerable hardship and alarm in Pakistan. India claimed absolute right to the waters that flowed out of her territory. This was a denial of the rights of a lower riparian State and therefore contrary to international law.

This was clearly a serious situation for Pakistan, particularly in view of the Indian threat to stop the waters altogether in 1962. The matter was taken in hand by the World Bank, under whose auspices negotiations began between the two countries for a settlement of the waters dispute. It was announced on March 1, 1960, that the negotiations had resulted in an agreement, which would be embodied in a treaty to be signed by both countries. According to the agreement the waters of the Indus basin would be divided, the three eastern rivers, the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej, being exclusively for the use of India and the three western rivers, the Chenab, the Jhelum and the Indus, likewise for the use of Pakistan. Under this arrangement it is contemplated that water will be transferred from the western rivers to supply the need of those areas of West Pakistan, which have hitherto depended on the three eastern rivers. This would involve the construction of storage tanks, link canals and other works, the total cost of which would be \$1,000 million, partly in foreign exchange and partly in local currencies. The Bank would give loans to India and Pakistan of the value of \$103,000,000, the United States a grant of \$177,000,000 and a loan of \$103,000,000 and another of \$235,000,000 in local currencies. Grants promised by other countries are: Australia £A6,964,286; Canada \$C22,100,000; Germany 126,000,000 D.Marks; New Zealand £NZ1,000,000 and the United Kingdom £20,860,000.

It will thus be seen that the countries of the Commonwealth would be making a notable contribution to the enormous cost of the construction of the works on which depends the settlement of one of the major disputes between India and Pakistan. However, the attitude of these countries is determined more by a desire to appease India in her defiance of international law than by a desire to bring about a solution which is fair and lasting. Such

a solution would have been to get India, consistently with her legal obligations, to allow Pakistan to draw her historic share of the waters of the eastern rivers, India herself drawing her historic share of them. A solution such as that would have avoided colossal expenditure such as is contemplated under the World Bank's proposals. It is sometimes said that India needs the waters of the eastern rivers also for irrigating Rajasthan. That could be done with the surplus waters of the Jamna-Ganges basin. In any event, Pakistanis have the legitimate fear that so long as India is in possession of Kashmir, she will be in a position to interfere with the waters of the western rivers.

The Kashmir dispute would never have arisen if Lord Radcliffe had not awarded the district of Gurdaspur to India. It would have been nipped in the bud if the Commonwealth Governments had heeded Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's appeals to them to use their good offices to persuade Pandit Nehru to desist from his military adventure in Kashmir and to sit round a table and talk the matter over. It would most probably have been settled in the spring of 1948, if Mr. Attlee's Government had not decided to go back on the plan for which Mr. Noel Baker had helped to build up a consensus amongst the members of the Security Council. Having once succeeded, through the good offices of the British Government and the United States Government, in coercing the Security Council into abandoning that consensus, India has gone from one defiance of that body to another.

An undeclared war was fought in Kashmir between Pakistan and India throughout 1948, the Commanders-in-Chief of the two opposing armies being both Britons. After the Indian army had suffered a serious reverse, its British Commander-in-Chief sent a signal directly to his countryman on the other side to arrange for a cease-fire. This was agreed to. These are points of no ordinary interest in Commonwealth history.

After the cease-fire, according to the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, accepted by both countries, Kashmir was to be demilitarized and a free plebiscite held to determine whether that State should accede to India or Pakistan. India has steadily refused to permit the holding of the plebiscite, despite repeated resolutions of the Security Council.

If the Commonwealth stands for self-determination and for the sanctity of agreements, then clearly the situation in Kashmir is inconsistent with the character of the Commonwealth. Foreign Minister Manzur Qadir said in March 1960 that there were three parties to the Kashmir question, Pakistan, India and the people of Kashmir. If a settlement of the question through a plebiscite is not acceptable, let someone suggest some other solution and Pakistan would be glad to consider it. So far there has been no response from India to this plea.

Surviving Racial Tensions

WE have said that it was a bold and momentous decision for the white members of the Commonwealth to admit Asian and African countries into it and to destroy its predominantly white character. This decision clearly implied that the white nations of the Commonwealth were renouncing once

and for all their claim to racial superiority and the right to rule over other people. If these ideas could be implemented in practice, the way would be opened to a new era of tranquillity and progress. Unfortunately racial tensions still prevail in the Commonwealth. An instance of that fact is the deplorable policy of the Union of South Africa. Pakistan has been firmly opposed to racial discrimination and *apartheid*. The situation in South Africa is contradictory of the very character of the Commonwealth and creates misgivings about it in Asian-African countries.

It is a matter of satisfaction that African countries are fast moving towards self-government or independence. Some of them are having birth pangs, as Pakistan did. Doubtless they will all have to face serious difficulties that all countries must after they have attained independence. But these difficulties should not discourage them nor those who sympathize with them in their new status of independence. It is a matter of profound regret, however, to Pakistanis that independence should still be denied to Algeria and that its people should be subjected to what is literally a genocide. Pakistan expects that the entire weight of the Commonwealth should be thrown behind the demand for a settlement of the Algerian question on the basis of self-determination.

The 1956 invasion of Egypt, in which the United Kingdom participated, was a clear case of resort to naked force. It was reminiscent of imperialist adventures of former days and could not be reconciled with the ideals of the new Commonwealth. Its Asian members found themselves in an extremely difficult situation and in Pakistan there was widespread demand for quitting the Commonwealth. Although mutual consultation on all major questions is supposed to be of the essence of the Commonwealth link, Pakistan at least was not consulted about the warlike steps that the United Kingdom proposed to take in Suez.

We have noticed that there is a great deal of diversity amongst the members of the new Commonwealth. But as a consequence of their common "upbringing" under the British, they share certain features with each other. The most important of these is the use of the English language for official and cultural purposes. As a result of that, they have the same values, in particular, political values. Their legal systems too are largely based on English Law. Finally, they all believe in the democratic form of government.

Until the revolution that took place in Pakistan in October 1958, it was generally assumed that parliamentary democracy of the Westminster variety was the accepted form of government in the Commonwealth. That type of government, which had worked successfully in Britain and the older Dominions, presupposed the existence of electors and leaders at various levels, who were educated, intelligent, responsible and public-spirited. Such electors and leaders did not come into being in those countries overnight. It took Britain hundreds of years gradually to evolve her system (and her tradition) of parliamentary government. In that evolution a vital part was played not only by the Reform Acts and the Representation Acts, but also by such measures as provided the people with extended facilities for education, increased social services or raised their economic status.

It is not surprising that it was discovered in Pakistan and in some other Asian and African countries that they were not sufficiently developed socially to be able to make a success of parliamentary democracy. Under President Mohammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan is now attempting to work out a pattern of government which will be democratic in spirit and substance, but which will avoid risks such as are incidental to the parliamentary type in socially underdeveloped communities.

The temporary suppression of democratic government and the assumption of power by President Ayub Khan seemingly posed a challenge to the principles on which the Commonwealth was based. The flexible Commonwealth, however, reconciled itself to the change and Pakistan has remained a member of it. President Ayub Khan attended the meetings of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers held in London in May 1960 and by all accounts he made a deep impression on his colleagues by his political acumen, sincerity and frankness.

We have spoken of disputes within the Commonwealth. If these disputes could be settled it would immeasurably add not only to the strength but also to the moral authority of the Commonwealth. Imagine Pakistan and India co-operating in the spheres of defence and economics. That would make a vast difference not only to their own circumstances but to the circumstances of South Asia as a whole. That would relieve both of tensions that have had a deleterious effect on their economies and even their respective political situations.

One of the most valuable gifts that the British have given to the world is the concept of the rule of law. It is through the rule of law that the rights of people are safeguarded and justice established between them. The rule of law is a part of the inheritance of the Commonwealth. It is now time that it should be extended to the international sphere. For the settlement of international disputes that are justiciable, there exists the Court of International Justice, which is one of the principal organs of the United Nations. But unfortunately most of the leading nations of the world accept the jurisdiction of that Court subject to important reservations. That is true of the United States as well as the nations of the Commonwealth. In 1959 Mr. Richard Nixon, speaking in London, made a spirited plea for the renouncing of those reservations by the United States. Although Congressional opinion did not permit that step to be taken by the United States Government, the fact that it was publicly advocated by the Vice-President underlines its importance. Amongst the reservations that Commonwealth countries, barring Pakistan, make is the exclusion from the jurisdiction of the Court of all disputes with other members of the Commonwealth. This reservation, in view of the fact that there is no machinery within the Commonwealth for the settlement of disputes between its members, is the least defensible. What the United States failed to do, the countries of the Commonwealth should and withdraw all their reservations to the jurisdiction of the International Court. That would be their contribution to the establishment of the rule of law in the international sphere.

Pakistan,

August 1960.

A CENTRAL AFRICAN VIEW

A FLUID SITUATION

THE Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has close ties with the United Kingdom and also with the Union of South Africa and is deeply affected by the actions and the attitudes of the governments of these two Commonwealth countries at the present time. The ties with the United Kingdom are the relationship existing between the Protectorates of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia and the British Government, together with a rather similar relationship which exists between the Home Government and the self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia. Since 1953 there has been in existence the new Federal bond between the three British territories themselves and between the Federal unit and the United Kingdom Government. The Protectorates work through the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office is concerned with the Federation itself and with Southern Rhodesia. The ties between the Federation and the Union of South Africa are many and varied. As the Federation is completely land-locked we have to use ports in neighbouring countries, and a main supply line runs through the Union of South Africa to her ports. As the Federation is not industrially developed we provide a very good market for Union industries and there is much going and coming by a great number of Europeans, but Africans are finding it increasingly difficult to travel between the two countries.

Along with the whole continent the three territories of Central Africa move towards self-government, but the final form which this will take is by no means clear. Nyasaland is the poorest State economically, the most backward both educationally and politically. At the time of writing a Conference on Constitutional Development is sitting in London and it can be expected that agreement on franchise and a time-table of steps towards self-government will be arrived at. Early in 1959 there was serious rioting in the Protectorate, with loss of life, and this happening resulted in the postponement of the Conference for nearly two years.

Northern Rhodesia was granted considerable political advance less than two years ago and the Governor and the Colonial Office have now transferred much of their power to elected Ministers, both white and black. The franchise has been broadened; but the details of the qualifications are most complex and further changes and also simplification can be expected, possibly within a year.

Southern Rhodesia has been self-governing since 1923, but her Constitution contains certain restrictions, and the consent of Her Majesty the Queen is required for legislation which may be discriminatory between the races. The effect of these restrictions has been to ensure consultation between the governments of Great Britain and Southern Rhodesia on all measures that could possibly be discriminatory and not just on those which were ruled so to be. Discussions have taken place regularly between the two governments,

and proposed Bills have not been submitted to the Legislature until they have been cleared by the Commonwealth Relations Office. In recent months the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia has demanded the removal of all remaining restrictions, and further discussions between the two governments are expected to take place before the end of the year. The British Government has, however, given a general assurance that if such restrictions are removed they will have to be replaced by safeguards which will be just as effective. There is nevertheless a wide difference of opinion regarding the effectiveness of the present restrictions.

While the three Territories all seek constitutional advance they must do so within a Federal structure, unless we are to see a dissolution of the Federation; and this is a possibility.

Africans Unconverted

THIS introduction will demonstrate just how fluid is the situation of the countries of Central Africa, for no Territory is entirely self-governing and the Federal Constitution itself is now awaiting review. In these circumstances we are particularly dependent upon the United Kingdom Government and our relationship is vital.

The Federation was established in 1953 and started off in an atmosphere of hope. Until 1957 the economic advance made was spectacular, but in that year there was a serious slump in the price of copper, and almost at the same time came rumblings of racial trouble. When the Federation was established it was recognized that many people were opposed to the move. In Southern Rhodesia one-third of the electorate, which was almost entirely white, voted against the proposition; and in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland many people and their Chiefs had demonstrated an almost violent opposition. Both Her Majesty's Government and local governments believed, however, that the benefits which would accrue from the union would soon convert the dissenters.

Unfortunately, despite spectacular economic progress the African people of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have certainly not changed their attitude except to show an even greater opposition to the continuance of the Federal régime. It is true that the African people of the northern territories have not benefited economically in proportion to the advances made by the country as a whole; but it is also true to say that economic advance in itself does not meet the whole need of a people, and the African people are no exception to the rule that bread alone is not satisfying.

Under the Constitution, 1960 was the first year in which a review could be carried out. The Federal Government began in 1957 to call for such changes in the Constitution as would bring "Dominion Status", but this call disturbed the African people to such an extent that protests were made to the United Kingdom Government, which has a special relationship to the indigenous people in that they consider the Queen to be their Protector. It appears that Her Majesty's Government is not free from certain deep conflicts in her relationship to the Federation, for the racial link with a quarter of a million dominant whites can prove to be an embarrassment. This is quite natural

and is understandable; but it does not make matters easier and it does demand of the Home Government that they maintain a particularly objective attitude. During 1958 Africans came to the belief that the British Government would give the Federal Government anything they asked and eventually it was decided in Nyasaland that protests must be made, protests of a kind that would not be misunderstood. Early in 1959 came widespread trouble throughout the Federation with the declaration of states of emergency, the imprisonment of many hundreds of people and the loss of fifty lives.

There was no longer any doubt about the attitude of the African people of the north, and the Southern Rhodesian Government stated that a serious position existed in that country also, warranting the declaration of a state of emergency.

Following the riots Her Majesty's Government decided that full opportunity must be afforded every section of the people in the three territories to express their views on the situation that existed. A Commission of Inquiry under Lord Monckton was established and a report is expected immediately. The new developments meant that the Conference on Constitutional Matters had to be postponed, and Africans came to the belief that there was now little immediate danger of losing the protection of the Queen. The quality of the commissioners under the chairmanship of Lord Monckton, and the painstaking manner of their work, has led to a general belief that the report will be so authoritative that it will not be easy for governments to escape its recommendations.

On the other hand, as the electors are almost entirely European, there is a serious danger that they will reject any wide extension of the franchise; and it is probable that this fundamental change will be a vital part of the report. The British Government must have realized that if a Commission of this kind were set up at their instigation, then a great responsibility would also rest with them to face the implications of the recommendations that would be made. It seems likely that Great Britain will find herself on the horns of a dilemma when the report is available; for the maximum recommended by the Commission will be the very minimum accepted by 95 per cent of our people, no matter what the electorate may feel about it. The relationship of Great Britain to the Federation is not very comfortable, but it is vital for our future. Britain has a deep responsibility to assist our eight million people along the road of sound political and economic development.

Southern Rhodesia and Great Britain

THE responsibility of the British Government is not confined to the Northern Territories, though, in the relationship through the Colonial Office, there is no doubt whatever regarding the extent and nature of her involvement or of her powers. Recent riots in Southern Rhodesia have brought that Colony into the news and have also high-lighted the relationship between Great Britain and this Colony, which has been self-governing since 1923. Under the Constitution it is held that the electorate in Southern Rhodesia is virtually all-powerful. At first glance it would appear that this is so, and there is no doubt that the whole weight of tradition supports those

who hold that Britain could not interfere in the affairs of Southern Rhodesia even if she would wish to do so. The British Government has made it very clear that it has no wish to interfere. On the other hand there are certain facts that are proving a distinct embarrassment to Her Majesty's Government, and are likely to become even more disturbing as the months pass. The most dangerous is that in Southern Rhodesia less than 10 per cent of the people wield 95 per cent of the political power. This situation is not only out-dated: it is a scandal in the new Africa and will in itself make trade and relations in general between Southern Rhodesia and the new African States very difficult to maintain. It brings to the Commonwealth scene a problem that is delicate to put it at its easiest and that may lead to bitter feelings amongst Commonwealth countries, especially if it were possible for Britain to bring pressure to bear upon Southern Rhodesia and she refrained from taking action. Another problem that concerns Britain is the embarrassment Southern Rhodesia causes to the possibility of maintaining a Federation of the three States. Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are not against the concept of Federation, but they do not wish to be linked with Southern Rhodesia because of the pattern of race relations that exists in that Colony.

But a new factor has now to be taken into consideration, and that is the influence and power of the new self-governing African States within the Commonwealth. Here is a new interplay of forces, which makes it increasingly difficult for Britain to take a "white" view of the problems that arise in a multi-racial State. It is not suggested that Her Majesty's Government would deliberately take a racial or prejudiced view of such problems; but in the past much has depended upon the "white" Governments of Kenya, Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa, and the information from such States has not always been unprejudiced. It is now certain that the coloured nations of the Commonwealth, and particularly the African nations, will insist that the claims and the rights of the people of their own colour be given full weight. These new nations have so recently emerged from colonialism that they are particularly sensitive to the feelings of people in the Federation who are denied votes.

There is no doubt that steady advance will be made in Northern Rhodesia and in Nyasaland, for in these matters Britain herself has the largest say, the decisive voice. Advance and development in the Federal sphere is more difficult to foresee; but Britain has great influence in this matter also, and, in the last resort, she has power to break up the Federation.

Southern Rhodesia, however, is a very special case. If Britain cannot use great influence with this government, and if the white electorate refuses to abandon its policy of white supremacy, then the Federation may not survive. It appears, however, that not only may the future of the Federation hinge upon what happens in Southern Rhodesia, but the prestige of Britain herself may well suffer; for Her Majesty's Government is concerned, in its relationship with Southern Rhodesia, with a régime founded upon an electorate which is almost entirely white and which, although it numbers only 8 per cent of the population, controls 96 per cent of the votes. The continuance of this situation is based upon a Constitution that was given by Britain.

There seems no doubt that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will continue for some time to play a decisive part in the affairs of Central Africa. But when, as eventually must happen, the countries of Central Africa have celebrated their independence they will then take their place in the Commonwealth of Nations, and they will hope to find in this mature relationship the fellowship and the practical assistance of which they will be greatly in need.

No nation lives unto itself, and if this is true of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom it is even truer of the young nations of Africa. They are arriving late on the international stage; but they wish to forge ahead all the more quickly because they have missed so much. Technical assistance and loans for capital development are needed now; but with self-government comes also a great need for sympathetic understanding and practical assistance.

The challenge to the Commonwealth of the emergence of young nations is in the best British tradition, and our developing family of free nations should become the greatest force for mutual understanding and for peace that this world has known.

Central Africa,
August 1960.

A VIEW FROM THE UNITED STATES

MORE FAVORABLE APPRECIATION

AGainst the backdrop of tragic and menacing events in Cuba and the Congo, American opinions about the Commonwealth have continued steadily to evolve—and in a more favorable direction. There is, of course, no unanimity of American opinion about the successor States of the British Empire. Certainly there is no agreed conviction about its future. The most familiar view among those who give any attention to the subject may be that the Commonwealth is a wasting asset, politically, economically, militarily. Its obsequies are occasionally intoned. But somehow the Commonwealth does not die.

And more thoughtful, better informed Americans, looking at the difficulties of their own nation's relationships in the Caribbean, in Latin America, in Asia, in Africa, are inclined to see in the Commonwealth a series of important potentials:

1. The Commonwealth is the world's most impressive illustration of responsibilities fulfilled or in process of fulfilment. It is a continuing tribute to the political genius of the British people. Hence, even retrospectively, it has a bearing on the future. It shows what can be done in the tutelage of colonial peoples.

2. The Commonwealth component of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand makes up the sturdy heart of the free nations, especially when linked with western Europe and Scandinavia. Inter-related to N.A.T.O., it constitutes the best free-world alliance we have.

3. Through the Commonwealth, the western nations have a channel to newly independent nations—to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana, Malaya, Nigeria—which is also better than any other link, and may be of major utility. Through these nations, the western powers can reach other nascent peoples and States. To some degree, the Commonwealth can be a bridge to the whole uncommitted world.

4. Less concretely, perhaps, the political and institutional capacities of the British people, as exemplified in the Commonwealth, reveal skills which may be very important in the long future. British talent for tutelage and statecraft, British institutional know-how, is a resource which may stand the world in good stead.

These possibly abstruse considerations stand out for Americans very clearly in the lurid light of Cuba, the Congo, and fiascos elsewhere in the world. It is quite apparent that Britain has never thrown into the ordeal of independence a people so little prepared as the Congolese. Of course, Americans know very well that there will inevitably be grave future problems in many Commonwealth countries. Ghana is highly uncertain. India after Nehru is problematical. And so on. But there is certainly more stability,

more hope of achieving viable institutions, in the areas brought to independence by Britain than by any other colonial power.

The United States has suddenly begun to talk about regional confederations, after the rather dramatic interjection of the subject by Vice-President Nixon and Governor Rockefeller at the Republican National Convention. If there is to be a continuing trend toward confederation in various parts of the world—in the North Atlantic and in Africa, particularly—the Commonwealth nations will be vitally important parts. And the experience of the Commonwealth, overall, gives us much practical evidence on the problems and possibilities of confederation. If there are to be such confederations, they will certainly have to operate with the flexibility and tolerance which has helped to keep the Commonwealth together. Here again, British instinct and experience may be invaluable.

As time goes on and the problems of great-power responsibility mount, the United States becomes far more patient than it ever used to be with the difficulties of tutorial powers. Cuba was never a colony of the United States, but it has certainly been something of a protectorate, and the United States has intervened more than once since U.S. forces acted to bring about Cuban independence. Panama is not a colony, either, but its creation came about in a familiar imperial way. The problems now arising in the Panama Canal Zone have some resemblance to the late difficulties in Suez. The situation in Okinawa must seem very familiar to the British; certainly it reminds Americans of troubles which formerly beset the Thin Red line of 'Eroes. And so it goes, around the world.

For a while, following the independence of the Philippines, the United States was inclined to put on airs about its colonial behavior. But even in the Philippines, it is evident that things could go badly wrong unless responsible leadership continues to develop there. While no Castro has appeared among the Luzon rice terraces, few Americans doubt that it could happen—there and elsewhere.

And in many other respects, the burdens and anguishes of great power leadership fill Americans with admiration for the British example. Whatever the future holds, it is clear that Britain played a responsible rôle on the colonial stage, and was never more responsible than in the method of liquidating and modifying its far-flung duties.

A Bridge for the Free World

WHAT can the Commonwealth mean to Americans in the future? How can its bridge between advanced and less-advanced peoples be used in the interest of more freedom and well-being for all? Its utility spans the free world. In Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand stand nations most nearly like-minded to the United States of any on the planet. Canada in particular brings us all closer together. But at the other extreme stand the newest nations. With all of them, through the Commonwealth, there is some chance of understanding and co-operation. The United Nations is of immense importance, but in the small forum of the Commonwealth

there is a much better chance of working frankly on the many problems of the new nations. Americans would hope that the immense talents of the more advanced Commonwealth nations would be of assistance, within the family group, in solution of the grave difficulties of the newer nations. Of course, the Commonwealth is not the exclusive channel for such help. But perhaps it tends to open the way, to provide the prototype.

In a very crucial sense, what happens in India may determine the future of Asia and of free society in the world. Americans are increasingly aware that India is the best competitive experiment as against the formidable operations of Communist China. If India proves that representative government, a mixed economy, the effort to maintain the rule of law and civil liberties, can operate on a large scale in Asia, and if it proves that the material needs of the people can be effectively met, then the lure of Communism will be rebuffed. If India fails, Communism may have a clear field in Asia, and hence may overturn the world balance decisively.

That is why Americans are steadily enlarging their respect for the overall job Britain did in India. Had the Indians been less well prepared for independence, virtually all of Asia would be under Communist sway today. The United States is increasingly willing to help the Indian Government cope with its immense problems—to help, that is, with economic aid. It realizes that the Indian governmental structure will stand or fall just to the degree that the lessons Britain taught were really learned and can be lived. The problem of Nehru's succession is expected to provide the most severe challenge. Here, too, the background of British-Indian relations and the foreground of Commonwealth co-operation may be decisive elements. Nowhere in the world, least of all in India, does the United States seek to interfere in Commonwealth relations or to attenuate them. We hope they become stronger.

Earlier American irritations at Indian neutralism have worn away. Even now, we have not acquired British patience with some of the lectures Pandit Nehru reads us. Whatever our own moral arrogance may have been or may be, we are still sensitive to it in others. Even so, we realize India's tremendous difficulties with its giant neighbor to the north, and we see India as a great earth dam against the Communist floods. We take Nehru's pronouncements far less seriously than we did a few years ago. And many of us, at least, regret some of the ineptitudes of earlier U.S. policy towards India. We have not been happy or comfortable that our closer relationship to Pakistan should create difficulties with India. We hope earnestly that Indian-Pakistan difficulties can be totally alleviated, and we see no better place to do it than within the channels of the Commonwealth.

Turning to the other extreme of the Commonwealth—Canada, Australia, New Zealand—it may be said that American affection and admiration for these peoples is very great. It cannot be very easy for the Canadians to live with us. We are so ignorant about their affairs, we are frequently so condescending, our tourists are sometimes so utterly ill-informed and boorish, our investors and businessmen sometimes so heavy-handed and demanding, that it is a wonder the Canadians have not closed the frontier against us long

ago. Of course, the United States is an advantage to Canada, but that does not make its policies any more popular nor its capital invasion any more comforting. Really, the emotional restraint the Canadians have shown toward us is one of history's great tributes to the self-control of British peoples!

And it has paid off. Intelligent, informed Americans look upon Canadians, the Canadian Government, economy, and way of life, as of a very high order indeed. We admire the way they run their affairs more earnestly than we do that of any other people. We continue to offend them, no doubt, by thoughtlessness and ignorance, or by economic aggression, but we respect them constantly. There will be future strains on U.S.-Canadian relationships, especially in the trade area. If protectionism continues to mount in the United States, it will make difficulties with Canada. But if the Nixon-Rockefeller ideas of confederation have any meaning in North America and the North Atlantic, they may begin with the United States, Canada, and Britain. Economically, it may be that the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, recently under negotiation in Paris, will provide a link between the U.S.A., the Commonwealth, the Inner Six, and the Outer Seven. Thus, even economically, Canada and the Commonwealth can help lead the United States into still more fruitful trade channels. Certainly, Canadian leadership's efforts down through recent years to make N.A.T.O. more meaningful both economically and politically, have some chance of progress through the new O.E.C.D., and through whatever may come of the confederation talk. Manifestly, there are many problems still to be solved in the economic relations of the United States, Britain, the Commonwealth, and of the two European groupings. Americans are not entirely sure their Government's policy has been right in so emphatically backing the Euromarket group, but they hope Britain's relations with the group are clarified before conflicts and competitive pressures become acute.

No Longer a Great Power

FROM all this, it may appear that in the author's view Americans regard the Commonwealth as a great and going concern, a powerful influence in the world. This would be an overstatement. American thinking toward the Commonwealth, it may be repeated, turns in two directions: recognition of the tremendous task achieved in bringing its newer nations to statehood, which is retrospective but nevertheless has continuing significance, and the forward-looking feeling that the Commonwealth can perhaps be a channel leading to better and broader things. As a thing in itself, now, the Commonwealth is a relatively small island of likemindedness among its white members, and a kind of isthmus with its un-likeminded tinted members. Both aspects are valuable.

The Commonwealth alone, particularly its agreed and kindred nations, is neither big enough nor strong enough to be a great power—a third force—in the world. But its members, its two different kinds of members, each open out on other nations, the decisive nations in the world. The Commonwealth is one of the few institutions—the only institution if we define the United Nations as something different—which possesses this dual function and

capacity. Thus the Commonwealth comprises the hard core of western civilization (along with the United States and western Europe) while it includes the most important and hopeful of the Asian and African States. Hence it is an inner circle, perhaps one should say two inner circles, within broader world relationships.

The rôle of an inner circle should not be abused, and it has not been abused in the case of the Commonwealth. But it can be used to advance the interests of the older and the newer societies in this world, the haves and the have-nots. These potentialities are presently unrealized. They are there to work with, as will and opportunity provide.

Viewing the Commonwealth's past, and recalling—as Americans sometimes do—their own ancient debt to British political thought and action, reflective Americans are bound to conclude that Britain's future rôle through the Commonwealth may provide much that is needed in a disturbed world. Prime Minister Macmillan's efforts to bring Washington and Moscow together fell into the abyss opened by the dreadful mischance of the U-2. But there may be future opportunities; Americans are inclined to think that there must be future opportunities. The Commonwealth tie still enhances the rôle of the British Prime Minister. More than that, the qualities which produced the Commonwealth have not vanished. It is these very qualities which may be most essential and useful in some future crisis. After its presidential election, the United States is certain to have a very strong and imaginative Presidency. Both candidates are men of ideas and of action, and neither is pledged to the past. Both have travelled widely in the world, have seen many parts of the Commonwealth, have learned much of Britain's rôle. In a period of dynamic change, the evolutionary elements which have kept the Commonwealth alive will still have a contribution to make.

Surely one of the great forces in today's world is the thrust and surge of the awakening peoples. If this force has any chance of expending itself in orderly channels of constructive stability, it will surely be largely due to the background and the foreground of the Commonwealth. What was done in the vanished Empire lives on, in the experience and capacity of peoples. The Commonwealth helps them to learn continuing lessons, or it can if its facilities are used. And as a prototype, it can help in the development of new and broader forms.

Perhaps there is a little symbolism in the fact that Nevil Shute in *On the Beach* chose a remote member of the Commonwealth as the last refuge of human life on a radiation-ridden planet. So, in a way, the Commonwealth today is a refuge of relative order, decency and freedom. But it must not be the last refuge—a diminishing asset. Its values must be extended. Its concepts, shared by the United States, by western Europe, and by some others, can be the basis on which the world ultimately raises its edifice of order. Perhaps this is looking a long way ahead. But we know there are certain institutions which can help—which have helped—mankind to organize a society of better fulfilment. The Commonwealth is one of them.

United States of America,

August 1960.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

THE launching of the 1960 presidential campaign in the United States was preceded, almost prophetically, by an unusual spate of learned books and studies dealing with the powers available to a "strong president" and the urgencies of national leadership.

The American public is now going to hear a great deal about these topics—at the popular as well as the intellectual level. For, while Moscow is developing new tensions all the way from Cuba to the Congo, an American election contest is commencing which will not only emphasize national leadership and the maximum employment of presidential power, but may indeed turn on the public's decision as to which of two energetic candidates, Richard Milhous Nixon for the Republicans and John Fitzgerald Kennedy for the Democrats, can best mobilize the powers of the White House and lead the nation through the challenges of the 1960's.

Coincidentally, it is no overstatement to suggest that this autumn's campaign will be unprecedented in scope and subject-matter, will adopt singular new techniques and will be, as Mr. Nixon has predicted, as sharply and closely contested a battle as the country has witnessed since the turn of the century.

This will be the first campaign waged in non-war years where foreign policy—"who can most effectively deal with the Russians?"—is far and away the outstanding issue.

This is the first contest—a far cry indeed from the "front porch" campaigns waged in more relaxed decades—where the chief contestants are threatening to visit each and every one of the fifty States, and where the Republican contestant openly, and the Democratic contestant quietly, has launched his campaign a full month ahead of the usual date in early September. This far-stretched contest—so different from Britain's six weeks of campaigning up and down a tight little isle—will thunder at the electorate's sensibilities for three mammoth months instead of two.

This is one of the few contests since the historic Lincoln-Douglas debates preceding the Civil War (which brought Abraham Lincoln to national prominence) in which both contestants will be engaging in face-to-face debate. Each has accepted the challenge of the television networks to argue together publicly, on the same platform, several times.

This is, moreover, an election in which the "platforms" of the two parties—the statements of principles which are intended to guide the candidate's behavior if elected—have received close attention as being much more meaningful than usual. Whereas past "platforms" have been vague and carefully generalized, those of 1960 are vigorous and specific, as though the parties really meant what they said.

What we see here, it seems, is a contest rendered unusually serious by

Moscow's recent behavior and a campaign in which the candidates on the Republican and Democratic tickets are, both of them, exceedingly serious young men with little humor or genial relaxation in their makeup.

There is a genuine break here with the political past. The nomination of Messrs. Kennedy and Nixon means that a new generation is taking over the reins of American power. In each party the contestants are under fifty and look young for their years, and their campaign managers and lieutenants are for the most part equally youthful. These men were schoolboys when the 1929 depression hit. To them the great Roosevelt social revolution of the 1930's is already ancient history.

After eight years of a benign "father image" in the White House, a President Nixon or a President Kennedy would be a less revered and beloved figure than President Eisenhower has been. As against the days when a Calvin Coolidge or a Harry S. Truman, men of modest education and homespun virtues, could easily be elected, this new generation of politicians is highly educated, more urbane, more world-travelled, and probably more "efficiently organized" mentally.

Indeed it has been suggested with some validity that both candidates represent the new breed of "organization men", a comment which refers not to political organization but to the managerial "types", with their retinues of skilled researchers, efficiency experts and technicians which have moved in on the running of great industrial corporations. The implication is that a Kennedy or a Nixon would inject more slide-rule efficiency, and less "muddling through", into the high (and low) echelons of the federal government.

This suggests a government with less warmth of heart, less down-to-earth appeal, than in the case of recent Administrations. Perhaps the new toughness, the new unsentimental directness will be necessary if the United States is to compete successfully with the Soviet Union. Moscow is not noted for being long on sentiment or sympathy. Certainly, whichever candidate is elected, there will be a new mood of efficiency and tough-mindedness in Washington, in both foreign and domestic affairs. These, at least, are the present portents.

The Candidates

ONE may ask, What are the two candidates like?

Both Senator Kennedy and Vice-President Nixon have a driving will to succeed, and both had early ambitions for the presidency. Senator Kennedy may have been nominated for the job by his family, and particularly his father, Joseph P. Kennedy, onetime ambassador to Britain, as early as the moment when John's elder brother, Joe, was killed in World War II. Certainly the ambition was functioning strongly when this young Massachusetts Senator was nosed out, by a scant 26 votes, from winning the Democratic vice-presidential nomination in 1956.

From 1956 onwards the Kennedy fortune, which is not inconsiderable, and the Kennedy family, prolific of brothers and sisters, have been aiding the cause. By the dawn of 1960 Senator Kennedy was prepared to fight for the

nomination with as formidable, as well-heeled and as professionally-staffed an organization as has been seen since James A. Farley's team elected Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932. "Jack" Kennedy outpointed opponents in the State primary elections and went on to "blitz" the Los Angeles convention, having coralled, convinced and pledged sufficient delegate votes to assure his victory, a month ahead of the balloting.

Senator Kennedy is a determined young Irishman with a patrician background and a Harvard accent. He has a keen intelligence, quick tongue and a cool disposition. He listens well and soaks up information fast from his bevy of university consultants.

As President he would be aggressive, "liberal" and partisan—using every ounce of executive power firmly and perhaps even ruthlessly. He would depend for advisers on politicians and intellectuals rather than on business men. He is determined to strengthen the United States' posture in the cold war. He would be tough with Congress and master in his own Administration—in short, a "strong" President.

No glamorous boyish exterior ever concealed a tougher personality underneath. But he is also warm-hearted and relaxed within his family circle: the Kennedys are clannishly loyal to each other.

Much of this description applies equally well to Richard Nixon. Both are thorough, hard-working, practical, talented, and audacious. Neither is particularly eloquent or a great speaker. Neither is soft, or emotional, or a gladiator. Each is a standout in any Washington group.

Vice-President Nixon is a thorough politician—thinks out carefully beforehand any public move, ponders its political impact. He is agile mentally—which makes him a superb debater, even in the "kitchen cabinet" type of argument with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at Moscow. He has a thorough understanding of—and keeps himself alertly briefed on—a wide variety of issues.

Mr. Nixon is a team worker—driving himself as hard as anybody on his team. He is admired and respected by many—and loved by few. This, however, could change as he campaigns, for now he is moving out from under the shadow of President Eisenhower, where he has always felt constrained to "pull his punches" and be meticulously correct as a member of the Eisenhower team. His first campaign speeches, and notably his acceptance speech at the Republican national convention in Chicago, seemed to display a more attractive Nixon with wider vision, larger culture, and more humble sense of mission.

Both Kennedy and Nixon have, it must be said, a few minor skeletons in their closets. Senator Kennedy for many months shied away from denouncing the late Senator McCarthy, aware that Democrats in his own State of Massachusetts admired the blunderbuss McCarthy attack on Communism. Mr. Nixon in turn conducted some rather ruthless campaigns in defeating left-wing Democratic opponents in his Senatorial campaigns.

Former President Truman contends that Nixon, in the midterm elections of 1954, called him a "traitor". The Nixon camp denies that Nixon ever accused the Democrats of anything beyond a "softness to Communism".

Both Kennedy and Nixon would now aver that they have graduated to more refined politics.

An example of the Kennedy audacity was the manner in which he, having won the nomination according to plan at Los Angeles, immediately decided to tap the Senate's powerful (and southern) majority leader, Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas, to be his vice-presidential running-mate. He had just defeated Johnson for the nomination, and the South, normally Democratic, was smarting a bit from the drubbing and a lot more from the extremely liberal Democratic platform which the Kennedy camp had forced through at the convention—a platform which included strong statements on negro rights. The Southern States, largely Protestant, also had some religious hesitations about Senator Kennedy, who is of course a Roman Catholic.

The Junior Partners

THE neatest way to assuage all the doubts and rifts, Senator Kennedy decided, was to persuade Johnson to join the ticket. Senator Johnson, an ambitious man who is aware that vice-presidents usually receive larger mention in the history books than do Senate majority leaders, didn't require much persuasion.

The result is a strong north-south combination: a Catholic and a Protestant, a vigorous exponent of civil rights running alongside a moderate, a "liberal" Democrat teamed with a midroad-to-conservative Democrat. The vice-presidential choice frequently does little to influence elections, but Senator Kennedy used his prerogative—the presidential nominee is always permitted to select his running-mate—to accomplish as much "balance" as possible.

On the Republican side, Mr. Nixon would have preferred to choose the personable Governor of New York, Nelson A. Rockefeller, as his vice-presidential partner. Governor Rockefeller was Mr. Nixon's chief rival for the presidency until he bowed out last December, having discovered that the party delegates—as distinct from the public—were overwhelmingly in favor of Nixon.

The New Yorker, however, steadfastly refused all proffers of second place on the ticket. He had served for years in the Eisenhower Administration in secondary posts, and saw his advice and proposals continually disregarded. He feared that, even as an elected vice-president, he would be pledged to absolute loyalty to his president, and hence unable to speak out freely when he disagreed. As governor of New York, Mr. Rockefeller has a forum from which he can orate at any time and speak his mind on the great issues confronting the nation.

The history of the Republican convention at Chicago, however, shows that Governor Rockefeller, by threatening to conduct a fight from the convention floor unless the Republican platform embodied a vigorous amount of urgency and new policy, helped Mr. Nixon to part company with old Eisenhower policies and espouse new initiative in defense policy, negro rights and national growth.

Deprived of the opportunity of choosing Governor Rockefeller, Mr. Nixon

and the G.O.P. convention nominated United Nations Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge for vice-president and thereby sought to emphasize that the Republicans are particularly equipped to deal with world problems. In the weeks immediately preceding the convention, Ambassador Lodge was being viewed nightly by large television audiences as he talked back to the Russians over the RB-47 plane incident, Cuba and the Congo.

While the Democrats managed to "paper over", at least, the big divergence of viewpoints between conservative South and liberal North, the Republicans achieved a more thorough closing of rifts when not only Governor Rockefeller decided that he could enthusiastically support the Nixon ticket, but the successor to the late Sen. Robert A. Taft as conservative leader, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, made his peace with the new leadership. In a remarkable speech this forthright, articulate Senator from the mountain States advised party conservatives not to sit on their hands and refrain from voting.

"We've had our chance; we've fought our battle," he proclaimed. "Now let's put our shoulders to the wheels of Dick Nixon and push him across the line."

This was remarkable in that Republican ideological wounds usually seem to heal slower than those of the Democrats; Senator Taft would never have urged the party to close ranks so quickly.

A Doubtful Issue

NO election forecast can be made at this juncture, other than to echo nominee Nixon's comment that the Democrats do have a "head start". The Democratic advantage is due to the fact that there are seven to eight million more registered Democrats than Republicans in the United States. This preponderance, along with the backing of many independents, has given the Democrats a string of victories in recent years. They have triumphed in the last three Congressional elections (conducted every two years). They hold thirty-four of the nation's fifty governorships.

Only when the Republicans discovered and ran an authentic American hero for office, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, has the party in recent years collected sufficient mass support to win the presidency. And Mr. Eisenhower has never demonstrated that his personal popularity would "rub off" on fellow office-seekers. Will it "rub off" at all on Mr. Nixon, his understudy?

The Republicans most certainly intend to emphasize the Vice-President's thorough training for the presidency—his goodwill trips abroad, undertaken on presidential orders, his chairing of many Cabinet sessions and meetings of the high-policy-formulating National Security Council, his intimate acquaintance with national politics and affairs of State.

The Republican need, however, is to attract a good many independent voters, and indeed some drifters from the Democratic columns. Mr. Nixon alienated many liberals in earlier years by his "hatchet" tactics against opponents. Whether the "new Nixon" will persuade them to revise their estimates remains to be determined. He will certainly try hard.

The political professionals believe that Senator Kennedy should be able to capture the eleven States of the Deep South, and about half of New England. If he can add to this a half-dozen of the big industrial States, he will win. He would need to triumph in only three or four of these industrial States if he could make inroads in the normally Republican farm belt.

Senator Kennedy starts out with the normal Democratic advantages: wide support from the leaders of organized labor, all-out support from the big city bosses, strong support in the South. He does, however, confront certain obstacles. One is the fact that, with Governor Rockefeller's popular appeal operating in favor of Mr. Nixon, the Republicans may be able to win New York State as well as one or two more on the eastern seaboard. Another prospect is that a vigorous Nixon farm program could win back the farmers when their *bête noire*, Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, has quit the government.

Then there is Mr. Kennedy's religion. He acknowledged in his acceptance speech that this could be an obstacle in a country which has never yet elected a Roman Catholic. The last prominent Catholic to run for presidential office, Alfred E. Smith, was badly defeated in 1928. Moods change, and the nation exhibits more tolerance of all religions today. Senator Kennedy has asserted that as President he would give strict heed to the constitutional provision for separation of Church and State, and that he would "reject any kind of religious pressure". Whether these vigorous statements will be sufficient to remove the religious issue from the campaign seems doubtful. The issue will not be discussed, except in whispers, but in the Roman Catholic metropolitan areas it seems likely to help the Massachusetts Senator and in the rural South and other Protestant areas it may hurt him.

No Radical Difference

SOME voters, but not all, will pay keen attention to the party platforms already mentioned. Both are more militant than usual, but in basic approach they do not radically differ.

Both emphasize civil rights, which in this day and age means the rights of negroes. Both support the Supreme Court decision ending school segregation; both support equal rights in employment; both urge simple scholastic tests to determine whether any citizen, black or white, is qualified to vote. It is possible that the Democrats may be damaged with Negro voters by the presence of a Southerner, Senator Johnson, on the ticket.

On foreign policy, the Republican platform focuses emphatically on military containment of communism. The Democratic platform demands a new approach to the uncommitted nations of Asia and Africa. But Mr. Nixon equally emphasized in his acceptance speech that the Republicans should "welcome the challenge presented by the revolution of peoples' aspirations in South America, in Asia, in Africa".

The Republicans will seek to suggest that the Democrats are too "soft" in dealing with Mr. Khrushchev—recalling Mr. Kennedy's suggestion that the President should express "regrets" to Moscow for the downing of the U-2 reconnaissance plane. The Democrats will counter with charges of

Administration "bungling" which led to the U-2 incident, the summit fiasco and the withdrawal of the President's invitation to visit Japan.

Concerning defense, the Democratic platform states that "over the past seven and one-half years our military power has steadily declined relative to that of the Russians and the Chinese". The Republicans contend that the United States is still the most puissant nation but—using words inserted by Governor Rockefeller—their platform does say there must be acceleration of missile production "as necessary", and "intensified" efforts to match the Soviets.

In dealing with the national economy the Democrats urge that the much-discussed national production should increase at the rate 5 per cent, about twice the rate of the Eisenhower years. The Republican plank simply urges a quickened growth pace.

Although the platforms are somewhat close in content, the record of the two parties in Congress will advise the voters that the Democrats favor a larger rôle for the federal government than do the Republicans. They favor more direct federal aid for the elderly, more federal construction of new housing, a higher minimum wage law, and a larger budget for federal aid-to-education. The Democrats would favor a larger degree of federal intervention and control to keep the nation's industrial machine functioning to full capacity.

The Republicans will warn the voters against "big government" and contend that a nation loses its moral fiber when it abandons individual initiative and local management of affairs.

To some voters, these domestic concerns will loom as pre-eminent. It is the expectation of party strategists, however, that this year public opinion will be more interested in the tremendous challenge to the free world represented by the truculent policies of Nikita Khrushchev.

The allies of the United States in the N.A.T.O. camp and the friends of America in the Commonwealth may well detect a more alert foreign policy next year, no matter whether Senator Kennedy or Vice-President Nixon wins the election. There will be a greater sense of urgency: both campaigners talk of bigger defense appropriations to close the "missile gap", of more ambitious studies toward a workable disarmament policy, and of a more sensitive, long-range approach to foreign aid and the "revolution of rising expectations" among the underdeveloped countries.

Either candidate would rely more intensively on "brain trusts" and university consultants than has President Eisenhower. Each would seek to develop new initiatives in the global power struggle, including closer economic and political relations with Europe, Africa and Latin America. Each has denounced the American tendency merely to "react" to Soviet thrusts.

Whether either candidate, as president, would succeed in all of his bold resolves is another matter. But assuredly this presidential campaign, with its able, tough-minded young men and its discussion of vital issues, does seem to be preparing the United States for a more effective rôle of free-world leadership in the 1960's.

United States of America,

August 1960.

UNITED KINGDOM

HOME AND ABROAD

WHETHER parliamentary controversy continues to stir round the Prime Minister's decision to find his new Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Home, in the House of Lords will depend on the success with which the new arrangements work in the Commons. It was altogether understandable that the whole Opposition should have resented an appointment which fences off one of their favourite foxes in a reserve where he cannot be hunted, and it would have been surprising if there had not been a little muttering here and there on the Ministerial back benches. For members of the Commons there is undoubtedly an affront to self-esteem in the choice of a peer, for if one of the three or four major Ministers is in the Lords the stature of the elected House may be at least a little diminished. But to the detached observer the outcry was not wholly convincing. After all, in practice during the last year or two the Foreign Secretary had been out of the country, where neither peers nor Commons could get at him, for about a third of the parliamentary session, and he had been answering only about a quarter of the questions tabled by M.P.s. Moreover, whenever there has been a major debate the pre-eminently important contribution has been made by the Prime Minister himself. It is not difficult to argue, therefore, that the Commons may be better served under the new arrangements than under the old. Not only will Mr. Macmillan continue as the overlord of foreign policy, as a Prime Minister must be these days, but the day-by-day routine of the Foreign Office will be handled in the Commons by a Cabinet Minister specially deputed for the task—Mr. Edward Heath, who became Lord Privy Seal in the reconstruction of the Ministry. In return for a partly absentee Foreign Secretary the Commons will gain a Cabinet Minister and lose one of the two Foreign Office Ministers of State.

No doubt some of the Commons pique was justified by untimely pressure-grouping, which seemed to begin in Foreign Office circles, on the theme that we are now in a day, for one reason and another, when it would be better to accept the notion that the Foreign Secretary should always be in the Lords, where his burden of responsibility would no longer be exacerbated by parliamentary target practice. A peer, runs the argument, will be able to find time to think, and will not become physically worn by the strains, as Mr. Ernest Bevin, Mr. Herbert Morrison and Sir Anthony Eden were. This is surely a doubtful, even a dangerous line of thought; and some of those who readily accept that there is no rule, tradition or convention demanding that the Foreign Secretary should be a commoner will equally rise in their wrath at any suggestion of a new rule that the Foreign Secretary should be a peer. The test, surely, should be the man, not his place in either House.

Critics make a fair point when they question whether the new arrangements

will work in practice. Lord Home, as Foreign Secretary, is unmistakably the political head of the department, but Mr. Macmillan and other government voices have been at pains to remove any thought that Mr. Heath will be merely a spokesman for his chief in the Commons. It is emphasized that the Lord Privy Seal will have in fact as well as name the rank in Cabinet of his historic office, and will be specially charged with responsibilities for the political aspects of European affairs. In other words, we are given to understand that Lord Home is to be the first among equals. It would not be difficult to think of pairs of Cabinet Ministers who simply would not be able to work in tandem in this way; but Mr. Macmillan is a shrewd judge of men. If there are two Ministers in the team who have the temperament to get on easily with their colleagues they are certainly Lord Home and Mr. Heath; and their relationship will not be disturbed by the careerist spur. Lord Home is a politician of an earlier time: he is not goaded by ambition but is in politics for no other reason than that the great families have always sought to serve. Mr. Heath, who is 44, is ambitious but amiably so, and it is easy to think that ever since he became one of the Prime Minister's closest confidants as Chief Government Whip Mr. Macmillan has been deliberately fostering his political career. This helps to explain why some observers think they detect a temporary quality in Lord Home's appointment. There is a feeling that Lord Home has undertaken the task for perhaps two years to give Mr. Heath, a shrewd and able man who has had only a few months' departmental experience at the Ministry of Labour, a chance to grow into the big job. (There is good reason to think that in most of his recent Ministerial appointments Mr. Macmillan has been deliberately looking ahead to the future needs of the country and of the Conservative Party.)

When challenged by the Opposition in the Commons Mr. Macmillan gave a simple, direct answer to the question why he chose Lord Home. Lord Home was at the present time, he said, in his opinion the best man for the post, and the prerogative of choice was his. It was on this point, rather than the transference of the office to the Lords, that some Ministerialists were at issue with their leader until they were sternly suppressed. For it has been Lord Home's misfortune, amid all the parliamentary and extra-mural controversy over his appointment, to be the least known not merely of senior Ministers but of British political figures. It is nearly ten years since he left the Commons, where he was known as Lord Dunglass, for the Lords, and there are many new and newish Conservative M.P.s who simply have had no opportunity to judge his quality. Nor did the post of Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, which Lord Home held for five years, help to make him familiar to the British public, or the popular newspapers. And on top of all Lord Home is a man of reserved and quiet manner. So it was easy for the popular newspapers and the partisans to talk about "the faceless man at the Foreign Office" or, more bitterly, about the Prime Minister's choice of a rubber stamp.

The truth is, of course, that Lord Home has been given the Foreign Office entirely on the strength of his position within the small Cabinet circle, and senior Ministers have no doubt that he is pre-eminently equipped in intellect

and character for his new post. They liken him to Lord Salisbury and Mr. Derick Heathcoat Amory, two men to whom the Conservative Party owe much; and there are Cabinet Ministers who do not hesitate to say that in the last few years there has been no voice that has had more influence with them than Lord Home's, although it has not been the most assertive voice. Now that Lord Home is in a post which will inevitably stamp his name and figure upon the public retina it is to be expected that the disadvantage of popular ignorance of his worth will quickly disappear, and it will be surprising if within a few months he is not being more fairly and sensibly assessed.

Return to the Fold

IN Mr. Macmillan's remaining new appointments there is much of interest. Mr. Duncan Sandys, who is 52, succeeds Lord Home as Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. It was generally known that he felt that he had discharged the tasks allotted to him when he became the first Minister of Aviation last October—mainly the rationalization of the British aircraft manufacturing industry for both civil and military purposes. But his move to Commonwealth Relations had not been expected. Mr. Sandys's particular role as a thruster in Conservative Administrations during the last few years has been such that it is always safe to assume that Mr. Macmillan has some difficult slogging work to be done by any Department in which he is placed. He has been in turn Minister of Supply, Minister of Housing and Local Government, Minister of Defence, and Minister of Aviation, and in each post he has been asked to burst through some log-jam or other. Mr. Sandys is perhaps the most conscientious man of detail in the Cabinet and he works himself, his staff, and everybody even on the fringes of his official life unsparingly. It remains to be seen what brief he has been given this time by Mr. Macmillan, but we may be sure that the tempo of routine at the Commonwealth Relations Office is going to alter considerably and that the office lights will be burning much later into the night from now on.

For Conservatives the restoration to the Cabinet of Mr. Peter Thorneycroft and the return to office of Mr. Enoch Powell as Minister of Health were a welcome proof that the unhappy breach of January 1958 has been repaired. Mr. Thorneycroft and Mr. Powell, with Mr. Nigel Birch, resigned simultaneously from their Treasury posts when the Cabinet agreed to go only part of the way with them in cutting back government expenditure. Since then, Mr. Thorneycroft has done nothing to embarrass Mr. Macmillan, as a man with his reputation easily might have done in the present mood of the Conservative backbenchers, and Mr. Powell (a former Professor of Greek in Australia) had gained new influence as chairman of the powerful back-bench finance committee. But it is possible to wonder whether Mr. Macmillan has not been a little ironic in the tasks he has now set them. Both the austere economizers have been placed in spending departments. Mr. Thorneycroft succeeds Mr. Sandys as Minister for Aviation and will be responsible for not only some of the most costly aircraft and rocket projects but for any programme of space research that may be undertaken. Mr. Powell goes to

the Ministry of Health, and will have the oversight of the country's enormous doctors' and dentists' bills.

Europe and the Commonwealth

AWAITING Parliament when the new session opens on November 1 are all the problems of European trade. It is not easy to find a form of words to define where the Government and the official Opposition really stand in relation to the Common Market (only the Liberal Party of six in the Commons plumps for unreserved entry), but there is no doubt that during the last few months there has been a sharpening sense everywhere of the need to find some way of reconciling the Six with the Seven to avoid a deepening economic abyss which would lead to political divisions of the most serious kind. But what way? After the summit debacle the government made gentle and discreet overtures to the Six, chiefly France, and there were a few kites busily flown for a time about Britain's readiness to go into Euratom; but they came to nothing. When the Commons debated European free trade just before the summer recess the government framed a motion more remarkable for its piety than its positiveness: "That this House recognizes the need for political and economic unity in Europe and would welcome the conclusion of suitable arrangements to that end satisfactory to all the governments concerned." The Opposition leaders, who are so very close to the government on this question that policy is virtually bipartisan, found no reason for qualms about supporting this. Indeed, the only serious criticism from Labour leaders is that the government have handled all the protracted negotiations on European free trade clumsily and rather arrogantly.

The truth seems to be that the difficulties which prevented Britain from joining the Common Market in the early days are still much what they were, and if there is to be any hope of a reconciliation between the Six and the Seven (the rival group Britain brought into being) France must undergo a change of heart. In the words of the Conservative Central Office:

Briefly, the difficulties in question for Britain spring from the fact that the development of her political relations with the outside world have in the past been governed, broadly speaking, by pre-existing patterns of trade and exchange. Endowed by few natural resources and shut in by the sea, high policy in Britain has traditionally been concerned to sustain our commerce. But in one important area of our trade, namely Western Europe, the emergence of the European Economic Community has disturbed the normal functioning of British trade policy. This group of six important States has, for well-attested historical reasons, sought to establish a relationship among its members in which political considerations are foremost and economic criteria are regarded as means, not ends. . . .

If the European trade problem is to be seen in its proper perspective, full weight must be given to the United Kingdom's trade relations and prospects in other parts of the world, and to the particular political problems which face the United Kingdom on the one hand, and the Continental nations on the other. The largest single portion of our trade is with the Commonwealth (45 to 50

per cent.), 25 per cent. is with the eighteen nations of Europe (about 14 per cent. with the E.E.C.), and 25 per cent. with the rest of the world.

These trading interests might be thought of as being interlocking circles, represented contractually by the system of Imperial Preferences, a European relationship (still to be worked out), and the G.A.T.T.

The government have always maintained that these interests are not conflicting, and that they can be reconciled given a mutual determination to do so, and provided always that a multilateral approach is adopted.

Undoubtedly the most difficult problem is that posed by the Common Tariff, which is the fundamental difference between the Customs Union of the Six and the Free Trade Area of the Seven. For the duty-free entry of Commonwealth products has been a foundation of Britain's world-wide trading policy.

Naturally European trade problems were under study when the Commonwealth Prime Ministers met in conference in London last May. They expressed concern at the prospect of any economic division of Europe and its possible political implications, and they hoped that European countries would follow trade policies in accordance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade "and thus avoid damage to the economies of the primary-producing countries and those that are also developing exports of manufactured goods".

There is no sign anywhere in the political leadership on either side in Britain of a disposition to bargain with Commonwealth interests in the attempt to work more easily towards a European trade settlement. Mr. Gaitskell and his senior colleagues, as much as Mr. Macmillan and his government, recognize that to enter into the Treaty of Rome as it now stands would inflict intolerable damage on the Commonwealth; and at the present time this is a factor of more importance than the special position of British agriculture.

Nevertheless, if there are principles of political sovereignty and Commonwealth connexions that Britain will adhere to, nobody in authority denies that in default of a European solution there will be growing disruption of natural trade patterns and a distortion and duplication of investment. For the time being, the official view is that no harm has been done to Britain by the operation of the Common Market. It is said, for instance, that American investment is not yet being strongly polarized towards Continental Europe to Britain's disadvantage. But in the industrial world there are voices sounding an anxious note, and here and there one is given the impression that before long some British industrialists will have to consider spreading their interests and investment into the Common Market.

Leaders and Led

ALL the troubles that have bedevilled the Labour Party since their third successive electoral defeat last October will come to a head at the party delegate conference in Scarborough next month (October) unless once again some triumph of horse-trading behind the scenes enables the leadership to

evade the issue. On the evidence of the years it would be rash to overlook the possibility of such a triumph. But the fact remains that this year's crisis is far more fundamental than one of differences about policy (that crisis is always with Labour). It will involve not only Mr. Hugh Gaitskell's personal position as party leader but also the relationships between the Parliamentary Party and the annual conference.

In the months since the general election there have been two main controversies splitting and stultifying the Labour Party. First, Mr. Gaitskell, gambling too far on the prestige with which he emerged as campaign leader, confirmed all the old fears that as leader he is a man of the right and not the centre by proposing, or even demanding, at the post-mortem conference in Blackpool last November, that the "Old Testament" constitution drafted in 1918 should be revised and amplified to leave no doubt that the party is not committed to the public ownership of everything but regards nationalization as a means to an end in a mixed economy. Secondly, there has been the rising tide on the Left of the unilateral disarmament campaign, which has ended in the capture of some of the large unions on whose support the leadership have always in the past tended to rely to keep the party on a stable, politically viable course.

Already Mr. Gaitskell's "New Testament" constitution has had to be jettisoned under the pressure of events, with Mr. Gaitskell assenting with his colleagues on the National Executive Committee that it will be impossible at this year's delegate conference for the leadership to hope to fight on two fronts and win. The declaration diluting the dogma on public ownership is now to be tucked away in an annual report and left to the obscurity that the trade unionists think worthy of it; and there is doubtless misplaced hope that in return for Mr. Gaitskell's pacific gesture the fundamentalists will be generous enough to let the whole matter drop.

With this flank more or less protected from the most violent attack the leadership are now concentrating on holding the ground they staked out in a new defence policy. Nobody, least of all Mr. George Brown, the party's front-bench defence expert, would pretend that this is more than a compromise to try and keep some electorally defensible policy for the leadership to work by. It rather bravely reaffirms Labour's loyalty to Britain's alliances within N.A.T.O. and with the United States, and tacitly accepts that American nuclear bases should continue in Britain at least until such time as rocket development makes aircraft and medium-range rockets unnecessary. But, laying the blame on the government who have abandoned the military development of Blue Streak, the policy promises that Labour would give up the independent nuclear deterrent and concentrate on a better contribution to N.A.T.O. forces, with N.A.T.O. itself under tighter political control.

Such a policy hardly stood a chance of satisfying the nuclear disarmers, unless they were uncharacteristically anxious to make things easy for the leadership. In the event, there is at the time of writing a majority commitment of trade union votes (five out of six Labour conference votes come in union blocks) for some form of unilateral disarmament, and it is difficult to believe that the leadership can hope to win the day for their new defence policy.

This raises the fundamental question: what is to happen if the conference passes a resolution in favour of unilateral disarmament?

It is a question that is already splitting the party to its constitutional foundations. On the one hand, it is being held that conference decisions are directions to the national executive committee but that the Parliamentary Labour Party are not bound by them. The Parliamentary Party, this school of thought argue, is autonomous, and must be allowed to apply party policy according to the political needs of the day; and some rasher voices insist that the Parliamentary Party, elected by 12,000,000 voters, alone has a constitutional right to determine policy, and that the conference is merely a sounding board for party opinion of which the politicians take note. On the other hand, there are many, mostly on the Left but not exclusively so, who remember that the Parliamentary Labour Party was created to be the instrument in Parliament of the mass movement (unlike the Conservative mass movement, which was created to support the Parliamentary Party). It follows that this school of thought is appalled at any suggestion that the Parliamentary Party should not take their orders from the conference, which is regarded as the supreme policy-making body.

There is no simple answer to this fundamental question. In parliamentary practice, of course, the Parliamentary Party under the party leader (who is elected not by the conference or the national executive but by the Labour M.P.s) must be free to adapt policy to what is politically practicable; but it is also true that in practice the Parliamentary Labour Party itself will wither away if it no longer holds the confidence of the party workers in the country who are demanding that they should issue the orders. For many rank and file Labour supporters this is a straightforward issue of democratic process or caucus rule; and the only thing that has reconciled them to undoubted caucus rule in the past is that the leadership have put a democratic complexion on their policies and activities by striking bargains and reaching understandings with trade union leaders who wield the block votes.

Before Mr. Gaitskell gave way on the amendment of the constitution there were some observers willing to predict that if the annual conference next month goes unilateralist the leader would throw in his hand. He is certainly a man of the highest integrity and he is committed to the support of N.A.T.O. and the American alliance beyond any thought of fundamental compromise. Clearly the conference will not be able to push him too far. But not only Mr. Gaitskell is involved. Both the national executive committee and the Parliamentary Labour Party are formally and solemnly bound to the new defence policy, and in all logic the entire leadership would be involved in any clash with the annual conference. It is the magnitude of this possibility that gives support to the belief that somehow a way—a very devious and unconvincing way perhaps—will be found to avoid this utter and irreparable act of self destruction by the Labour Party. All the evidence is that Labour has continued to lose ground and electoral respect since the general election, and surely the time is ripe for all men of good will to go in search of a compromise that will at any rate serve to unite the party during their years of opposition. For the Conservatives, if they were in such a dismal plight, the

solution would be easy: they would concentrate to a man on attacking the enemy. But for Labour it is different. They are never happy without a policy drafted in fullest detail and with every comma carefully considered; and when they have the policy they are not happy because no policy is so elastic that it can be made to stretch from one wing of the party to the other.

Great Britain,
August 1960

NORTHERN IRELAND

AN agreeably surprising Budget introduced on May 24 has earned the Government some respite from the critics of recent progress in economic policy. The Minister of Finance, who a year ago had given a grave warning that Northern Ireland was outrunning its resources, was able to show a sudden rise in revenue to £117,469,000, and a surplus of £6 million, payable to the Treasury as the Imperial Contribution.

The increase in the yield of reserved taxation (i.e. taxation levied by the British Government) by a sum of no less than £13 million reflected a greater sharing in national prosperity than was generally thought possible in view of the continuing high level of unemployment, now 6 per cent of the insured population. The earnings of industry, however, have been high, especially in shipbuilding, which in the past year was at a peak of activity, and in aircraft production and light engineering. It is also evident that the linen industry has made a fair recovery after the further attrition suffered in the latest cycle of a downward trend dating from the end of the First World War. It is characteristic of Northern Ireland's staple industry that its rationalization has been a matter of *laissez-faire*. Instead of bringing about an organized elimination of surplus and uneconomic capacity, as was done for cotton in Lancashire, the provincial government was made to persist with its scheme of grants for new equipment, a measure which has not averted the disappearance of several of the large firms to take first advantage of it. A paradox of local self-government is that it has not helped to lessen the exclusiveness of industrialists, many of them still operating as family concerns. In the sense that the public company is now the most efficient form of industrial financing and management, Northern Ireland can be judged to be still twenty or thirty years behind Great Britain. Only now is being seen a greater readiness to bring about strengthening amalgamations and to invite the public to share in the provision of capital.

To the Budget revenue agriculture again made a notable contribution. Although it might well be that in this way farmers were repaying the Treasury's largesse, it is a fact that the guaranteed prices and scientific methods fostered by both Governments have transformed what for Northern Ireland is still its largest industry, and given the countryside a new security and a new pride. Not again should we see farmers struggling one step ahead of bankruptcy, as Irish farmers have done for centuries, and as this remarkable rise in their standard of living has been enjoyed by Roman Catholic and

Protestant, the effect on the issue of Partition becomes quite incalculable. Reference will be found in the article on the Irish Republic which follows to the long delayed recognition of agriculture as the true basis of the economy: enough to say that in this respect, and despite the relatively small nature of its farm holdings, Northern Ireland is many years ahead in its education for the land, technical application and marketing organization.

Tax revenue and duties on consumer goods being so buoyant, it may be asked why the Budget should be taken with reservations. Even so marked an increase has not wholly provided for the continuing rise in the cost of government, nor put beyond doubt Northern Ireland's ability to support standards of public service in parity with those in the rest of the United Kingdom. The Imperial Contribution was made possible only by contra payments from the Treasury of £7 million under the Social Services Agreement and £1,065,000 under the Agriculture Act, 1957, together with a sum of £5 million as a transfer between the two National Insurance Funds. The concealed deficit thus means that the problems of balancing the Budget and of perpetuating the Contribution thrown up by the previous Budget* remain unsolved.

Only a more rapid expansion of industry and in the gross provincial product can relieve the British Government of the ultimate necessity of reviewing the financial basis of the devolutionary system, little changed as it has been since 1921. Indeed, any economic setback would make this a matter of urgency. A section of opinion at home would probably welcome most the revision of the Contribution which one M.P. has called "a polite fiction" and which has come to have an undue political significance as a symbol of solvency, mustered in the past only by the imposition of economies that widened the already unfair leeway in the public and social structure. To those in the Unionist Party who insist that such a tribute must be paid, as if taxpayers were not already meeting the same obligations as taxpayers in Great Britain, there is no way out but a larger and more diversified economy. This is also the answer to unemployment, a steadily rising population and a stream of emigration to England and overseas now, with higher education, in excess of that export of people and their skills long accepted as a normal feature of Ulster life. In fine, it is no more than the vindication of the British connexion.

Where the Budget disappointed was in the absence of consideration of further avenues of attraction for new industries to offset the inducements newly available in Great Britain under the Local Employment Act. The Government is choosing to rely on the present code and to encourage smaller-scale local enterprise by building factories in provincial towns. The best hopes are more and more being placed on the United States, where the Northern Ireland office in New York has been strengthened, and on other countries interested in the European market. The drive in America has not been without success, as shown by the opening last month at Maydown, Londonderry, of a synthetic rubber plant for the Du Pont Corporation. This is the largest element in a total American investment approaching 50 million dollars.

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 196, Sept. 1959, p. 383.

From West Germany, too, there was recently secured a branch of the electronic industry of Grundig. On the other hand, Ulster manufacturers, linen being some exception, have still to show an awareness of the demands of the European Common Market either as a new field for exports or as a factor that calls on them to defend their home market. Since higher Bank Rate is already tending to hold back expansion by British firms at a moment when the labour shortage was again causing them to look to the reserves on this side of the Irish Sea, the prospect of rapid progress in creating employment has again been dimmed. The extent to which credit restriction has been reduced in Northern Ireland—the banks are not called upon to make special deposits with the Bank of England—is clearly not enough to counteract the change in the economic climate generally. The deprivation of the final benefits of the boom, a somewhat frustrating repetition of previous experience, was shortly followed by a ten-day shipping strike on the Irish Sea routes. This came cruelly at the height of the tourist season, and was publicity of an adverse kind for Northern Ireland as an industrial location.

Northern Ireland,
August 1960.

IRELAND

TWO MAIN PROBLEMS

TWO main problems, which are interdependent, confront the Irish Government. The first concerns the development of our relatively static and backward economy, the second the adjustment of that economy to external changes, more particularly in Europe. Both these matters have engaged, and must increasingly engage, its attention. A major attempt to deal with the first problem began in 1958 when Mr. T. K. Whitaker, the Secretary of the Department of Finance, was authorized to examine our economic structure and to formulate "an integrated programme of national development". His report, which incidentally revealed the failure and mistakes of much previous policy, also emphasized our absolute dependence on agriculture and the impossibility of attempting to maintain a closed economy.* The Government wisely adopted most of his proposals as the basis of a new economic policy. This involved *inter alia* the pump-priming of our economy by the expenditure of some £212 million spread over a period of ten years. The broad effect was to substitute a policy of productive development for a policy of social development which anyhow had run its course.

The results of this new policy are now becoming apparent. If not yet conclusive they are certainly encouraging. Statistics recently published show that in 1959 the national income rose to £503 million, an increase of 5 per cent over 1958, and, what is more important, exceeded by 3 per cent the target set by the Government in their Programme for Economic Expansion based on the Whitaker Report. Moreover, while the net value of agricultural production rose by £4 million, or 2½ per cent, the net value of industrial production rose by £13 million or 10 per cent. While cattle exports fell by £3½ million and our agricultural output by £3 million the total exports of raw materials and manufactured goods rose by £9 million. The import excess for the first six months of this year shows a decrease of £4 million as compared with 1959 and during the first quarter, after making allowance for certain new factors, there has been an increase in production of about 6 per cent. One result of increased production or of emigration to Britain has been a fall of nearly 10,000 in the number of unemployed. The recent report of the Central Bank, our most accurate economic barometer, states that the prospect of doubling the national income is now bright. While the Government programme for economic expansion set thirty-five years as the period in which it was hoped to reach this target the Central Bank believes it may be reached in a much shorter time. It attributes the progress made in 1959 mainly to higher productivity, fuller use of manufacturing capacity, greater export activity and technical advances. In spite of the temporary setback in cattle exports, stocks had increased, agricultural productivity was rising steadily and, with increased investment, the long-term prospects for agriculture were encouraging. The Bank's unusual optimism is confirmed by the

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 194, March 1959, pp. 177 *et seq.*

recent O.E.E.C. special report on the Irish economy, which states that at the beginning of 1960 it was in a more satisfactory position than for some years. But the report also points out the importance of keeping wage increases within the limits set by productive gains, and emphasizes the necessity for lowering tariffs, too often used to shelter unsuitable industries, and reducing restrictions on trade. It also points out that success will ultimately depend on maintaining an equilibrium over all. One must not, however, overlook its general conclusion that "although the general economic situation in Ireland is now more satisfactory than for some years past, the basic problems remain to be solved, and by their nature they are not susceptible to short-term solutions".

External Trade

AMONGST these basic problems that of our external trade takes first place. The deficit of £8,700,000 in our international balance of payments for 1959 would have been much greater but for a spectacular rise of £11 million in the value of our invisible earnings. But taking the last three years together our balance of payments is in equilibrium. Fundamentally our position is simple. Of our total exports to Western Europe 90 per cent. go to Great Britain where we have under our trade agreements the right of tariff-free entry. Last year our exports of dutiable goods to the Common Market Six were less than £1½ million, and to the Free Trade Seven less than £½ million. In short, the British Isles are an economic unit of which we form a part whether we like it or not. For forty years we have laboriously built up a series of small industries behind protective tariffs, and many of these could not hope to survive under free trade. When the Free Trade Area is in full operation we must face the consequent free competition with other countries in the British market. Moreover, under the new Trade Agreement with Great Britain we must now proceed to review our existing protective tariffs against British industrial products. In the debate on the Trade Agreement in the Dail. Mr. Lemass said that the best possible situation for us would be association with the Common Market on a basis which took account of our economic circumstances, but only if Great Britain was also a member. Speaking to a meeting of the Junior Chambers of Commerce on June 12 he said that it was highly improbable we could obtain the trading opportunities for export which we need in Europe except within the context of a general trade agreement involving free trade, such as most West European countries had already accepted. Referring to the recent negotiations between the Six and the Seven at which Ireland was represented, Mr. Lemass said this was the procedure his Government had desired and advocated and he hoped this Committee would continue to function until the present uncertainty as to the future of O.E.E.C. had been resolved. His Government had informed the Chairman of this negotiating body that, subject to the maintenance of the special trading relationship provided for in the Anglo-Irish trade agreements, and to our obligations thereunder, we were prepared, if suitable arrangements were made for us to share in the advantages of the new trade and economic developments in Europe—with special reference to

opportunities for agricultural trade—to agree to make regular reductions in our own protective tariffs in favour of the countries concerned in accordance with broad principles which took into account our economic system. He added a final warning that whatever happens we had to be prepared to dismantle our system of protection. He did not think that we need be much perturbed about this prospect provided we could secure a reasonable time in which to do so. This rather vague attempt to define our position really settles nothing. Long-term agreements which are designed to settle the future of European agriculture are being made or have been concluded in which we have failed to take part. In fact we have been completely ignored. In any case Ireland even taken as a whole is a minute economic unit. In short, our policy has been too timid and too late.

North and South

DURING the debate on the Anglo-Irish trade agreement Mr. Lemass stated that he had made it clear during the discussions with the British Ministers that his Government did not seek any trade advantage from Britain at the expense of Northern Ireland, although they realized that while things remained as they were this was unavoidable. He had suggested the formation of a committee at which matters of this kind could be considered but that had not proved acceptable to the Northern Government. It seemed to him foolish in the extreme that when such practical questions arose there should be no procedure for direct communication about them. It was noticed that Mr. Lemass referred to "Northern Ireland" instead of to "the Six Counties", the offensive description normally used by the Dublin press and politicians. It is of course absurd, as has been often pointed out in these columns, that we should maintain ambassadors in various remote capitals with which our trading relations are negligible, while we have not even a trade commissioner in Northern Ireland, with whom our trade and business relations are continuous and considerable. There seems to be no reason why we should not have such a representative there save the ostrich-like attitude of our Government, which after forty-two years still keeps up the silly pretence, for which there is no shred of justification, that the Northern Government has no legal validity. However, in spite of this nonsense, mutual respect and co-operation are constantly growing between the peoples of North and South. It is no longer a question of absorption of the North by the South, but of co-operation of both North and South as good neighbours for their mutual benefit.

Lord Brookeborough's reply to this fresh overture by Mr. Lemass was that all Northern Ireland wanted was friendship with the Republic and that, while his Government were prepared to negotiate in the normal way concerning any trade affair not normally the function of the United Kingdom Government, such as transport, drainage or electricity, when it was the duty of the British Government to negotiate he could not allow a wedge to be driven between them which would have a disastrous effect on Northern Ireland. Subsequently, Mr. Lemass stated in reply to a mischievous question by Dr. Noel Browne T.D. in the Dail that no formal decision had been taken

by his Government to recognize the Northern Government or as regards the official description of Northern Ireland as such, and that they did not recognize the partition of the country as a just or durable arrangement. Their purpose, he said, was to bring about a situation in which the essential unity of the Irish people would be restored and expressed in the country's political institutions. He then repeated the offer, made originally by Mr. Sean MacBride on behalf of the Inter-party Government, that his Government would accept a solution under which the powers concerning Northern Ireland now vested in the British Parliament should be transferred to the Republic, leaving the present internal political structure of Northern Ireland intact.

Mr. Lemass should of course know that since the establishment of the Irish Republic as such there is not the remotest chance that the Government or people of Northern Ireland will consider such a proposal. To make it only discloses his invincible ignorance of the Northern attitude. Every intelligent Irishman knows that the partitioning of Ireland has its roots in a real problem which is that, rightly or wrongly, the great majority of the Northern people intend to remain in the United Kingdom. There is therefore only one way to deal with the Border, namely to forget about it.

The Irish "Establishment"

WHILE these dreary, and now rather absurd, controversies about partition were proceeding, the Dail was engaged in discussing a matter of more immediate importance. This concerned the appointments made in recent years to the staff of University College, Dublin, a constituent college of the National University. As such its professors and lecturers are appointed by the University and not by the College. In order to avoid this statutory requirement the Governing Body of the College in breach of its Charter appointed, for the most part without public advertisement or competition, some seventy-five so-called College lecturers and assistant lecturers, leaving about 53 per cent of the statutory lectureships unfilled. This state of affairs was brought to the attention of the College authorities by Mr. John Kenny S.C., a distinguished member of the senior bar who is himself an assistant in the law faculty of the College. The Governing Body rejected his view that these appointments were illegal and in effect told him to mind his own business. A member of the Senate of the University then brought the matter to the attention of the Senate but that body also, for reasons unexplained, refused to take action. Mr. Kenny, as he was entitled to do, thereupon courageously petitioned the Government to appoint a Board of Visitors to examine and report on the legality of the Governing Body's activities. The Government accordingly appointed three judges to consider and report on the issues raised. They reported in due course that Mr. Kenny's complaints were fully justified, that the appointments were not authorized by the College Charter, and that the failure to take the proper and necessary steps to fill the statutory lectureships when they became vacant was a breach of the duties imposed on the President of the College, Dr. Michael Tierney.

At this stage in the proceedings the forces of what may perhaps be described as the Irish "Establishment" came into operation. Dr. Tierney, a distin-

guished classical scholar, was a prominent member of the Fine Gael Party, while Mr. de Valera, the former head of the Fianna Fail Party, who is still Chancellor of the National University, also was involved through the action of the University Senate, though Mr. de Valera is said to have expressed the view that the appointments were unauthorized. Therefore, on the receipt of the Visitors' Report it is perhaps not surprising that the Government, with the full support of the Fine Gael Party, immediately introduced legislation to validate these illegal appointments and to permit University College, Dublin, to continue its present practices pending the report on higher education of a Commission to be set up by the Government.* This peculiar measure, which the Government introduced before the Dail had a proper opportunity of considering the Visitors' Report, was opposed strenuously but unsuccessfully by Dr. Noel Browne T.D. and Mr. McQuillan T.D. of the National Progressive Democratic Party. Dr. Browne declared that these temporary appointments made without advertisement were in effect an attempt by Dr. Tierney to obtain complete dominance over the Dublin College in order to achieve his objective, the removal of the College to a new site at Belfield outside Dublin.† During the Dail debate on the Bill Mr. P. McGilligan T.D., a prominent member of the Fine Gael Party and an ex-Minister who is also a Senior Counsel and Professor of Law at University College, Dublin, suggested that the finding of the Visitors was merely "a series of three opinions and not a judicial determination" and that therefore the Visitors' decision was of no binding force. But as Professor Bryan Murphy, one of the law professors at University College, Cork, subsequently pointed out,‡ the Visitors were appointed by the Government as a tribunal of University College, Dublin, and their findings had a coercive and binding effect as to all matters of law and fact so referred to them.

The whole affair is profoundly disquieting and suggests that our major parties are prepared to combine without hesitation or justification when the interests of their friends are concerned. It is to be hoped that the proposed Commission on higher education will not be another whitewashing operation. The fact that only a quarter of our population are at present able to obtain even a secondary education suggests that such an inquiry is long overdue. Dr. Tierney and his colleagues, with the support of their political allies, have dealt a blow at the autonomy and integrity of our universities, which it should be their duty to cherish and safeguard. It must be recorded, however, that the Convocation of the graduates of the National University later carried by an overwhelming majority a resolution censuring the administration of University College, Dublin, for the disrepute which its activities had brought upon the College.

Ireland,

August 1960

* University College, Dublin, has over 4,000 students, or nearly twice as many as the other two Colleges at Cork and Galway combined. Dr. Tierney and his supporters desire to make it an independent University. *Hinc illae lacrimae.*

† See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 199, June 1960, p. 294.

‡ *Irish Times*, May 17, 1960.

PAKISTAN

THE CONSTITUTION COMMISSION

PAKISTAN'S Jack-in-the-Box politicians staged a brief but startling come-back when they tried to make the Constitution Commission's questionnaire a pretext to revive political activity in the country. It all started quietly, almost imperceptibly, at least in its initial stages. But it soon gained momentum. Meetings were held, and organized publicity to condition the people's mind on certain constitutional and political postulates was carried on on an extensive scale. For some time it had seemed that the wheel had turned full circle again and the quest for a suitable constitution for the country would be hampered by the same kind of slogan-mongering and tub-thumping as had become the hall-mark of the political régimes.

To subject the difficult and delicate task of constitution-making to political stresses and strains betrays a pernicious and destructive trend of mind, especially in a country like Pakistan where parochial and provincial loyalties may have been submerged, but have not yet died down. It is common knowledge how at one stage, before the proclamation of Martial Law, an opportunist provincial leadership had impudently and recklessly advocated the dismemberment of the country. That episode in Pakistan's history was too painful and too recent to be forgotten so easily or so soon. And now that the politicians were once again back at their old game, the portents for the country's future could not be too good. It was, therefore, incumbent on those in power to act firmly in putting an end to such activities. On July 2 a press note was issued from the headquarters of the Chief Martial Law Administrator which contained a strong warning to persons indulging in "mischievous and devious methods" by using the Constitution Commission's questionnaire "as an excuse for reviving political activity". The press note added: "Activities of this nature will not be tolerated and the full force of Martial Law will be brought to bear against them."

Before discussing some of the views recently advanced on the future constitution of Pakistan, it will be useful to make some brief references to the Constitution Commission. Ever since its appointment in February last, President Ayub and several of his Ministers have time and again categorically stated that the Commission was free to make any recommendations on the future constitution of Pakistan and was not committed in favour of any particular system of government. For instance, in a speech in Lahore on June 15, the President said that the "Constitution Commission is not to be influenced in anything except its own conscience and its love for Pakistan" and added: "It is the height of foolishness to suspect that they (the Constitution Commission) could be used as a signing machine." Similarly the President has held out repeated assurances that he would accept the recommendations of the Commission if they were in the best interest of the country,

even though they differed from his own ideas on the future constitution of Pakistan.

In view of these welcome and reassuring pronouncements there was hardly any need or occasion to raise public controversy to influence the deliberations of the Constitution Commission, which is composed of eminent and highly qualified Pakistanis. Moreover, it should never have been forgotten that the Constitution Commission was not a Constituent Assembly and as such was not expected to conduct its affairs in the limelight of public debate.

However, the dramatic publication of his replies to the Constitution Commission's questionnaire, by Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, a former Prime Minister of Pakistan, created quite a stir in the country. Making a strong plea for the restoration of the parliamentary system he said that it was "misleading to talk of the failure of the parliamentary pattern of government in Pakistan", and that the Constitution of 1956 failed, not because of any inherent defect in it, but because of the faults of "those entrusted with its runnings". He also pointed out that only its transitional provisions were in force when it was abrogated. Accordingly he made a plea for its restoration.

It is easy to understand Mr. Ali's solicitude for the discarded constitution, since it was passed under his Prime Ministership. Nevertheless the fallacies of his views are so palpably apparent that they would have hardly merited any comment, were it not for the confusion they created in Pakistan and elsewhere. On June 18 Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Minister of Fuel Power and National Resources, said that it was wrong to say that the Constitution of 1956 had not been tried and only its transitional provisions were in force when it was abrogated. As far as the basic provisions of Cabinet responsibility and a parliamentary system of government were concerned, the system dated back to 1935. The essential features and basic structure of the Government of India Act were still being worked in Pakistan at the time of the abrogation of the constitution in October 1958. Such modifications and alterations as had taken place since 1935 were matters of detail and of a minor nature. It would thus be a distortion of history, Mr. Bhutto said, to claim that the parliamentary system was not given a fair trial in Pakistan and was scrapped before it had time to get into its stride.

How is it then that, after such a long run, the parliamentary system should have failed so dismally in Pakistan? The question is only partly answered by pointing to conditions which obtain not only in Pakistan, but in other Afro-Asian countries—mass poverty and illiteracy, poor and even primitive means of communication, and the growing pressure exerted by a steady increase in the population. In Pakistan, however, they are reinforced by other more specific and peculiar causes, which militate against the satisfactory functioning of the parliamentary system of government.

Pakistan is divided into two wings separated by over a thousand miles of Indian territory. Even though air travel between them is heavily subsidized, the cost is out of reach of most of the people. The same is more or less true of the sea link, which involves a journey of seven days. There is diversity of languages, scripts and social customs. As President Ayub said in an important article in an American magazine, all "these factors are centrifugal in nature

and call for a new and bold experiment with political and administrative science to weave unity out of diversity”.

The President on Nationhood

IN the same article President Ayub made another very important observation; and it will be most appropriate to quote him at some length to emphasize that the concept of Pakistani nationhood needs all care and attention to strike deeper and firmer roots. Pointing out that “till the advent of Pakistan, none of us was in fact a Pakistani”, the President observed that

prior to 1947, our nationalism was based more on an idea than on any territorial definition. Till then, ideologically we were Muslims, territorially we happened to be Indians, and parochially we were a conglomeration of at least eleven smaller provincial loyalties. But when suddenly Pakistan emerged as a reality, we who had got together from every nook and corner of the vast sub-continent of India were faced with the task of transforming all our traditional, territorial and parochial loyalties into one great loyalty for the new state of Pakistan. This process of metamorphism was naturally attended by difficult psychological and emotional strains which we have borne in full measure—and are still bearing.

To meet these formidable challenges to our national solidarity, Pakistan has to evolve an indigenous system of democratic government. No carbon copy of any system, no matter how efficiently it works elsewhere, will solve our problems. The country needs a strong and stable executive for a long time, not only to resolve the complexities, moral and material, which followed its creation, but also to implement the various reforms which have been recently introduced in the country. This is not possible under a parliamentary system of government, for a successful functioning of which even the elementary pre-requisites are lacking in the country. For one thing Pakistan has never had strong political parties with a national outlook, except for two or three years of its existence when the Muslim League had some emotional appeal for the broad masses of the people.

Another essential of the parliamentary system is that power must be given to him who has a majority in the legislature. But in Pakistan whoever manoeuvred himself into power commanded a majority in the legislature because of an utter lack of party loyalty and discipline.

As such, parliamentary democracy in the country became nothing but a farce. Sentimental shibboleths and provincial rivalries brought in their wake a succession of weak and inefficient political régimes. Each was a house divided against itself. Every member of the central or provincial legislatures, barring some honourable exceptions, was a law unto himself. The Administration had become completely paralysed. The balance of payments became precarious. Foreign reserves dwindled to a dangerous level. In short the country was brought to the verge of ruin and threatened with dismemberment. To forget this bitter experience and to make a plea for the restoration of a parliamentary form of government and the abrogated Constitution of 1956 can be interpreted at best as misguided idealism and at worst as disruptive tactics. The President was right in saying that “in life you do not

even though they differed from his own ideas on the future constitution of Pakistan.

In view of these welcome and reassuring pronouncements there was hardly any need or occasion to raise public controversy to influence the deliberations of the Constitution Commission, which is composed of eminent and highly qualified Pakistanis. Moreover, it should never have been forgotten that the Constitution Commission was not a Constituent Assembly and as such was not expected to conduct its affairs in the limelight of public debate.

However, the dramatic publication of his replies to the Constitution Commission's questionnaire, by Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, a former Prime Minister of Pakistan, created quite a stir in the country. Making a strong plea for the restoration of the parliamentary system he said that it was "misleading to talk of the failure of the parliamentary pattern of government in Pakistan", and that the Constitution of 1956 failed, not because of any inherent defect in it, but because of the faults of "those entrusted with its runnings". He also pointed out that only its transitional provisions were in force when it was abrogated. Accordingly he made a plea for its restoration.

It is easy to understand Mr. Ali's solicitude for the discarded constitution, since it was passed under his Prime Ministership. Nevertheless the fallacies of his views are so palpably apparent that they would have hardly merited any comment, were it not for the confusion they created in Pakistan and elsewhere. On June 18 Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Minister of Fuel Power and National Resources, said that it was wrong to say that the Constitution of 1956 had not been tried and only its transitional provisions were in force when it was abrogated. As far as the basic provisions of Cabinet responsibility and a parliamentary system of government were concerned, the system dated back to 1935. The essential features and basic structure of the Government of India Act were still being worked in Pakistan at the time of the abrogation of the constitution in October 1958. Such modifications and alterations as had taken place since 1935 were matters of detail and of a minor nature. It would thus be a distortion of history, Mr. Bhutto said, to claim that the parliamentary system was not given a fair trial in Pakistan and was scrapped before it had time to get into its stride.

How is it then that, after such a long run, the parliamentary system should have failed so dismally in Pakistan? The question is only partly answered by pointing to conditions which obtain not only in Pakistan, but in other Afro-Asian countries—mass poverty and illiteracy, poor and even primitive means of communication, and the growing pressure exerted by a steady increase in the population. In Pakistan, however, they are reinforced by other more specific and peculiar causes, which militate against the satisfactory functioning of the parliamentary system of government.

Pakistan is divided into two wings separated by over a thousand miles of Indian territory. Even though air travel between them is heavily subsidized, the cost is out of reach of most of the people. The same is more or less true of the sea link, which involves a journey of seven days. There is diversity of languages, scripts and social customs. As President Ayub said in an important article in an American magazine, all "these factors are centrifugal in nature

and call for a new and bold experiment with political and administrative science to weave unity out of diversity”.

The President on Nationhood

IN the same article President Ayub made another very important observation; and it will be most appropriate to quote him at some length to emphasize that the concept of Pakistani nationhood needs all care and attention to strike deeper and firmer roots. Pointing out that “till the advent of Pakistan, none of us was in fact a Pakistani”, the President observed that

prior to 1947, our nationalism was based more on an idea than on any territorial definition. Till then, ideologically we were Muslims, territorially we happened to be Indians, and parochially we were a conglomeration of at least eleven smaller provincial loyalties. But when suddenly Pakistan emerged as a reality, we who had got together from every nook and corner of the vast sub-continent of India were faced with the task of transforming all our traditional, territorial and parochial loyalties into one great loyalty for the new state of Pakistan. This process of metamorphism was naturally attended by difficult psychological and emotional strains which we have borne in full measure—and are still bearing.

To meet these formidable challenges to our national solidarity, Pakistan has to evolve an indigenous system of democratic government. No carbon copy of any system, no matter how efficiently it works elsewhere, will solve our problems. The country needs a strong and stable executive for a long time, not only to resolve the complexities, moral and material, which followed its creation, but also to implement the various reforms which have been recently introduced in the country. This is not possible under a parliamentary system of government, for a successful functioning of which even the elementary pre-requisites are lacking in the country. For one thing Pakistan has never had strong political parties with a national outlook, except for two or three years of its existence when the Muslim League had some emotional appeal for the broad masses of the people.

Another essential of the parliamentary system is that power must be given to him who has a majority in the legislature. But in Pakistan whoever manoeuvred himself into power commanded a majority in the legislature because of an utter lack of party loyalty and discipline.

As such, parliamentary democracy in the country became nothing but a farce. Sentimental shibboleths and provincial rivalries brought in their wake a succession of weak and inefficient political régimes. Each was a house divided against itself. Every member of the central or provincial legislatures, barring some honourable exceptions, was a law unto himself. The Administration had become completely paralysed. The balance of payments became precarious. Foreign reserves dwindled to a dangerous level. In short the country was brought to the verge of ruin and threatened with dismemberment. To forget this bitter experience and to make a plea for the restoration of a parliamentary form of government and the abrogated Constitution of 1956 can be interpreted at best as misguided idealism and at worst as disruptive tactics. The President was right in saying that “in life you do not

reinforce a failure. It is the height of stupidity to enforce a system that failed”.

There must be democracy in Pakistan. All are agreed on that. Civil freedom must be ensured. Once again all are agreed on that. But parliamentary forms and the Federal structure of the Government are not the roads that lead to the goal. The Federal type of government only aggravates provincial tendencies in a country where even the concept of nationhood is in the course of development.

The question, therefore, is what type of democracy should be introduced in Pakistan. In the words of President Ayub the “answer need not be sought in the theories and practices of other people alone. On the contrary it must be found within the book of Pakistan itself.”

He lays four pre-requisites of any democratic system in a country like Pakistan. They are:

1. It should be simple to understand, easy to work and cheap to sustain.
2. It should put to the voter only such questions as he can answer in the light of his own personal knowledge and understanding without external prompting.
3. It should ensure the effective participation of all citizens in the affairs of the country up to the level of their mental horizon and intellectual calibre.
4. It should be able to produce reasonably strong and stable government.

The scheme of “basic democracy” has been discussed at length in the pages of this journal. It has taken the country nearer to the realization of these goals. The first elections to these institutions were held in December last. The average percentage of votes cast was 67 per cent by men and 42 per cent by women. Those elected included 14 per cent university graduates, 78 per cent literate and 8 per cent illiterate. They came from the hard core of the country, the majority of them being middle class and lower middle class agriculturists, lawyers, medical practitioners, business men, retired government servants and workers and artisans. These encouraging results have been achieved because Pakistan took a leaf out of its own book. It is quite possible that the 80,000 members elected to “basic democracies” may form the future electoral college of Pakistan.

Meanwhile the Constitution Commission is likely to conclude its work before the end of the year and, after its recommendations have been accepted by the President, country-wide elections are expected to be held in the winter of 1961.

Pakistan,
August 1960

CANADA

LEGISLATING AGAINST TIME

THE third session of the present Federal Parliament of Canada, which began on January 14, has already lasted over six months and its members are now working overtime in the hope that prorogation can be achieved before the end of July. Once more the inefficiency of the Cabinet's management of the business of the House of Commons permitted far too much time to be wasted in the first four months of the session in dreary academic debates over trivial issues, the rehashing of bygone controversies and long wrangles about points of procedure. As a result at mid-May only small fractions of the Government's legislative program and the departmental estimates had been dealt with and successive extensions of the daily sittings of the Commons have been decreed. When Prime Minister Diefenbaker blamed the Opposition for frustrating the smooth progress of business by a long daily barrage of written and oral questions, his opponents retorted that the Government's reluctance to give clear expositions of its views and policies made the daily interrogations necessary and its dilatoriness in submitting its legislation was responsible for the accumulation of such heavy arrears of untouched business.

Old observers of the parliamentary scene at Ottawa give the present House of Commons a very low rating. Too many of its members, particularly on the Tory back benches, have scant regard for the amenities of parliamentary life and bouts of puerile backchat, which have often degenerated into rowdy verbal brawls and produced an atmosphere of partisan acrimony, have been much too frequent. There has also been a scandalous amount of absenteeism from the sessions of the Commons, the chief offenders being members from the central Provinces who have felt free to spend long weekends at their homes; and when extra hours of sitting were announced, Mr. Douglas Fisher, a Socialist, protested that far too many members were anxious to wind up the session in indecent haste and escape from Ottawa in order to attend to their private interests and refused to give the public fair value for their generous remuneration of \$10,000 per annum plus perquisites like free railway travel, by faithful attendance to the nation's business. At one time the Prime Minister talked of adjourning Parliament at the end of June and bringing it back for an autumn session to finish its program; but he has now intimated that he will keep it in session until all the business on its order paper is finished.

No new parliamentary reputations were made during the session. The Prime Minister left the routine duties of leadership in the Commons mainly to his deputy, Mr. Churchill, Minister of Trade and Commerce, but the latter continued to irritate the Opposition and prove a poor substitute for his predecessor, Mr. Howard Green, now Secretary for External Affairs. However, Prime Minister Diefenbaker was always ready to intervene in

debates, when a situation seemed to demand a vigorous exposition of his Government's policies and the motives behind them and a strong lead to his supporters, and he remained one of the most effective debaters in the House. But, as the session progressed, he revealed an increasing sensitiveness to criticism and a tendency to outbursts of peevish irritability and in one single sitting he was thrice called to order by the Speaker and forced by him to withdraw a charge of "falsification" which he had levelled at Mr. Pearson. He has also been freely criticized, even by some of his own party, for his frequent aerial excursions from Ottawa to deliver orations on both sides of the border and to receive from Indian tribes the accolade of honorary chieftain, for which his fondness has become a joke. His most useful lieutenant has been Mr. Fleming, Minister of Finance, who handled his Budget skilfully and shouldered more than his fair share of the defense of the Government's policies. Mr. Green, since he became Secretary for External Affairs, has been transformed from an old-fashioned Tory Imperialist into a Liberal internationalist and has therefore been able to secure the endorsement of the Opposition for most of his policies; and Mr. Fulton, Minister of Justice, and Mr. Harkness, Minister of Agriculture, have both enhanced their reputations. But there are some obvious weaklings in the Cabinet and its latest recruit from Quebec, Colonel Pierre Sevigny, has done little to cure the feebleness of French Canada's representation in it.

To the Liberals, who became more militant after their victories in provincial by-elections had raised their spirits, Mr. Pearson gave forceful and intelligent leadership and could always rely upon effective support from two former Ministers, Mr. Martin and Mr. Pickersgill, while some of the younger French-Canadian Liberals by excellent speeches helped to remove the impression that their party was incapable of maintaining a long debate. Mr. Argue, the leader of the C.C.F., has disabused the House of the idea that he could not speak with authority on any but agricultural problems; and the high average of the debating skill and the industry of his small flock of seven supporters have atoned for its numerical weakness.

The substantial volume of useful legislation, which has already been passed, includes Bills which give financial succour to western farmers whose grain was left unharvested owing to the premature arrival of last winter, gave the Federal franchise to the Indians and established a new Federal Department of Forestry. But one of the most controversial debates of the session was produced by a Bill containing numerous amendments of the Combines Investigation Act. The Government maintained that the proposed changes would strengthen its efficacy by closing loopholes for evasion and that, through the ban which would be enforced on certain trading practices, they would give small retail merchants a better chance to meet the competition of the large chain and departmental stores; but both the Liberals and the C.C.F. argued that some of the amendments would have a contrary effect.

Another sharp controversy developed over a pet project of Prime Minister Diefenbaker, a Canadian Bill of Rights, which he introduced late in the session. He admitted that it would only apply to such basic human rights as

were within Federal jurisdiction, but he claimed that it would provide adequate safeguards against any recurrence of violations of such rights as had frequently occurred in Canada. But Mr. Pearson, who had the support of Mr. Argue, after reminding the Prime Minister that he had not kept his promise to submit the Bill early in the session, pronounced the Bill "inadequate and ineffectual" and argued that, since future Parliaments could not be bound not to remove the safeguards, their permanence ought to be assured by embodying them in a constitutional amendment. He also declared that the Prime Minister ought to have made an effort to secure the acquiescence of the Provinces in the inclusion in his Bill of rights within their jurisdiction. The Bill has also been severely criticized by authorities on constitutional law like Professor Frank Scott of McGill University, who said he would prefer no Bill at all to the Prime Minister's measure, which has been referred for study to a special committee.

Defense

THE problem of Canada's defense has been a subject of recurring controversies. The parties in opposition have denounced the Government's policy for it as a complete and disastrous muddle and have severely criticized General Pearkes, the Minister of National Defense, for his stubborn reliance for the defense of Canada against aerial aggression upon supplies of the Bomarc "B" missile from the United States, where its value was seriously questioned. However, when the crisis over the American U-2 plane caused the United States' Congress to reverse its earlier decision to discard the Bomarc and to include in the large vote for its extensive production, funds adequate to fulfil the agreement to supply the missile to Canada and help in the building of two Canadian bases for it, General Pearkes could claim that his faith in the Bomarc had been amply justified.

Then negotiations with Washington about control of the Bomarc missiles assigned to Canada came to a head at a conference at Montebello in Canada between the Canadian and American Ministers concerned with problems of defense on July 12-13. At its close Mr. Thomas Gates, the American Secretary for Defense, informed a press conference that the Bomarcs on Canadian soil could not be fired without the authority of the President of the United States, but that the Prime Minister of Canada would always be consulted before any order was given. Apparently this pronouncement was not satisfactory to Mr. Diefenbaker, for he subsequently told the House of Commons that he wanted for Canada the same rights of control over American nuclear missiles as were accorded to Britain; and he also declared that his Government had not decided to acquire nuclear weapons for Canada even if its terms about control of them were conceded.

Debates on international affairs have revealed that all political parties in Canada are in agreement that nuclear armaments should be completely abolished, as a prelude to general disarmament, that the political structure of the NATO alliance should be strengthened and that greater economic and technical aid should be given to backward countries, and at intervals both

Mr. Pearson and Mr. Argue were sharply critical of the foreign policies of the United States.

Parliament as Divorce Court

AN interesting feature of the session has been a crusade by two young members of the C.C.F., Mr. Frank Howard and Mr. Arnold Peters, with the object of forcing Parliament to abandon responsibility for divorce cases from Quebec and Newfoundland, the only two Provinces whose law courts lack jurisdiction over divorce. In petitions for divorce from residents of these Provinces, the procedure is for the evidence to be heard by a special divorce committee of the Senate and the finding of its report to be embodied in a private Bill which, except in rare cases, has always been passed through all its stages in the Senate and House of Commons without serious further scrutiny. As long as the number of petitions for divorce was comparatively small the burden of dealing with them was light, but its rapid increase in recent years—it is 609 this year—has made it very heavy, and many Canadians have come to feel that such judicial work is not a proper function of Parliament and is an intolerable waste of its time.

In some earlier sessions members of the C.C.F. have held up the passage of divorce Bills temporarily as a protest against the practice of passing them through the House of Commons in batches without any consideration of their merits, but it has been left to Messrs. Howard and Peters to maintain a successful blockade of them by consuming the two hours allotted each week to private Bills in an exhaustive dissection of the evidence submitted to the Senatorial Committee. So far they have allowed only a few divorce Bills to pass and remain adamant to the anguished pleas of some 450 mismatched couples, who had counted upon an early release from their present matrimonial ties. The Government is naturally embarrassed by this crusade, but it has considerable support from members of all parties in both Houses and, if it is renewed next session, it will be forced to take action to end the impasse. Alternative remedies favored for it are the establishment of a Federal divorce court or the transfer of Parliament's present responsibility for divorce to the Exchequer Court, which would have to be enlarged.

Canada,

August 1960

SOUTH AFRICA

FROM SHARPEVILLE TO THE CONGO

THE events in South Africa these last four months are bounded on the one side by the police shootings at Sharpeville and on the other by the White exodus from the Congo. The first set up a world-wide reaction against South African policies, and the second came as a long-expected relief from the pressure of this criticism and exclusive attention.

The vehemence of the international reaction to the killing of seventy Africans by the police at the Sharpeville and Langa locations surprised the South African Government, used as it had become by then to boycotts, denunciations, U.N. votes of disapproval and individual national pleas to see sense. The sharp State Department comment from the United States, the arrival of the matter before the Security Council, the debates on the killings in both the United Kingdom and the Canadian Parliaments shook even the outwardly cast-iron confidence of the Nationalists, as well as the country at large. This pandemonium of condemnation also began to take a more solid form on the stock exchange. Long after the more violent political gesticulations had died down to a distant angry muttering, South African shares slumped steadily downward until they had shed some £500 million in quoted value. The full effects of this particular form of international unpopularity have not yet been felt in South Africa.

The internal ructions were no less alarming. After the shootings the whole South African race-relations and political landscape seemed to be in motion as in an earth tremor. Angry and/or purposeful processions of Africans everywhere emerged from locations and demonstrated in or near the cities. Fires swept locations in country areas and destroyed churches and schools. Even the Government appeared to be shaking in the general confusion—and the first concession to the Africans in twelve years appeared to have been made when the police suspended arrests for pass offences. But this apparent lack of determination suddenly hardened into wholesale, almost indiscriminate arrests, upon the heels of which came the declaration of emergency and the invocation of the vast powers of the 1953 Public Safety Act. Under the direction of the Special Branch of the South African police hundreds of White, Coloured, Asian and African leaders and members of the Liberal and extra-parliamentary political groups were rounded up and packed into jails.

Arrests continued on a large scale for nearly three weeks. By the end of that time there were nearly 20,000 people in jail, about 2,000 of whom were political detainees. The remaining 18,000 were Africans who had been swept off the streets and out of the locations as "vagrants" and "undesirables". In addition, the Pan-African Congress and the African National Congress were banned and numbers of their leaders tried for incitement. The head of the young Pan-African Congress, Robert Sobukwe, a former university lecturer, is already serving a three-year sentence; while ex-Chief Albert Lutuli,

President of the veteran African National Congress, is also standing his trial for incitement. There have also been secret summary trials in prison of numbers of the arrested "vagrants" (the so-called "tsotsi element"). These prisoners are said after trial to be dispatched to labour rehabilitation centres, possibly to increase the amount of farm labour available. The Minister of Justice has made the powers given him to arrest these "vagrants" a main reason for continuing the emergency. At the time of writing the emergency is in its 115th day.

The "detainees", that is the subjects of political arrest, have so far been subjected to questioning, but no legal proceedings have been instituted against any of them. Frequent demands were made in Parliament, the Press and by the detainees themselves, sometimes backing their requests with hunger-strikes, that they be either charged or released. After three months the bulk of the detainees have been released—many of them under conditions imposing a curfew and a ban on all comment on their treatment. Even these conditions appear to be challengeable by an appeal to court. Two hundred and fifty detainees are still in jail at the time of writing, and it is not yet known what, if any, charges are going to be preferred against them.

In addition to these detainees, there are numbers of South Africans of all races who fled the country after the first wave of arrests. Some of these are still lodged in the three British Protectorates, others have made their way oversea via Dar Es Salaam, or have been airlifted out by Ghanaian agencies. The most important of these fugitives is Mr. Oliver Tambo, Vice-President of the African National Congress, who left the country in the company of Mr. Ronald Segal, editor of the quarterly, *Africa South*. Mr. Tambo has toured Africa raising sympathy for Africans in the Union and is now in the United States to present the Union Africans' case before the United Nations. These refugees are adding fresh energy to the international movement to boycott, condemn and generally bring pressure to bear on the South African Government. Their efforts may be far more effective outside the country than they were within it.

Attempted Murder of the Prime Minister

THE most startling event in the first month after Sharpeville was the attempted murder of Dr. Verwoerd, the Prime Minister. David Pratt, a wealthy farmer, was promptly taken into custody, but for reasons of public calm he was not immediately charged; instead he was detained under the emergency regulations. Only at the time of writing is the case against Pratt being tried. However, the effects of the attempt on Dr. Verwoerd's life have long been felt in South African politics. The main result was to rally popular Nationalist support to Dr. Verwoerd's side at a time when he most needed it. Whether this is a temporary or a permanent relief remains to be seen. However, Dr. Verwoerd's most ardent followers in the party hierarchy are still doing their utmost to turn the event to their leader's continuing advantage.

Parliament continued without Dr. Verwoerd much as it had done while he was there, in a state of excitement and altercation. Nobody really took

very seriously the Government's promise that the 1960 session would be an amiable prologue to the May celebrations of fifty years of Union. Indeed Dr. Verwoerd in his first speech ended all possibility of this by announcing that a referendum, of the White voters only, would be held to decide whether there should be a republic—and that the referendum might even be held later in the year.

If there had been little calm in Parliament before Sharpeville, there was none whatever after March 21. The House continued in a state of intermittent clamour until May 21, when it was prorogued. The Opposition naturally blamed the Government for the condition of the country—the Government members closest to Dr. Verwoerd attributed the state of affairs to a variety of causes, Mr. Macmillan's "Winds of Change" speech, the "sickly sentimental liberalism of the West", the machinations of international communism, the British Labour Party, the South African Liberal Party, the Progressives, the English-medium universities, the Anglican Church, and, above all, the English-language press. It is significant that this attack on the English press was the most prolonged and violent yet seen in the Assembly, and went further, in its demands for the censoring and even closing down of one, some or all of these newspapers, than ever before. Dr. Verwoerd himself took up the attack later, and now one of the Ministers, Dr. Albert Hertzog, is taking the attack to even further extremes. Some of the attacks have attempted to pin the blame for the attack on Dr. Verwoerd on the English-language press.

There were, of course, other tensions in Parliament besides those between the Government and the Opposition. The Opposition itself felt the strain between the United Party and the dozen members who had broken away from it to form the Progressive Party. Their differences came into open debate on several occasions, though the leaders on both sides did their best not to allow their parties to succumb to Nationalist goading. There was even greater tension between the 101 Nationalist members and the one ex-Nationalist member of the new National Union Party—Mr. Japie Basson. This was probably made all the greater by the awareness of the Verwoerd group that Mr. Basson represented the tip of an iceberg of coolness deep within the Nationalist Party towards some of the Prime Minister's most cherished policies. Dr. Verwoerd's decision to have a republican referendum is believed to have been taken as much to meet this concealed and cautious disaffection as to continue the appearance of Nationalist dynamism and progress.

Mr. Paul Sauer, the senior Minister who took over the chairmanship of the Cabinet after Dr. Verwoerd had been shot, made a cautious attempt to bring this ultra-cautious group into the open. He delivered a speech in the deep *platteland* which said that South Africa would never be the same again after Sharpeville, and that changes and concessions were necessary in policies affecting the three million urban Africans. But by that time the groundswell of rank-and-file sympathy for the wounded Prime Minister had started to become apparent and Mr. Sauer and the *Burger*, which had aired similar views, were left as lonely voices in Nationalist political circles. However,

many of the same demands are being made by Afrikaner business men, industrialists, and Churchmen, as well as, more forcefully, by the English-speaking business community. In spite of being told brusquely by Nationalist ministers and members to "mind their own business", the industrialists and commercial men continue to call for changes.

Towards the end of the session Dr. Verwoerd began to guide parliamentary proceedings by remote control from his hospital bed. Mr. Eric Louw, Minister of External Affairs, making an oblique attack on Mr. Sauer's call for changes, said that only the Prime Minister was entitled to make that kind of speech. When the Opposition insisted that some other senior Minister should take the wounded Prime Minister's place at Mr. Louw's side in the coming Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in London, Mr. Louw insisted that he had the Prime Minister's fullest confidence to do the job alone. Parliament guessed that this was because the only possible alternative choice of companions lay between the senior Minister, Mr. Sauer, Dr. Verwoerd's main critic within the party, and Dr. Dönges, Finance Minister, who was Dr. Verwoerd's main rival for the leadership of the party after Mr. Strijdom's death in 1958. Mr. Louw eventually left for London by himself, after a conference with Dr. Verwoerd in hospital.

The Proposed Republic

BEFORE Parliament ended, Dr. Verwoerd sent it two long messages to be read to the members by Dr. Dönges. By then the Commonwealth Prime Ministers had met, and most of the press had interpreted their communiqué as meaning that South Africa's return to the Commonwealth upon becoming a republic was not automatic. Dr. Verwoerd's first message to Parliament interpreted the position somewhat differently: "Whereas the form of government—republican or monarchical—is not a condition of membership (of the Commonwealth) and is, indeed, not even a matter for consideration by the Commonwealth, the Union, in the event of its becoming a republic with all the other circumstances remaining unchanged, will be equally welcome." Dr. Verwoerd has since elaborated this statement into a prediction that the major and older Commonwealth countries will see to it that South Africa is readmitted, and British Ministers have replied that no guarantees have been given South Africa in this matter.

Dr. Verwoerd's second message to Parliament offered some minor changes in the regulations governing the urban Africans: smaller reference books, some new urban authorities for increased consultation, and changes in the liquor laws. An Opposition spokesman described it as "the mixture as before with an infusion of alcohol". But Dr. Verwoerd's main public enthusiasm still concerned the republic. He emerged from hospital to take part in the concluding ceremonies of the Union Festival. Speaking on the final day in the stadium at Bloemfontein he made a call to the English section to assist in the bringing into being of a republic, a "parliamentary, democratic republic" which he represented as a concession by the "Afrikaners of the North".

After this appeal to the English section there were signs that the Nationalist

leaders and organs were forming up, at least for the time being, round the figure of Dr. Verwoerd. He was even referred to as a "figure of destiny" by the *Burger*, which was an echo of the claim by Dr. Verwoerd's own supporters that he had been preserved by Providence to lead South Africa to safety. The complaints still continued to come in thick and fast from the leaders of trade and industry—and Dr. Verwoerd found himself forced to reply that they were politically inspired. But the Nationalists had obviously decided to conduct a holding action and wait for whatever Providence provided by way of a diversion in the rest of Africa—and particularly in the Congo. Events there, they hoped, would give them breathing space, and the republican campaign would offer a necessary distraction. While waiting, the Nationalist press concentrated heavily on the progress of the two touring teams, the All Blacks in South Africa, and the South African Cricket XI in England.

There was also another unclosed public account which had still to be met—perhaps an even more disturbing one than that of the republic's chances of remaining in the Commonwealth. This was the Security Council's instruction to Mr. Hammarskjöld, Secretary General of the U.N., to discuss South Africa's policies with the Government. Mr. Louw had preliminary discussions with him in London, and Mr. Hammarskjöld is soon to arrive in South Africa to hold further talks. Mr. Louw has said very firmly that Mr. Hammarskjöld is coming to talk only with the representatives of the Government. It is possible that among the topics discussed will be, in addition to *apartheid* as applied in the Union, the application of that policy in the mandated territory of South West Africa. This mandate is almost certain to come under heavy Afro-Asian attack in the new session of the U.N., and a serious attempt seems to be building up to prise this territory out of the Union's hands altogether.

Thunder in the North

AT last the long-awaited Congo storm has burst. The Nationalist press is making immense capital out of it and demonstrating to its own satisfaction that Blacks and Whites must be kept apart. But in the inner conclaves there is likely to be some concern over the prompt and increasingly massive U.N. intervention to restore peace and order. Like most of the political windfalls that the Nationalists exploit, events in the Congo may have long-term effects which may be just as dangerous as the pressures on South Africa which they have momentarily eased. Should the U.N. intervention in the Congo prove successful, the already considerable prestige and influence of the World body in Africa will be greatly increased. For South Africa that is an incalculable development.

A more immediate international conundrum is the extent to which boycotts and capital malnutrition will affect the country. It was generally believed some months ago that the boycotts would have little effect. Now at least two shipments, and there may be others, of South African goods have been returned to South Africa because dockers refused to unload them. There are new boycotts growing up in various parts of the world, from Malaya to

Sweden. The Congo market now seems irretrievably lost to the Union—although men must eat however much they dislike a country's politics, and the Congo is short of certain foodstuffs. Whether Western disillusion with other African developments will restore more confidence in South Africa is difficult to determine at this moment.

In the shade of these international imponderables, the internal political battle between the Whites is in a more interesting state than it has been for years. The new parliamentary divisions are now finding some substance in the country. The Progressives have from the start been drawing satisfactory and interested audiences. They have only just been beaten by the United Party in the only by-election (a municipal one) which they have felt strong enough to fight. Mr. Basson's National Union seems to be making some headway, especially in South West Africa. Both parties have shown recent good results in spite of a fortnight of Congo atrocity stories.

Among the non-Whites political activity only takes place in dense obscurity. There is talk of a new attempt to obtain a united political front among the disastrously splintered Coloured people. What political currents are flowing among the African people are concealed, but not prevented, by bannings, censorship and seclusion. One hint so far comes from Pondoland where there has apparently been a full revolt against the Bantu Authority system. This has taken the form of considerable discontent with the chieftanship of the Government's most prominent supporter in the Bantu Authority's policy, Chief Botha Sigau, described by government spokesmen as "the Prime Minister of the first Bantustan". This dislike by tribesmen of the Authority's system, the keystone of *apartheid*, appears to be repeated in some other centres. But there is no means of clear knowledge for the outsider in these matters at all—and not even for the Government. Unless the present system and philosophy of administration changes, we can only wait for the next explosion of dissatisfaction to find out how much deeper African grievance has gone.

South Africa,
August 1960.

NEW ZEALAND

A TESTING SESSION

THE House of Representatives elected in 1957 met on June 22 for its final session, which promises to be charged with great interest. Some politicians would prefer a five-year parliamentary term rather than the present three-year term, and certainly the shorter period encourages hand-to-mouth opportunism. For particular reasons, however, the present Parliament has not followed the usual sessional pattern: one session to settle down, one session to work and one to prepare for the election. The Labour Government, holding office with a parliamentary majority of 41 to 39, found itself in 1958 faced with the fulfilment of election promises which would have been a tax on abundant resources. And the resources were sufficient for current needs only with careful husbanding. Instead of presenting a first Budget glittering with the gold of Labour's election programme, the Labour Minister of Finance, Mr. Nordmeyer, was compelled to announce heavy increases in taxation and the deferment of some of the promised benefits.

In a situation of lower realizations from exports of butter, cheese and wool and continuing deterioration in the balance of overseas payments, political strategy advised immediate and radical economic surgery, in the hope that the patient would recover health and good humour by the third (and election) year. Mr. Nordmeyer took this course. Import control was immediately tightened, and reinforced later by heavy duties and taxation.* But imports could not respond at once to tightened control. Essential capital equipment and raw materials for many of New Zealand's secondary industries had to be obtained. So a Labour Government, averse from overseas loans, had to negotiate loans and credits in the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States for over £44,000,000. As a set-off to the economy-compelling taxes Mr. Nordmeyer made a selection of election promises for fulfilment in 1958, and undertook that others should be put into effect, taxes eased and import control relaxed as soon as this was deemed safe. That promise has been kept and in the meantime the overseas payments crisis has lifted, with better returns for dairy produce and wool and a substantial reduction in private imports.

Now the Minister of Finance faces Parliament with a small surplus (£630,000) in the Consolidated Fund. Taking the Public Account as a whole, the Minister has stated there is a cash deficit for last year's operations of £18,300,000; but against that there has been no overseas borrowing during the year. Overseas funds have been strengthened. For the year ended March 31, 1960, there was a surplus of £11,800,000 on exchange transactions. Though this may not be large it was achieved not only without overseas borrowing, but after government investment of £16,000,000 overseas (in preparation for redemption of loans) and official debt repayment of £11,600,000.

* See THE ROUND TABLE, No. 192, Sept. 1958.

This is the position as the parties make their preliminary appeal to the electors through the broadcast debates of Parliament. Labour can point to a recovery and renewed prosperity. Certainly the Government has had Mr. Doolittle's "little bit of luck" in the export markets, but it has not been idle. It has worked resolutely to remove the menace of butter dumping, has vigorously supported the search for new outlets for produce and measures for extending and diversifying industry. Labour will, moreover, lift more of its tax impost in the final session. It will also announce an extensive scheme of public works and improved services. But, in the customary competition between parties in offering benefits, there may be a new factor in this year's election. New Zealand electors have for long been ready to follow the word of St. Paul and eat whatsoever is sold in the shambles "asking no questions for conscience sake". But if their memory of 1957 promises and 1958 taxes still arouses resentment they will be guided by a classic legend and will look carefully into the mouth of any gift horse if they suspect a Greek strain in the breeding.

The National Party, led by Mr. Holyoake, has given no evidence up to the present of a desire to compete in offering gifts. It has rather emphasized the intention to relax controls, ease taxation, and give industry an incentive by allowing enterprise to retain its reward.

On the personal side the parties are fairly evenly balanced. In leadership Mr. Nash has had long experience, and at the age of 78 his capacity for work, and for travel, is truly amazing. But Mr. Holyoake also has a good ministerial record, and if he does not vie with Mr. Nash in being at all places at all times, it may be that he has heard and noted some facetious comments on Mr. Nash's ubiquity.

In the membership behind the leaders, neither party can claim marked superiority in talent. In policy, the difference between the parties cannot be pinned down to a clear and specific issue. It is more a difference of viewpoint, emphasis and degree. Labour has not wholly forsworn socialism, but announces no nationalization plans. It rather favours State initiation, participation and control. National, with more faith in private enterprise, would prefer to clear the field for a society that would venture and advance. National would encourage and share risks, but control with reluctance.

With the parties so evenly balanced, which way will the people go? Labour got off to a bad start in 1958, and an election in that year would have seen the party heavily handicapped; but much prestige has since been recovered. Conditions are different and the people, or many of them, will vote on the present and on hopes, rather than on memories. In the formation of their impressions, what is said and done in the session will loom large and may be decisive. Either Mr. Nash or Mr. Holyoake could say, in rugby football terms: "Give us the ball in the first half and we'll win the match."

A Rethinking of Labour Party Policy

IT is time to shift the emphasis from security and stability . . . and to direct our efforts towards growth. . . . New directions will not involve the sacrifice of what is good in our other aims; on the contrary; it will

strengthen them. But it will involve our rethinking our present practices and policies in order to create a climate for vigorous growth... The Government has already gone a considerable way in rethinking its policies and measures." This was the highlight of a statement made to the Industrial Development Conference by the Prime Minister, Mr. Nash, on June 13.

By some commentators, this announcement has been interpreted as a puzzling somersault yet to be confirmed by precise policies. Attention has been drawn to the fact that government expenditure has been rising by about £30 million per annum since the Labour Government regained office, and that the biggest increases have been upon social welfare schemes, in particular upon family benefits, universal superannuation and the provision of finance for housing. The magnitude of the increase in government expenditure is seen as a major reason for the maintenance of high rates of taxation and restrictive credit policies which impede development in the private sector.

Yet there is some tangible evidence that the Government has now appreciated the necessity of modifying some of its previous policies of security, group stability and egalitarianism, and of placing a good deal more emphasis on growth, if it is to retain sufficient support to regain office in this year's election.

A change of attitude had previously been demonstrated in connexion with its policy of guaranteed prices for dairy produce. During its first period of office between 1935 and 1949, this had been based on the theory that the producers should be assured of a price which would cover their costs and assure them and their families of "a reasonable state of comfort". Since 1958, however, the Government has made it plain that the dairy industry must rely on market realizations overseas and has received the agreement of leaders of the industry that any scheme of stabilization for the dairy industry must be self-balancing over a period of years. The Prime Minister has set the seal on this change of attitude by his announcement at the Industrial Development Conference that "A basic standard of living is assured to all, but a 'cost-plus' standard of living is not. Security cannot mean immunity for the firm which is inefficient or which pays little attention to the needs of the consumer."

Concerned by the continued vulnerability of an economy which remains heavily dependent on sales of wool, meat and dairy produce abroad, the Government has been actively encouraging the development of a wide range of manufacturing enterprises. It has been giving particular attention to enterprises which will process either indigenous raw materials or imported materials from their crudest form, as opposed to mere assembly plants. The severe intensification of import restrictions at the end of 1957 to protect the country's depleted exchange reserves appears to have induced several overseas concerns to establish subsidiaries within New Zealand, as well as encouraging domestic enterprises to expand or diversify their operations behind the shelter of controls. There has been some suspicion, especially in farming and importing circles, that some of the enterprises which were considering establishment in New Zealand might be receiving assurances, not from the Government itself, but from the Department of Industries and Commerce, that the balance-of-payments position was likely to justify protection by

import controls for an indefinite period. Knowing the difficulty of removing protection from any industry once it has developed a substantial labour force, farming spokesmen have been vigorously criticizing government policy in this field on the ground that it was fostering "hothouse" industries, which could never hold their own in competition with oversea products, and which would have the effect of inflating domestic costs, thus retarding development in the more efficient industries, such as farming. This the Government vigorously denies, claiming that the new industries would, in general, be fully competitive in price and quality with the imports which they were replacing.

The Industrial Development Conference

ON the grounds that, in the words of the Minister of Industries and Commerce "it is vital for the country that there be broad acceptance of the principles of development", the Government convened the Industrial Development Conference previously mentioned to consider agenda covering all aspects of economic development.

The 230 delegates, and the 40-50 background papers which had been prepared for the Conference, represented the views of leaders of a very wide range of interests, including manufacturers, trade unions, primary industries, marketing boards, chambers of commerce, government departments and educational institutions.

After hearing keynote speeches on the first day from the Prime Minister, the Secretary of Industries and Commerce and the General Secretary of Federated Farmers, the delegates divided for three days into three committees to consider the various aspects of the agenda. With the committees varying in size from about 100 to 400 people, many of them with divergent interests, it was hardly to be expected that they would be able to provide a design for development; nevertheless, the conference revealed a wide measure of agreement in principle on some of the basic determinants of development, and by dispelling ignorance of the problems and viewpoints of others undoubtedly narrowed the area of disagreement on the more contentious matters.

As was perhaps inevitable, the debates on protection were at times acrimonious. The committee debating the role of Government in giving protection to industry eventually expressed the view that industry must be assured of "a determinable share of the New Zealand market" and that "the feasible way of giving effect to this policy is by a properly designed and adequate tariff, supplemented in special circumstances by import licensing but having regard always to the cost involved to the whole New Zealand economy". The statement bears obvious marks of compromise, and leaves room for considerable differences of interpretation, but it is perhaps significant that it should have been included in the report without dissent, in a gathering that included strong supporters of relatively high tariffs and of the permanent retention of selective import licensing as means of protecting local industry.

There appeared to be considerable agreement in principle on a wide range of other matters. Many positive agreed suggestions were made on the

promotion of exports, including an expression of concern at New Zealand's lack of official representation in Western Europe, Africa and South America; on the exploration and more efficient exploitation of New Zealand's natural resources; on industrial research and extension services; and on the desirability of achieving an even higher rate of investment than at present, where necessary with the aid of oversea capital. In particular, there seemed to be full agreement on the over-riding importance of the provision of increasing numbers of highly educated and skilled men and women to face the challenge of development in the years ahead.

One committee of the conference suggested that the need for skilled people was such that the rate of net immigration should be increased, perhaps to 15,000 or 20,000 per annum, over the next few years, with emphasis on the inflow of skilled workers. But the basic need was seen to be the development of human resources in New Zealand by the improvement of the educational system at all levels and by a reversal of the trend towards the narrowing of margins for skill and responsibility.

New Zealand,
August 1960.

CORRIGENDUM

In THE ROUND TABLE, No. 198, March 1960, the national referendum of March 1959 was erroneously dated 1949.

THE ROUND TABLE is a co-operative enterprise conducted by people who dwell in the different parts of the British Commonwealth, and whose aim is to publish once a quarter a comprehensive review of imperial politics, free from the bias of local party issues. To this is added a careful and impartial treatment of outstanding international problems that affect the nations of the Commonwealth. The affairs of THE ROUND TABLE in each portion of the Commonwealth are in the hands of local residents, who are responsible for all articles on the politics of their own country. It is hoped that in this way THE ROUND TABLE serves to reflect the current opinions of all parts about imperial problems, and at the same time to present a survey of them as a whole, in the light of changing world conditions.

THE ROUND TABLE, which appears every March, June, September and December, can be obtained through any bookseller or through:

GREAT BRITAIN, IRELAND, SOUTH AFRICA, AND THE UNITED STATES: THE ROUND TABLE, LTD., 15 Ormond Yard, Duke of York Street, London, S.W. 1.

CANADA: H. W. Macdonnell, 1404 Montreal Trust Building, 67 Yonge Street, Toronto, Ontario.

AUSTRALIA: Angus & Robertson, Ltd., 89-95 Castlereagh Street, Sydney, and 66-68 Elizabeth Street, Melbourne.

NEW ZEALAND: The Secretary, THE ROUND TABLE, G.P.O. Box No. 877, Wellington.

Any would-be reader of THE ROUND TABLE who has difficulty in obtaining it through his usual bookseller is requested to write at once to the nearest of these addresses.

The price of THE ROUND TABLE is 7s. 6d. or \$1.25 per copy, and the annual subscriptions (including postage) 30s., in U.S.A. and Canada \$5. There is an air edition at 10s. or \$2.50 per copy, or 40s. or \$10 per annum. The air edition is sent by air freight to Australia and New Zealand: the annual subscription is 35s. sterling.

Covers for binding volumes may be obtained at the price of 3s. 6d. from THE ROUND TABLE, Ltd., London, who will also supply back numbers of THE ROUND TABLE, if stocks allow. A limited number of copies of the Index and Title-page are annually available, free of charge, to those subscribers who bind THE ROUND TABLE, and may be obtained on application to any of the above agents, or to THE ROUND TABLE, Ltd., 15 Ormond Yard, Duke of York Street, London, S.W. 1.

PERMISSION TO REPRINT

For permission to reprint matter that has appeared in THE ROUND TABLE application should be made to the Editor, 15 Ormond Yard, Duke of York Street, London, S.W. 1, or, in Canada and New Zealand, to the Hon. Secretaries of THE ROUND TABLE Groups whose addresses are given above.

Splendid news for savers!

Now you can hold

£5,000

worth of

NEW 5%

DEFENCE BONDS

(Exclusion of holdings of earlier issues)

DEFENCE BONDS

- Earn 5% interest per annum.
- Are repayable after only 7 years, at the rate of £103 for every £100 invested.
- Earn this 3% bonus U.K. Income tax free.
- Do not have income tax on interest earned deducted at source.
- May be cashed before maturity.
- In 7 years 5% Defence Bonds yield the equivalent of £5.12.6 per cent (gross) per annum if you pay tax at the present standard rate of 7/9.

**NEW 5% DEFENCE BONDS
are on sale in £5 units**

*Full details can be had from your bank manager,
stockbroker, or from your local Savings Committee,
Post Office, or Trustee Savings Bank.*

Issued by the National Savings Committee, London, S.W.7

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, OXFORD
BY VIVIAN RIDLER
PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY

